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## *CALVIN'S PROGRAMME FOR A PURITAN STATE IN GENEVA, 1536-1541*

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In 1559, the little republic of Geneva was menaced by its former viceroy, the Catholic Duke of Savoy, who had been restored to his hereditary domains by the treaty of Cateau Cambrésis and had begun to take steps to recover the rights which he claimed over Geneva. The Duke's ambassador gave fair words, but a Genevan councillor declined his offer in this Puritan response, "For the sovereignty of God and the Word of God we will hazard our lives." The council promptly voted "to recommend themselves to God and to keep good watch."<sup>1</sup> The response of the councillor and the vote of the council reveal the characteristics bred by twenty-three years of Calvin's programme for a Puritan state in Geneva. A sense of a moral obligation to "hazard life for the sovereignty of God and the Word of God," a quiet trust in God, intelligent preparations for a vigorous defence of God-given liberties through practical human means—these are characteristics of the Puritan. Where he was able to organize the state on these principles, he built up a series of Biblical commonwealths, or Puritan states, Geneva under Calvin and Beza, Scotland under Knox and Melville, the England of Cromwell and Milton, and the Puritan colonies of New England.

The Puritan state was not confined to one people, speech, or region. It won its first triumph among the cosmopolitan popula-

<sup>1</sup> A. Roget, *Histoire du peuple de Genève*, VI, 2-3 (Geneva, 6 vols., 1870-1881).

tion of Geneva, and recruited itself there through exiles for conscience' sake from all lands. It dominated for a time the national life of England and Scotland. Successfully transplanted across the Atlantic, the Puritan state exercised an even more comprehensive and permanent control over a great part of the American colonies. Most, if not all, of its essential characteristics found expression in Holland. France extruded her Puritan stock, but it was a Frenchman who made Puritanism possible in other lands; and the exiled Huguenots impregnated still further with Puritanism those states that ultimately triumphed over France. In all these countries a certain kind of people had their innate moral earnestness moulded by a Hebrew hunger and thirst for righteousness and a French love for logical completeness into a new type, the Puritan. This kind of people thus moulded was able to dominate the national life in Geneva, England, Scotland, and New England, and so to found a new type of state. This Puritan state can be best understood, first, by a historical study of its development in each land, and, second, by a comparative study of the common characteristics and the individual peculiarities of the various states. Any comprehensive definition of the Puritan state should follow such a historical and comparative study. A general idea of the new type of state may be suggested through the figure already used. The Puritan state of Geneva or Massachusetts Bay differed from the ordinary Protestant state as the moulded and tempered steel differs from the iron which went into the blasting furnace. The iron is the basis of the steel, but it has received new ingredients and a new temper, and has been moulded into a different shape. Or, again, the Puritan state differs from the Protestant state somewhat as the Jesuit differs from the ordinary Roman Catholic. The Puritan and the Jesuit are examples of a faith carried to its logical limit with marvellous loyalty and enthusiasm; each is the epitome of a church militant acting on the offensive rather than waiting to act on the defensive.

The earliest programme for a Puritan state is to be found in the first edition of the *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, completed by John Calvin in 1535 and printed at Basel in 1536. Within the next five years the essentials of the *Institutes* were restated in four other documents adopted by the Genevan state;

and in 1552 the *Institutes* were declared by the Genevan council "to be well and truly made, and their doctrine to be the holy doctrine of God."<sup>2</sup> In these five documents, from 1536 to 1541, the formative programme of the first Puritan state may be historically traced.

The first edition of Calvin's *Institutes* was a little handbook of 514 pages of small octavo, which could be slipped into the pocket. It was written and printed at a time when Francis I had decided on the policy of forcible repression of the "Lutherans" within the kingdom of France. "The occasion of my publishing the *Institutes*," wrote Calvin, twenty years later, "was this: first, that I might wipe off a foul affront from my brethren, whose death was precious in the sight of the Lord; and, secondly, that, as the same sufferings were impending over many others, at least some interest and sympathy for them might be excited in foreign nations."<sup>3</sup> It was at once an *apologia*, a confession of faith, a handbook of theology, and a programme. It contained the premises, though not all the conclusions, of the later editions. All the later editions are less simple, more controversial in their theology, and less winning than the first, and they omit some of its gentler portions. The first edition is divided into six chapters, on the Commandments, the Apostles' Creed, the Lord's Prayer, the two true and the five false sacraments, with a final chapter "on Christian liberty, ecclesiastical power, and civil government." The striking enlargements in the later editions are in the treatment of such topics as the knowledge of God, the fall of man, predestination, the officers and discipline of the church, and the history of the papacy. The treatment of the church and its function was in-

<sup>2</sup> *Registres du Conseil*, 9 Nov. 1552, fol. 301; quoted by Choisy, *La théocratie à Genève au temps de Calvin*—a luminous discussion of the subject, based on careful study of the documents. The standard edition of Calvin's Works (cited throughout this article as *Opera*) was edited by Baum, Cunitz, and Reuss (Brunswick, 1863–1900), in 59 quarto volumes. The *Institutes* are in vols. I–IV. A valuable synopsis, which enables one to compare the matter in the various editions, is in vol. I, pp. 1–lviii. The comparison is further aided by the use of different type to illustrate the additions made in the successive editions from 1536 to 1559.

<sup>3</sup> *Opera*, XXXI, 23–24, in the Preface to *Psalm*s. Translation in Beveridge, *Calvin's Institutes*, I, p. ix, and in *Comm. on Psalms*, I, p. xi.

creased eightfold in the definitive edition of 1559, while the whole book was increased but fivefold. The fall of man, original sin, the loss of freedom of the will, are increased from two pages in the first to eighty-two in the final edition; while the treatment of civil government is increased by only six pages, and the prefatory address to Francis I is even less changed.

It was but natural, as the book became less of an *apologia* and more a handbook of theology, that the sections dealing with doctrine should be most largely increased. The things that impress a modern reader in comparing the successive editions are, first, Calvin's growing belief in a more representative form of government in church and state; and, second, the unflinching way in which he deduces startling but entirely logical conclusions from his premises.

In the first edition of the *Institutes* Calvin did not attempt to differentiate between bishop and presbyter, but called them both indifferently ministers.<sup>4</sup> The conception of elders as lay officers and the definition of their function occur first in the edition of 1543, two years after the actual introduction of elders into Geneva.<sup>5</sup> Similarly, it was after seven years of practical experience with the governments of Geneva and Strasburg that Calvin modified his original declaration of 1536 in favor of aristocracy as the most desirable form of government. In the edition of 1543 he advocated as the best form "either aristocracy or aristocracy tempered with democracy."<sup>6</sup>

A striking illustration of his unshinking deduction of conclusion from premise is his teaching of double predestination. The first edition of the *Institutes* does not contain any mention of predestination or any explicit teaching of double predestination. The doctrine of election as expounded in the first edition was no new thing, but rather an exposition of the teaching of St. John, St. Paul, and St. Augustine. A modern mind familiar with Calvin's later teaching might deduce double predestination from a phrase in the discussion of Providence; but Calvin certainly did not

<sup>4</sup> *Opera*, I, 186: *Episcopos et presbyteros promiscue voco ecclesiae ministros. Ordo, est ipsa vocatio.*

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* I, 567.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Opera*, I, 232 with I, 1105, and with the French edition, IV, 1134.

give the doctrine explicit expression in his first edition. Bretschneider failed to find predestination there, while Kampschulte and Schaff did find it.<sup>7</sup> No one, however, after reading the first edition would maintain that the idea of double predestination, if held at all, was either a starting-point or a point of essential importance in Calvin's thought in 1536. Whatever the interpretation of a dubious phrase may be, it is quite clear that Calvin started, not with double predestination, but with the twin premises of the absolute sovereignty of God and the authority of the Word of God. But the predestination of the damned as well as the saved was so logical a deduction from his belief in a biblical teaching of damnation and in a God of absolute sovereignty, "without whom nothing comes to pass," that a man of Calvin's logical and unshrinking temper was bound to draw the conclusion. Therefore in the second edition of the *Institutes*, published in 1539, he did not shrink from this startling but logical deduction. "In conformity therefore to the clear doctrine of Scripture we assert that, by an eternal and immutable counsel, God has once for all determined both whom he would admit to salvation and whom he would condemn to destruction."<sup>8</sup> This, it should be remembered, first appeared in 1539, and had not been stated in the first edition of the *Institutes* nor during Calvin's first stay in Geneva. Double predestination later proved a convenient theological earmark by which to recognize Calvinists. It should however be noted that it is a deduction from more essential premises, namely, "the sovereignty of God and the Word of God." That it is a deduction rather than a premise appears when one considers the logic of Calvin's thought. That it is not the historic starting-point is clear from an examination of the documents in their chronological order. Calvin's ultimate contribution lay not so much in the

<sup>7</sup> Bretschneider, *Reformationsalmanach*, 1821, p. 76; Kampschulte, *Calvin*, I, 256, note 1; Schaff, *Creeds of Christendom*, p. 448.

<sup>8</sup> *Opera*, I, 861 (ed. of 1539): *Hominum alii ad salutem, alii ad damnationem praedestinantur . . . aeterna quoque rerum omnium dispensatio ex Dei ordinatione pendeat.* *Ibid.* 865: *Aliis vita aeterna, aliis damnatio aeterna praordinatur. . . . Quod ergo scriptura clare ostendit, dicimus Dominum, aeterno ac immutabili consilio semel constituisse quos olim assumeret in salutem, quos rursum exitio devolveret.* In this second edition there is an entire new chapter of forty-one pages devoted to "Predestination and the Providence of God."

new dogma of a double predestination as in the temper of mind which produced the dogma and developed its adherents. The temper of mind has survived the dogma. Calvin's searching examination of premises and his unflinching drawing of conclusions inevitably tended, in religion and education, to develop a spirit of re-examination and eventually a denial of premises. A like spirit in the domain of law led to enforcement, to repeal, or to revolution.

Given in the first place a great leader of men tending toward a more representative form of government in both church and state, second, an unflinching system of re-examining premises and drawing conclusions, and, finally, a type of followers bred to enforce conclusions, and it is not difficult to foresee that such followers of such a leader and system would inevitably tend to develop liberty and self-government far beyond the leader's personal plans for his own generation. "Modern Democracy," as Professor Borgeaud has pointed out, "is the child of the Reformation, not of the reformers."<sup>9</sup> Modern liberty is the resultant of many forces, and may not be attributed solely to any single era or movement; but at least one line of its ancestry has its roots in the Reformation. Democracy and liberty were not the objects of the Reformers, but they are valuable by-products of the Reformation.

The twin premises with which Calvin starts in his *Institutes* in 1536 are the absolute sovereignty of God and the authority of the Word of God. "God is the only sovereign of souls. Whatever befalls us comes from him." "He is deceived who expects lasting prosperity in that kingdom which is not ruled by the sceptre of God, that is, his Holy Word."<sup>10</sup> "God is not idle." "He holds the helm of the world."<sup>11</sup>

Trust in such a God gives moral poise. "If we sanctify the Lord of Hosts we shall not be much afraid," wrote the young author in 1536. Three years later, after his humiliation and exile from Geneva, he could add, "The necessary consequences

<sup>9</sup> C. Borgeaud, *Rise of Modern Democracy in Old and New England*, p. 2.

<sup>10</sup> *Institutes*, in *Opera*, I, 209, 63, 11-12.

<sup>11</sup> *Opera*, I, 63; II, 168, 147, 150 (Deum mundi gubernacula tenere).

of this knowledge are gratitude in prosperity, patience in adversity, and a wonderful security respecting the future.”<sup>12</sup> Reinforced by the healthy sense of moral obligation so strong in the Puritan, such a trust gives men moral power. “Let us play the man for our people and for the cities of our God, and let the Lord do that which seemeth him good”—this was Calvin’s stirring counsel twenty years later in that very year when the Genevan councillor replied to the ambassador of Savoy, “For the sovereignty of God and the Word of God we will hazard our lives.” In this same passage, published in the month when Geneva was threatened by Savoy, Calvin taught that sane combination of trust in God with active defence which found expression in the council’s vote “to recommend themselves to God and to keep good watch.” “Joab,” wrote Calvin, “though he acknowledges the event of battle to depend on the will and the power of God, yet surrenders not himself to inactivity, but vigorously executes all the duties of his office, and leaves the event to the divine decision.”<sup>13</sup> “If our calling (*vocatio*) is indeed of the Lord, as we firmly believe that it is, the Lord himself will bestow his blessing, although the whole universe may be opposed to us. Let us, therefore, try every remedy, while, if such is not to be found, let us, notwithstanding, persevere to the last gasp” (*ad ultimum usque spiritum*).<sup>14</sup>

It would be easy to multiply examples of the same spirit “wher-  
ever the evangelical movement drank of the spring of the *Institutes*.”<sup>15</sup> On the receipt of the news of the massacre of St. Bartholomew, the council of Geneva ordered that “everyone should hold his arms in readiness and frequent the sermons.”<sup>16</sup> Governor John Winthrop and his companions in the Puritan

<sup>12</sup> Opera, I, 20; II, 895–896.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. II, 162.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. X, ii, 331. Calvin to Farel, March, 1539. Translated in Bonnet, Letters, I, 131.

<sup>15</sup> Kampschulte, J. Calvin, seine Kirche und sein Staat in Genf, I, 447 (Leipzig, 1869). This phrase is applied by Kampschulte to another aspect of Puritanism. Kampschulte was a Catholic (later an “Old Catholic”), and did not live to finish his book. A second volume was published in 1899, after his death; it extended only to 1559.

<sup>16</sup> Borgeaud, Histoire de l’Université de Genève, I, 122.

exodus of 1630, on sighting supposedly hostile Spanish vessels, first put up the defences, armed the men, and tried the weapons; then, "all things being thus fitted, we went to prayer upon the upper deck. . . . Our trust was in the Lord of Hosts; and the courage of our captain and his care and diligence did much encourage us."<sup>17</sup> "Trust in God and keep your powder dry" indicates two Puritan actions, but not the order of the acts. The Puritan first tried the weapons and then "trusted the Lord of Hosts." The guns on the meeting-house at Plymouth, the carefully stacked muskets in the New England house of prayer, the men "with powder-horn and bullet pouch slung across their shoulders while their reverend pastor (who is said to have had the best gun in the parish) prayed and preached with his good gun standing in the pulpit"<sup>18</sup>—these are familiar examples of the same spirit of trusting in God and utilizing the wits and weapons he had foreordained. Some Puritans even prayed with their eyes open, possibly in literal fulfilment of the injunction, "Watch and pray." "God made him a heart wherein was left little room for any fear but was due to Him," was the characterization of Oliver Cromwell, by "one who knew him well."<sup>19</sup> The characterization applies well to the Puritan of all lands, bred on the teachings of fear of God and fearless performance of duty. Profoundly convinced that his work in this world and his place in the next were alike marked out for him by the Almighty, the Puritan fearlessly and unflinchingly worked out his other profound conviction, that his daily task was to fulfil his calling however dangerous or however humble. Calvin and the Puritans were saved from fatalism by their practical temper and their sense of moral obligation. Man's obligation to daily fulfilment of God's law was the corollary to the eternal authority of that law. The "Saint's Rest" was to come in the next world; in this world he was to labor at his "calling" and "do all his work." "He who has fixed the limits of our life has also intrusted us with the care of it."<sup>20</sup> "It will be no small alleviation of his cares, labors,

<sup>17</sup> Winthrop, *History of New England*, I, 7.

<sup>18</sup> Nathaniel Bouton, *History of Concord, N.H.*, p. 154.

<sup>19</sup> Gardiner, *Cromwell*, p. 319.

<sup>20</sup> *Opera*, II, 157.

troubles, and other burdens, when a man knows that in all these things he has God for his guide. The magistrate will execute his office with greater pleasure; the father of a family will confine himself to his duty with more satisfaction; and all, in their respective spheres of life, will bear and surmount the inconveniences, cares, disappointments, and anxieties which befall them, when they shall be persuaded that every individual has his burden laid upon him by God. . . . There will be no employment so mean and sordid—provided we follow our calling (*vocationi*)—as not to appear truly respectable, and be deemed highly important in the sight of God.”<sup>21</sup>

Calvin's discussion of the church and civil government makes a striking contribution to the development of a Puritan state. The state is distinct from the church, but is bound to co-operate with it. Tyranny on the part of the state is prevented by the Word of God and the constitutions of men, and also by the counterbalancing power of the church. Tyranny on the part of the church is to be prevented through the liberty conferred by Christ. In the conception of the church there is also the profound moral emphasis so characteristic of Calvin and his Puritan followers.

To the ordinary Protestant definition of the church as marked by the preaching of the Word and the administration of the sacraments, Calvin added a third test, “example of life”; the Word of God must be not only preached but “followed.”<sup>22</sup> The business of the church is “edification” rather than salvation, for salvation is in the hands of God, “who alone has the power of saving

<sup>21</sup> Opera, II, 532 (Institutes, Book iii, chap. 10, definitive edition of 1559). The last sentence appeared first in 1539; all the previous portion of the quotation in 1559. The reader who may wish to know something of Calvin's somewhat unpuritanical attitude toward “the right use of present life and its supports” will find this chapter illuminating. Three other passages which will well repay reading are Book i, chaps. 16 and 17 (on Providence and its application), especially section 4; Book iv, chap. 10, “Conscience”; Book ii, chap. 8, sections 28–34, giving his liberal theories as to Sunday. All these may be found in either Allen's translation, published in London, 1813, and by the Presbyterian Board of Publication, Philadelphia, 1841; or in Beveridge's translation, published in Edinburgh, 1845–46, by the Calvin Translation Society; or in the quaint Elizabethan English of Thomas Norton in the nine editions published between 1561 and 1634.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. I, 71, 75, 76, 77.

and destroying.”<sup>23</sup> The Puritan’s motive was not his own salvation—he “trusted God for that”—but rather “zeal to illustrate the glory of God.”<sup>24</sup> “Christian living” must be maintained not only by preaching and the sacraments but also by the discipline and excommunication prescribed by the Word of God and practised by the early church. Discipline and excommunication have a threefold object: that evil men in the church may not dishonor God, that they may not corrupt others, and that they may themselves be brought to repentance.<sup>25</sup> The church has its own head and its own liberty. “Christ is the sole head of the church and no necessity should be laid upon consciences where Christ has made them free.”<sup>26</sup> The church has its own officers and jurisdiction. “Pastors by the word of the Lord may constrain all the glory and rank of the world to obey his majesty, and by that Word may govern all from the highest to the lowest”—a doctrine effectively used against political tyranny or maladministration.<sup>27</sup>

Church and state are distinct in respect to officers and jurisdiction, in the same sense in which soul and body are distinct; but they must co-operate, for they acknowledge the same sovereignty and have a common object. Civil government has for its objects not only “tranquillity and humanity,” but also “the maintaining of God’s glory unimpaired and the preservation of the honor of divine truth.”<sup>28</sup> “Civil government should provide that the true religion which is contained in the law of God be not violated and polluted by public blasphemy.”<sup>29</sup> The private citizen must be obedient to the civil government, even if laws and rulers are unjust.<sup>30</sup> Here Calvin made his contribution to good order at a time when the Protestant state was in danger of seeing liberty degenerate into license. On the other hand, “princes” are bidden to “hear and fear”; and the doctrine of obedience is safeguarded

<sup>23</sup> Institutes, in *Opera*, I, 71, 75, 204, 205, 209. Compare these references on edification and salvation with the preface to the Latin catechism of 1538 (*Opera*, V, 322). The phrase *religionis nostrae puritate* (*Opera*, V, 318) is one of the many examples of the word whence Puritan is derived.

<sup>24</sup> Calvin to Sadolet, 1539, in *Opera*, V, 391; translated in Beveridge, *Calvin’s Tracts*, I, 33.

<sup>25</sup> *Opera*, I, 76–77.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.* p. 204.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 208–209.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.* I, 11–14.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.* p. 230.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 245, 248.

by a significant reservation and a constitutional provision. "Obedience to the authority of governors may not lead us away from obeying him to whose will the desires of all kings ought to be subject," for "we ought to obey God rather than men." "If there be in the present day any magistrates appointed for the protection of the people and the moderation of the power of kings, such as the ancient ephors . . . or tribunes . . . or perhaps the three estates now in every kingdom, if they connive at kings in their oppression of the humbler of the people (*humili plebeculae*), they betray the liberty of the people of which they know they have been appointed protectors by the ordinance of God."<sup>31</sup> Many men had repeated Peter's words "we ought to obey God rather than men." Calvin rendered a service to modern liberty, first, by pointing out the modern way in which political tyranny could be constitutionally checked; and, second, by training up a type of men with the moral poise and the moral power necessary for a constitutional revolution and self-government. Men of this Puritan type, bred on Calvin's doctrine and discipline, checked political tyranny in Holland, Scotland, England, and America, and justify the dictum of Gardiner, that, "as a religious belief for individual men, Calvinism was eminently favorable to the progress of liberty."<sup>32</sup>

With this programme marked out in his "little book," Calvin came to Geneva in 1536, at a moment critical not only in the history of the city but of Protestantism. Geneva had just won her independence from bishop and duke, and accepted the authority of the Word of God. Nominally Protestant, it was far from being a Puritan state. Geneva on Calvin's arrival was a little republic of not over 13,000 inhabitants, of whom 1,000 to 1,500 were citizens capable of voting in the primary assembly.<sup>33</sup> In addition to the walled city, there were included under the jurisdiction of the city about twenty-eight villages on both sides of

<sup>31</sup> *Opera*, I, 248.

<sup>32</sup> Samuel Rawson Gardiner, *History of England, 1603 to 1642*, I, 24.

<sup>33</sup> E. Mallet, *Recherches historiques et statistiques sur la population de Genève, 1549-1833* (Paris, 1837). Mallet concludes that the population never exceeded 13,000 in the 16th century. Mallet gives the above estimate of voting citizens in his *La Suisse historique et pittoresque*, II, 552 (Geneva, 1855-1866).

the Rhone and Lake Geneva. Geneva was practically an independent republic. It was not a member of the Swiss confederation, though it was an ally of Bern. France had also espoused the cause of Geneva in order to check Savoy. The little republic had no intention of allowing either ally to control her. When the chiefs of the Bernese army in 1536 asked for what was practically a suzerainty, the magistrates and councillors replied, "We have endured war against both the Duke of Savoy and the bishops for seventeen to twenty years . . . not because we had the intention of making the city subject to any power, but because we wished the poor city which had so much warred and suffered to have its liberty."<sup>34</sup> All political and religious control was in the hands of four councils: the *Conseil Général*, or primary assembly; the Council of Two Hundred; the comparatively unimportant Council of Sixty; and the Council of Twenty-five. This smallest council, commonly called the Little Council (*Petit Conseil*), was by far the most important body in the state. It included the four syndics, or chief magistrates, the treasurer, and the four syndics of the previous year, all elected by the primary assembly; and also sixteen other councillors elected by the Council of Two Hundred. It possessed large and somewhat undefined executive and judicial, as well as legislative, powers. It was with this Little Council that the Reformers ordinarily had dealings. These councils had introduced the reformation, and they continued to control ecclesiastical property, to hire and dismiss "preachers," to declare parishioners freed from excommunication, and to pass any legislation regarding religious matters which they saw fit. The civil authorities in 1536 did not recognize, and could not have recognized, the church as an organized body; for no such body had any legal or definitely established standing. It is doubtful if the thought of the church as a distinct institution in Protestant Geneva had occurred to the matter-of-fact magistrates and councillors who had just got rid of the claims of a troublesome ecclesiastical prince. The only cases of the use of the word "church" noted in the records of the councils for 1536 refer to the church building, with two exceptions: one the use of "church" by a good Roman Catholic, Balard, who before Calvin's

<sup>34</sup> *Registres du Conseil*, XXIX, fol. 11<sup>ro</sup> and 12<sup>ro</sup>.

arrival had been threatened with banishment for his views; and the other its use in a statement that Farel proposed "articles concerning the government of the church."<sup>35</sup> Calvin's description is historically correct: "When I first came, there was practically nothing in this church. There was preaching, and that was all. The idols were sought out and burned, but there was no reformation."<sup>36</sup> There was no definition or control of membership; no officers subject to church control; no property in the hands of the church; and no creed adopted by the church. There was simply the general body of citizens maintaining preaching and the sacraments under the control of the councils without any church organization. The records of the council regularly describe Calvin and Farel simply as "preachers" (*predicans, prescheurs*) until the negotiations for Calvin's recall in 1540, when he is addressed as "minister."<sup>37</sup> Calvin recognized the distinction, and complained in a letter to Bullinger, "the common people regard us as preachers rather than pastors."<sup>38</sup>

The religious situation in Geneva before Calvin's reorganization was much like that in other Protestant cities; for the introduction of Lutheran or Zwinglian reforms had not included the establishment of an organic church. A Lutheran or Zwinglian church was in practice largely controlled by the civil power, and was practically regarded as a phase of the state, not as a corporate entity. Luther had rightly found his forte in preaching and writing rather than in organizing. "Luther," a modern German scholar picturesquely writes, "when he had preached and sowed the seed of the Word, left to the Holy Spirit the care of producing the fruit, while with his friend Philip he peacefully drank his glass of Wittenberg beer." As the same German jurist and historian has pointed out, "the independence of the church is a Reformed and not a Lutheran principle."<sup>39</sup> Meanwhile Catholi-

<sup>35</sup> Opera, XXI, 206, Nov. 10, 1536.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid. IX, 891.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid. XI, 94; XXI, 272.

<sup>38</sup> 21 Feb. 1538. Opera, X, ii, 154; in Bonnet, Letters, I, 66: *Vulgus hominum concionatores nos magis agnoscit quam pastores.*

<sup>39</sup> Professor K. Rieker, in the *Historische Vierteljahrsschrift* (Leipzig), translated by E. Choisy in *Revue de théologie et de philosophie* (Lausanne,

cism still maintained the mediaeval theory of the supremacy of the church over the state. The way was therefore open in 1536 for a new conception of church and state as two distinct and balanced organisms, each co-operating with the other.

The general situation in Europe in religion and morals needed a greater legislator and organizer than existed among the Lutherans or Zwinglians. The years in which Calvin was endeavoring to reform the church and state constituted a critical period for both Protestant and Catholic. In 1535, when Calvin was writing his *Institutes*, there occurred the collapse of both the fanatical Anabaptists at Münster and the over-ambitious commercial democracy of the Baltic led by Wullenweber. The vicissitudes of Henry VIII's matrimonial and ecclesiastical changes were not adding to the reputation of the Reformation for piety or singleness of motive among its political leaders. The same year in which Calvin published his *Institutes* witnessed in England the dissolution of the smaller monasteries and the transfer of their property to the crown, the death of Henry's first wife, the execution of his second, and his marriage to his third on the following day. Henry VIII., in Calvin's opinion, was "scarcely half-wise."<sup>40</sup> The wives of Philip of Hesse were even more synchronous than Henry's, and his bigamy in 1540, connived at by Luther and Melanchthon, proved a severe blow to the political and religious leadership of the German Reformation. France had adopted the policy of persecution of Protestants since their placards of 1534 attacking the Mass. In 1536, the death of the humanistic reformer Lefèvre and the publication of Calvin's *Institutes* mark the transition from the earlier humanistic to the later Calvinistic reform. Erasmus, humanist and satirist rather than reformer, died in the same year at Basel, where only four months earlier Calvin had seen his *Institutes* issue from the press. To none of these earlier leaders was the definitive leadership of the reform to fall. A greater organizing power and moral force, a man of Calvin's

1900), separate reprint, p. 19. See also Rieker, *Grundsätze Reformierter Kirchenverfassung* (Leipzig, 1899), pp. 64-71; see especially p. 70: "sind die Lutherischen Landeskirchen Anstalten des öffentlichen Rechts, nicht Genossenschaften."

<sup>40</sup> Opera, X, ii, 328: *Rex ipse vix dimidia ex parte sapit.* Translated in Bonnet, Letters, I, 125; Calvin to Farel, Strasburg, March 16, 1539.

"architectonic genius in knowledge and practical life," in the words of Dorner, was needed to take the next step. Such a man was necessary to save Protestantism from becoming the tool of social anarchy and political absolutism, or from remaining a nerveless and unmoral phase of intellectual life.

These were also critical years for the papacy, which was debating an inclusive reform capable of taking in the Lutherans, but which finally turned from Luther and Contarini and Pole to Loyola. In the same year that Calvin arrived at Geneva, Paul III nominated to the cardinalate men of the reform party like Contarini, Pole, and Sadolet, and appointed a commission to report on needed reforms. Their scathing indictment was presented to the Pope the same year in which Farel and Calvin submitted to the Genevan council their "Articles" on the organization of the church. The failure of the attempt at compromise between Catholic and Lutheran at the Ratisbon conference in 1541 was one more proof that the conflict was inevitable. The date is eloquent. It was in that same year 1541 that Calvin, recalled from exile, secured the adoption of his Ecclesiastical Ordinances, the programme for a Puritan state, and that Loyola was elected General of the newly established Society of Jesus. Calvin and Loyola, both at the same college in Paris within the same twelvemonth, each under trial from 1536 to 1538, and both armed with a new organization and new powers in 1541—these were the men to lead the two new forms of organized and militant Christianity, the Reformed Churches and the Society of Jesus, the two new types of men, the Puritan and the Jesuit.

Geneva on Calvin's arrival presented a picture interesting for its apparently contradictory phases and its exuberant vitality. It did not present an inviting field for a Puritan programme. Calvin consented to stay in Geneva only because of Farel's dramatic appeal to the conscience which bade him remain and struggle rather than return to Basel to the peaceful life of a scholar which he craved. Between the Calvin of the *Institutes* and the Geneva of 1536, between his legal mind and Puritan conscience and their thoughtlessness and love of pleasure, there was a profound difference. No one recognized more clearly than Calvin this essential difference of innate characteristics (*ingenium*).

"They will not be tolerable to me, nor I to them," he wrote four years later when the Genevans were seeking to recall him.<sup>41</sup> Conscience, not compatibility, compelled Calvin to remain in Geneva in 1536 and to return to the task in 1541. The Genevans were a cosmopolitan people, of French, Italian, and German descent, and of complex characteristics. Their complex characteristics presented to the reformer grave difficulties. Their cosmopolitan character offered an opportunity for an international and adaptable type of reform radiating from a cosmopolitan centre. At their worst the Genevans of 1536 were loose-tongued, riotous, "thoughtless and devoted to their pleasures," as their own Bonivard confessed. At their best they were keen-witted, shrewd in business, sagacious in city politics, deft in international diplomacy, and mettlesome in defence of their liberties. Their thoughtlessness and love of pleasure made Calvin's task a difficult one. Their keen business sense and administrative power, their political sagacity and their mettlesomeness, made it possible to transform their obstinacy from the plane of politics to that of religion, and to make the next generation as keen in defence of the Ten Commandments and the *Institutes* as their fathers had been in defence of their *franchises* and their political liberty. It was a city where merchants and artisans had been trained to use the sword. In 1461 it had been ordered "that every one should have a sword behind the door in the front of his house, or in the workshop of his house."<sup>42</sup> Genevans had the inborn temper to which Calvin's unflinching teaching could appeal; and they possessed the skill and hardihood to carry out a programme to which they should once devote themselves. They were more skilful politicians than the young author of twenty-seven; and "that Frenchman" (*ille Gallus*) had many hard lessons to learn from grave magistrate and witty populace before he was able to beat them at their own game. On the other hand, Calvin, with his broad and scholarly training in classics theology and law, his profound scholarship, his unwavering devotion to a single purpose, his definite programme and his organizing genius, was the one man

<sup>41</sup> *Opera*, XI, 91.

<sup>42</sup> *Registres du Conseil de Genève*, II (1461-1477), 75, Dec. 10, 1461. Société d'Histoire de Genève, 1906.

fitted to mould the mettlesome but plastic republic into a Puritan State.<sup>43</sup>

In January, 1537, "Farel and the other preachers," including Calvin, took the first decisive step in the formulation of the new programme. They presented to the Genevan council articles concerning the organization of the church.<sup>44</sup> These Articles, evidently drawn from the *Institutes*, are Calvin's attempt to apply his fundamental ideas to a specific situation. Starting and ending with the "Word of God," the Articles propose six things as essential: a communion service frequently and reverently celebrated, if possible once a month; "the discipline of excommunication"; a common confession of faith; singing of psalms in public worship; the religious training of children; and marriage laws in conformity to the Word of God.

The first article includes both the communion and "the discipline of excommunication," for to Calvin's mind discipline, "the nerve of the church," was essential to a reverent observance of communion. In this article two points in the Puritan programme are emphasized; the moral obligation resting on the individual, and the moral responsibility for its members resting upon the church as an organization. Calvin's emphasis on the communion was ethical rather than dogmatic. His attitude was practical rather than mystical, and he concerned himself rather with the character of the communicant than with the character of the bread and wine. The essential question was not whether Christ was present in the bread and wine, but whether he was present in the life of the communicant. "The principal point is . . . that those who show by their wicked and iniquitous life that

<sup>43</sup> For a study of "Geneva before Calvin" see an article by the writer in the American Historical Review for January, 1903, especially p. 239, and note 2.

<sup>44</sup> The Articles are in Opera, X, 5-14; and in the extremely valuable and scholarly work of A. L. Herminjard, *Correspondance des réformateurs dans les pays de langue française*, IV, 154-166 (9 vols., 1512-1544, Geneva, 1866-1897). See in Herminjard, notes 1, 6, 7, 11, on similarities between *Institutes* and Articles. Calvin had been engaged on a French version of his "little book" after his arrival in Geneva. See his letter in Opera, X, 63, translated in Bonnet, *Calvin's Letters*, I, 45. The document is simply indorsed, "Articles bâilles par les prescheurs." Modern authors like Kampschulte, Herminjard, Roget, Walker, and the editors of the Opera confirm the contemporary statement of Beza and Colladon that Calvin was the author of the Articles.

they in no wise belong to Jesus should not come to communicate with him." "All those who wish to have Jesus for their life should participate in the communion," was the statement in the confession of faith adopted a few months later, in accordance with the proposals in the Articles.<sup>45</sup> In order to secure this ethical aim of "Christian living" and to check "iniquitous life unworthy of a Christian," the Articles recommended the following method for enforcing the "discipline of excommunication enjoined by the Lord upon his church in the 18th of St. Matthew." It was a method almost unknown among Protestant churches, and it was put into practice in Geneva only after eighteen years of bitter struggle.<sup>46</sup> It was little less than revolutionary in its implication of the church as a distinct organism with powers of its own. Calvin recommended that the council should appoint "in every quarter of the city certain persons of good life and reputation and a constancy not easy to corrupt." These persons should "have an eye on the life of every one," and report "any notable vice" to a minister for private admonition. If this is unheeded, the offender should be threatened with report to the church. "If he recognizes his fault, then there is great profit from this discipline." If he still refuses to listen, he is to be denounced by the minister in the assembly; and if he still "persists in hardness of heart," he is to be excommunicated. No provision is made as to how or by whom excommunication was to be pronounced; but that the power was vested in the church and not in the state is clear from a succeeding paragraph: "Beyond this correction the church cannot go," but it shall be the duty of the council to prevent "mockery of God and of his gospel" on the part of any "who do nothing but laugh at being excommunicated." The persons to be corrected thus are "those named by St. Paul," "a fornicator, or covetous, or an idolater, or a railer (*maldisans*), or a drunkard, or an extortioner," as the Genevan New Testament

<sup>45</sup> Articles, Opera, X, 8; Confession, Opera, XXII, 92.

<sup>46</sup> For the ideas of Bucer, Oecolampadius, and Melanchthon on discipline see Cornelius, Historische Arbeiten, pp. 373-4 and 378, and his references to Richter, Evangelische Kirchenordnungen, I, 158, and to Melanchthon, Corpus Reformatorum, IV, 547 (ed. Bretschneider, 1837). Cf. Kampschulte, Calvin, I, 391, and note 2.

and the King James version alike translated the passage quoted by Calvin (1 Cor. 5:11).

Calvin's practical and organizing temper thus led him to urge a system of discipline as a means of training or rejecting members already in the church. Discipline of morals was no new thing in Geneva or other cities.<sup>47</sup> Calvin's new step was in making systematic provision for the enforcement of scriptural morals by a scriptural church re-enforced by the co-operation of the state. He wished to restore to the Protestant church the practice which proved "of singular utility and advancement to Christianity" in the primitive church (*anciennement*), until "wicked bishops, or rather brigands, turned it into tyranny."<sup>48</sup>

In order that the church might be properly instituted, two other steps were necessary. First, "the right beginning of a church" required "that all the inhabitants should make confession of their faith and give reasons for it," in order to show that they were "united in one church." Second, in order that future generations might preserve "purity of doctrine . . . and be able to give reasons for their faith," the children should be instructed at home by their parents in a simple catechism, and then be examined and, if necessary, further taught by the minister until pronounced "sufficiently instructed." Calvin did not in the Articles formally state the doctrine of an independent church which he had already stated in his *Institutes*. That would have been impolitic, had he wished to do so. What he did do was to take certain practicable steps toward a more independent church. The three steps were: determination of present membership by a creed; admission of future members by a catechism; and discipline of morals as a means for both training and pruning membership. Such steps would in time produce an independent church with organic life of its own.

<sup>47</sup> See "Geneva before Calvin," Amer. Hist. Rev., Jan., 1903, pp. 229-231, and notes. Vincent, "European Blue Laws," in Annual Report Amer. Hist. Assoc., 1897, pp. 356-372; and Lindsay, Reformation, II, 107-113. Principal Lindsay's characterization of the Genevan excommunication as "not in a way conformable to his [Calvin's] ideas" is applicable to the period before 1555, but hardly to the later period, when the consistory had secured the right of excommunication. See Choisy, Théocratie à Genève, pp. 165-166.

<sup>48</sup> Opera, X, 9.

The final article requested that a joint commission of magistrates and ministers be appointed to settle existing marriage causes and to draw up ordinances according to the Word of God for the decision of future cases. The Genevan councils in their reply to the preachers' memorial displayed a characteristic willingness to admit the theoretical authority of the Word of God and an equally characteristic unwillingness to lessen their own authority or to enforce any thorough-going programme. The councils were not accustomed to regard the Word as a means for lessening their power. They therefore reserved to themselves the decision of marriage causes, and declined to associate the preachers with themselves in joint commission. They also declined to increase the frequency of communion. In lieu of the new system vesting discipline in the church, they reaffirmed an old vote charging two councillors with the general supervision of morals in the city. This was merely a vote to continue the ordinary municipal police supervision common to Geneva and other cities of that day. In view of the councils' previous policy, their votes at this time, and their later refusal to allow the preachers to exclude any one from the communion, it is quite clear that a vague vote, "the rest of the articles is passed," meant actually that the councils did not propose to alter their historic and continuous policy of control of religion and morals, or to recognize any new order of things; but simply that there was to be a confession and catechism. If one comes to the councils' vote from a study of their records in the *Registres du Conseil*, it is evident that the magistrates had no intention of sharing jurisdiction with the ministers or of conferring powers on a "church." As we have already seen, the councils did not use the word "church" in their votes at this period, though Calvin used it in his Articles. On the other hand, if one approaches the situation from Calvin's point of view as revealed in the *Institutes*, the Articles, and his letters, it is equally clear that he had in mind the bestowal of certain rights upon the church as an organization. Calvin and the council were approaching the question at issue from such totally different conceptions of a church that they did not understand each other. So modern writers, failing to note the two points of view of Calvin and the council, and failing to scrutinize carefully the somewhat jumbled

votes of the councils, have been apt to attach too much importance to their somewhat vague vote. Calvin knew what he wanted, and was working on long lines; but he did not get the essential thing that he asked for in 1537.<sup>49</sup> A year later he wrote to Bullinger, "It appears to me that we shall have no lasting church unless that ancient apostolic discipline be completely restored, which in many respects is much needed among us."<sup>50</sup> He had to demand the same things in 1538 and again in 1541, and won them all only in 1555.

Quite different from the opportunist policy of the council was the thorough-going Puritan temper of the preachers' closing appeal: "If you see that these warnings and exhortations are truly from the Word of God, consider of what importance and consequence they are for maintaining the honor of God in its proper state and the church in its entirety (*en son entier*) . . . and do not spare yourselves in diligently putting them into execution. . . And do not be moved by any difficulty which any one may find

<sup>49</sup> Even Professor Walker, the author of the latest and the most judicious life of Calvin, does not seem to the writer to take this difference in point of view between Calvin and the council quite sufficiently into account or to scrutinize sufficiently the blanket vote of the council, "the rest of the articles is passed." He says (p. 192), the councils "promptly adopted the Articles with slight reservations" (mentioning the marriage questions and the monthly communion), and then adds, "but the plan which Farel and Calvin had presented became the law of Geneva in its essential features." This seems to neglect the following facts: (1) one of the "essential features," if not the essential feature, "discipline of excommunication," was a part of the article on the communion, and so probably went by the board with the refusal to adopt monthly communion; (2) the vote of the Little Council was modified by the vote of the Council of Two Hundred, which made it clear that it was the magistrates who were still to continue to look after morals and see that the city "lived according to God"; (3) the council had already exercised the right of excommunication, and refused it to the ministers the first time it was suggested; (4) the right of excommunication remained a bone of contention until 1555; (5) the only things actually done were the adoption of creed and catechism; (6) Calvin himself felt the thing essential to a "lasting church" had not been done, and was obliged again in 1538 to insist upon the adoption of the same thing as a condition of his return. The votes of the councils are in *Opera*, XXI, 206-207. For earlier and later votes see *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, Jan., 1903, p. 227, note 6, and *Herminjard*, IV, 26, and *Opera*, XXI, 220. For modern comments see *Kampschulte*, *Calvin*, I, 289, 290; *Roget*, I, 23; *Cornelius*, *Historische Arbeiten*, p. 187, who suggests with reason that their votes may not have been quite clear to the councils themselves.

<sup>50</sup> *Opera*, X, ii, 154; *Bonnet, Letters*, I, 66.

in these matters. For when we offer ourselves in fulfilment of that which has been ordained (*ordonne*) for us by God we should hope that of his goodness he will cause our enterprise to prosper and will conduct it to a good end."

A catechism and confession of faith were promptly printed by the state.<sup>51</sup> The catechism briefly restated in French the fundamental teachings of the *Institutes*. Like the *Institutes* it closes with the principle, "we ought to obey God rather than men." The confession of faith was an extract from the catechism. It is a document of great simplicity and power, admirably adapted for the creed of a newly reformed community. Like the *Institutes* and the Articles it begins and ends with the twin premises of the sovereignty of God and the Word of God, and the corollary of man's obligation to obey the law of God. "Since his will is the sole rule of all justice, we confess that our whole life ought to be regulated by the commandments of his holy law."<sup>52</sup> The Ten Commandments, which directly follow this declaration, became the moral constitution to which every inhabitant of Geneva had to take public and solemn oath. Sworn allegiance to the moral law as summed up in the Ten Commandments became an official test of good citizenship and social standing as well as of church membership. On the other hand, the moral obligation of "all Christians to obey statutes and ordinances which do not contravene the commandments of God" had its logical converse of Christian liberty. "All laws made to bind men's consciences to things not commanded by God and tending to break Christian liberty are perverse doctrines of Satan."<sup>53</sup> This clause, in what was probably the first Protestant creed to be adopted by a representative body and sworn to and permanently observed by the inhabitants of a republic, contains the same significant political principle already noted in the *Institutes*. This germ of liberty,

<sup>51</sup> In *Opera*, XXII, 33-96; and in Rilliet et Dufour, *Catéchisme français de Calvin* (Geneva, 1878). For facts regarding the actions of council see Herminjard, IV, 185, notes 8-10; Rilliet et Dufour, xxxii, lx-lxi; *Registres du Conseil* for April 27, 1537, quoted in *Opera*, XXI, 210-211. Calvin afterwards revised the catechism in the form of question and answer. In this form it became the basis of religious instruction of the Reformed Churches. Fourteen editions were printed in English alone before the Puritan exodus to New England in 1630.

<sup>52</sup> *Opera*, XXII, 86.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.* XXII, 95, 92.

coupled with that other provision of the *Institutes* for constitutional revolution, was to be used effectively later by Huguenots, Dutch, Scotch, English, and New Englanders in resistance to tyranny. In his provision for means to check religious and political tyranny through the Word of God and the constitutions of men, Calvin made a contribution reaching far beyond his own personal intentions. His services here cannot be gainsaid on account of his failure to provide for freedom of individual consciences, or to avoid all tyranny on the part of the church, or to make thorough-going distinction between church and state. His tendency is clear; and the later Puritan movement will be found to have blazed a rough trail in the direction of larger liberty, even though with halting and sometimes wandering steps. It was not possible to have complete liberty in Geneva in 1536, before Calvin or after Calvin. It was not essential that there should be a clear-cut academic distinction between church and state. It was of profound importance that there should be laid down and worked out in the middle of the sixteenth century such a rational, legal, and practicable means of checking the tyranny of either the church or the state as should contribute to the ultimate liberty of both. Men will always differ about so profound a personality as John Calvin, but one is astonished that a scholar of Lord Acton's reputation should so misrepresent both Calvin's words and his deeds as to say of him, "There was nothing in the institutes of men, no authority, no right, no liberty, that he cared to preserve, or towards which he entertained any feeling of reverence or obligation."<sup>54</sup>

The Confession reaffirms the profoundly ethical emphasis already noted in the *Institutes* and Articles. It was more than a creed: it was a religious and social compact. Professedly following the examples of the covenants of the Old Testament, it was the forerunner of the Scottish National Covenant of 1638, the Solemn League and Covenant signed by the English Parliament in 1643, and the covenants entered into by the early New England town churches. As a practical working standard for the special needs of Geneva, the Confession went further than Calvin's earlier documents, and doubled the kinds of "rotten members" who might be disciplined with excommunication. To the "forni-

<sup>54</sup> Acton, History of Liberty, I, 178.

cator, idolater, railer, drunkard," are now added "manifest murderers, thieves, false witnesses, seditious persons, brawlers (*noiseulx, jurgatores*), slanderers (*detracteurs*), fighters (*bateurs*), and spendthrifts (*dissipateurs de biens*)."<sup>55</sup> The list in the Articles had been based on the injunction of St. Paul. The list of offences in the confession of faith is based also on the Ten Commandments, and made their acceptance by the inhabitants of Geneva mean something. The list is however even more comprehensive than the Ten Commandments, for it adds the offences of sedition, quarrelling, slander, fighting, wastefulness, and drunkenness. The additions are significant, for they mark the special offences which were felt by Calvin and Farel to need discipline in Geneva. That there was no mention of Sabbath-breaking will not surprise one who is familiar with Calvin's markedly liberal and practical interpretation of this commandment. The later and sometimes superstitious observance of the Sabbath was the work of smaller and more literal minds than Calvin's. He recognized the "abrogation of what was ceremonial in this command," and wished to retain its fundamental and permanent purposes of a day for common worship and "relaxation from labor for servants and workmen and animals." His sound method was to interpret the commandment in the light of the Christian liberty of the gospel; to preserve the kernel and throw away the shell. The social and economic purposes of the day appear in the second edition of the catechism. "This [commandment] conduces to public order (*police*). For every one gets in the habit of working the rest of the time when there is one day of repose." Calvin and the Puritan did not forget the positive portion, the six-sevenths of the commandment, "six days shalt thou labor and do all thy work." Possibly the inclusion of "spendthrifts" among the offenders subject to excommunication was regarded by Calvin as a logical inference from the commandment to work.<sup>55</sup>

<sup>55</sup> The discussion of the commandment in the first edition of the Institutes is in *Opera*, I, 36-38. The provision for rest for animals here included is, with the provision in the Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641 (see articles 92-93, "Off the Bruite Creature"), an interesting example of the Hebrew element in Calvin and the Puritans. The discussion in the Catechism of 1537 is in *Opera*, XXII, 41-42; that in the Catechism of 1542 is in *Opera*, VI, 65. The passage in the final edition of the Institutes is not essentially different from that in the first,

In view of this comprehensive list of offences which might subject "the deserter from the army" to such a military conception of discipline, it is not surprising that many of the inhabitants of Geneva were not enthusiastic "to enroll themselves under the banner of Christ."<sup>56</sup> The attempt by the council to enforce upon all inhabitants a public oath to the confession precipitated a crisis. After repeated attempts, the council felt obliged to threaten with the customary Genevan penalty of banishment those who refused the oath. Even then some delayed from July to November before complying. For refusal to swear, coupled with other offences, only two women and one man-servant were actually banished. Yet even then, in response to the summons of the council as late as November 12, not one person came from one of the important streets of the city.<sup>57</sup> The ground of objection to the confession is significant. It was not the doctrine but the discipline that was objected to. The confession was remarkably simple in doctrine. It contained no mention of the Trinity, original sin, predestination, or of eternal punishment; no mention of heaven or hell, save as they occur in the Lord's Prayer and the Apostles' Creed. It was a confession which emphasized the moral obligation of man, his conduct rather than his creed. It was, says the contemporary chronicler, Roset, "the point of excommunication that was a bit troublesome (*un peu facheux*) to the opponents."

and may be found in the English translation in Book ii, chap. 8, sections 28-34. The editor of the sixth American edition of Allen's translation naïvely wrote in his "Advertisement," "It is much to be lamented that so great a mind should have been led astray on so important a point."

<sup>56</sup> These and other military phrases are in Calvin's preface to the Latin edition of the Catechism, 1538, Opera, V, 319, 321; also in French translation in Rilliet et Dufour, Catéchisme, pp. 133, 137. This preface, written during the bitter fight of 1537-38, breathes a strikingly militant spirit and a spirit of liberty. Cf. Opera, V, 322; Rilliet, p. 142.

<sup>57</sup> The various votes of the council are in Registres du Conseil, XXX, fols. 208, 212, 219, 222; XXXI, fols. 32, 61, 81, 90, March 18-Nov. 15, 1537. The votes are reprinted in Opera, XXI, 208-217. For the banishments see also Roget, Hist. du peuple de Genève, I, 42-45. The street from which no one came was the Rue des Allamans. This street had in the Council of Two Hundred twelve representatives in 1535, and at least three in 1538. MS. Rolle du Conseil des CC (Dartmouth College Library); Registres du Conseil, 12 Feb. 1538, XXXI, fol. 191<sup>ro</sup>.

The popular objection went straight to the heart of the matter, and balked at just what the Puritan programme insisted upon—the real enforcement of the moral law by an organization whose business was morals and not politics. “The ten commandments of God are hard to observe,” and “they who swear to observe them are regarded as perjurers”—these were the objections which were heard at table and in the council chamber.<sup>58</sup> The feeling of the populace is shown by the wits who went about the streets and taverns, mocking the preachers, and saluting their supporters with the query, “Art thou one of the brothers in Christ? by God, you will be sorry for it.”<sup>59</sup> Even the council favorable to the preachers and ready to enforce the oath to the confession refused in January 1538 to permit the preachers to exclude any one from the approaching communion.<sup>60</sup>

The annual elections resulted in a complete defeat for the magistrates of 1537, who had been favorable to the preachers. In February 1538 these men were replaced by the most bitter opponents of the preachers and their Puritan programme. The newly elected magistrates speedily secured control of the councils by deposing the remaining partisans of the preachers on accusations of treasonable dealings with France. The Council of Two Hundred then, on March 11—the same day on which it deposed the councillors favorable to the preachers—extended their declaration of war to the ministers themselves by two significant votes. The council voted “that the preachers be notified that they are not to mix up in politics but to preach the gospel of God; and further to live in the Word of God according to the ordinances of Bern.”<sup>61</sup> These votes were two blows directed at two points in the preachers’ programme; namely, liberty of preaching and

<sup>58</sup> Roset, *Chroniques de Genève*, Liv. iv, ch. 9 (ed. Fazy, Geneva, 1894). The objections are recorded in *Registres du Conseil* for 26 Nov. 1537 (printed in *Opera*, XXI, 217, and in Roget, *Histoire*, I, 43).

<sup>59</sup> *Registres du Conseil* for 26 Nov. 1537 and 16 Jan. 1538, in *Opera*, XXI, 217, 222; Roset, *Chroniques*, Liv. iv, ch. 10; and Roget, I, 68; *Opera*, XXI, 217.

<sup>60</sup> *Opera*, XXI, 220.

<sup>61</sup> The votes of the council are printed in Herminjard, *Correspondance*, IV, 403, note 2, and in Cornelius, *Historische Arbeiten*, 159, note 1. On the deposition of the preachers’ partisans from the Council of Twenty-five see Roget, *Histoire*,

liberty of worship; or, as they expressed it in the confession, freedom from "all laws made to bind men's consciences to things not commanded by God and tending to break Christian liberty."<sup>62</sup> "The ordinances of Bern" were certain regulations prescribing to the churches under its jurisdiction the observance of four ecclesiastical holidays and certain methods of administering communion and baptism. The Genevan ministers had a right to feel that they should have been consulted by the magistrates regarding the adoption of such ordinances, and it was the intention of Bern that they should be.<sup>63</sup> But they were refused even their request that no innovations should be introduced until the question could be discussed by a church synod. The ministers were clearly standing for the rights of the church against a manifestly ill-considered demand for immediate and "servile conformity" to the ordinances of another city. Calvin cared little about ceremonies, but he cared much about "edification" and the rights of the church. "In things where the Lord has granted us liberty for the great end of edification it would be unworthy to introduce a servile conformity which does not edify," he wrote during the conflict.<sup>64</sup> His objections to civil interference with the ministers' liberty of preaching the Word he voiced in a letter to Farel when the subject of his recall was under discussion a year later: "If I shall speak a word which is unpleasant for them to hear, forthwith they will enjoin silence."<sup>65</sup>

The issue of the liberty of the church assumed an acute stage the Friday before Easter, when Coraud, one of the preachers,

I, 75, and note 2. The new magistrates of 1538 were the more bitter as they had themselves been defeated in the election of 1537. The bitter party struggle between the ins and the outs during these two years may be followed in Roget or Cornelius.

<sup>62</sup> *Opera*, XXII, 92.

<sup>63</sup> The letter of Bern to the Genevan council is in Herminjard, IV, 403; cf. Cornelius, p. 160, and also the later letter of Bern, Herminjard, IV, 416. The four festivals were Christmas, Circumcision (New Year's), Annunciation, and Ascension; see Herminjard, IV, 413, note 17, and V, 137, note 9.

<sup>64</sup> *Opera*, V, 322.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.* X, ii, 325, Calvin to Farel, Strasburg, 16 March 1539. Translated in Bonnet, *Letters*, I, 121.

was summoned before the council for criticisms made in his sermon, and threatened with imprisonment if he preached again. On the day after this threat against their fellow-minister, Calvin and Farel gave their first definite refusal to administer the communion according to the Bernese form. Next day Coraud preached and was imprisoned. To the demand for his release the council made a counter-demand that the preachers "obey the said letter of Messrs of Bern." "The said preachers replied they were unwilling to act save as God has commanded them."

Calvin and Farel state that the council was ready to accept their proposal for postponement of the question of ceremonies, provided the preachers would consent to the deposition of Coraud, but that they would not consent to this "against the express prohibition of Scripture."<sup>66</sup> The issue was clearly drawn between the church's newly-demanded liberty in preaching and ceremonies and the customary right of the caesaropapist state to full jurisdiction in religious matters.

Each side preferred to fight it out rather than compromise. On Saturday the sheriff brought to Calvin a renewed request from the council that he "preach and administer the communion next day according to the form in the letter" from Bern. Calvin replied that the council "had not observed the tenor of said letter," having failed to consult with the ministers,<sup>67</sup> and that he was "unwilling to administer the communion as contained in the said letter." He was then warned not to preach. During the night before Easter the populace shot off muskets before the doors of the preachers, threatened to throw them into the Rhone if they refused to give them the communion next day, and with characteristically keen wit and loose tongue made obscene puns on "the Word of God as the Ordure of God."<sup>68</sup> The next day, Easter Sunday, April 21, 1538, both Farel and Calvin preached, in spite of the prohibition; and, in spite of the council's orders,

<sup>66</sup> Opera, X, ii, 188; Herminjard, IV, 424. Farel and Calvin, 27 April 1538, to the Council of Bern.

<sup>67</sup> The council of Bern had written, "avec vous ministres Calvin et Farel amiablement sur ce convenir." Herminjard, IV, 416, and Cornelius, 174, note 1.

<sup>68</sup> Roset, Chroniques, Liv. iv, ch. 17: "Ils crioent la petolle de Dieu, parlans de la parole." Cf. Herminjard, IV, 426.

they refused to administer the communion to a people guilty of such "disorders" and "ridicule of the Word of God."<sup>69</sup> The general council of all the citizens promptly voted on Tuesday, April 23, that "Faret" and Calvin should leave the city within three days. The replies of the preachers to the sheriff are reported to the council and gravely entered in their daily record. "Very well," replied Calvin, "had we served men we should have been ill rewarded, but we serve a great master who will give us our reward." "Good," said Farel, "it is God's will." In marked contrast to the Puritan temper of the preachers was the old-time levity of the Genevese. Farel had been nicknamed by the popular wits "Faret," a burned-out candle-end. After his exile the populace paraded the streets with "farets" in frying-pans to show they had smoked out Farel.<sup>70</sup>

The story of the exile is a significant illustration of how the Puritan programme of enforcement of the Word of God bred in its adherents a spirit of liberty in matters "where Christ has made them free," and a readiness to "hazard all for the sovereignty of God and the Word of God." The precise question at stake is summed up in a document submitted by Calvin and Farel stating the conditions under which they would return. They insisted that the church should have the right to manage its own affairs according to the Word of God, including the right to discipline its membership and ordain its pastors. The statement of the method of excommunication makes plain what Calvin had in mind in the Articles of 1537: "The proper method of excommunication must be restored according to that which we have prescribed, namely, that by the council there should be chosen from each district of the city upright and judicious men upon whom in joint action with us (i.e. the pastors) that duty should rest."<sup>71</sup>

<sup>69</sup> Calvin and Farel to the Council of Bern, 27 April 1538, in Herminjard, IV, 425.

<sup>70</sup> The various votes of the council and replies of Calvin and Farel are in *Registres du Conseil*, quoted in *Opera*, XXI, 223-227; Herminjard, IV, 416, 423-426; Cornelius, pp. 174-179.

<sup>71</sup> The full conditions submitted by Calvin and Farel, May 1, 1538, to the Synod at Zürich are given in Herminjard, *Correspondance*, V, 2-6. They include the points of discipline, excommunication, more frequent communion, singing of

Calvin's opponents in Geneva proved unable to build up either an orderly state or church. They became discredited through their complaisance toward Bern, were charged with treason, and were unable to prevent riotous outbreaks in the city. In 1540 eight leaders were either executed or forced to flee for their lives. At the same time the ministers who had replaced Calvin and Farel also became discredited through their too great complaisance toward the magistrates and through their own weakness; and, feeling unequal to the task, they withdrew from the city. Through the deposition of his opponents in 1540 and their defeat in the following annual election, Calvin's friends came again into full power in 1541, and endeavored to persuade their exiled pastor to return from Strasburg to Geneva. It proved necessary to have recourse to a long series of persistent attempts on the part of councils, cities, churches, and friends in order to overcome Calvin's strong repugnance to give up his agreeable occupation and quiet home life in Strasburg, and to persuade him to undertake again the hard task at Geneva. Calvin knew he could not change his own character or his programme, and he did not know whether he could change the Genevese. In his private letters to his most trusted friends he speaks frankly of the difficulty of the task, his repugnance for it, and his dread of Geneva. "What, therefore, shall we do? Where shall we begin, if we attempt to rebuild the ruined edifice? If I shall speak a word which is unpleasant for them to hear, forthwith they will enjoin silence."<sup>72</sup> On the 19th of May, 1540, he wrote to Viret: "I could not read without laughing that part of your letter where you show so much solicitude about my health. 'Come to Geneva that I may be better'? Why not say rather 'come straight to the cross'? For it would be far better to perish once for all than to writhe again in that place of torment. Therefore, my dear Viret, if you wish me well, re-

psalms in public worship, already asked for in the Articles of 1537 but not granted. They add a method of adjusting the difficulties about the ordinances of Bern; a division of Geneva into "definite parishes"; a proper increase in the number of ministers; a "legitimate installation of ministers" by ministers; prohibition in both Bern and Geneva of "lascivious and obscene songs and dances composed to the music of the Psalms."

<sup>72</sup> Opera, X, ii, 325. To Farel, 16 March 1539. Translated in Bonnet, Letters, I, 121.

nounce that project.”<sup>73</sup> Five months later he wrote to Farel: “Now that by the favor of God I am delivered, who would not excuse me should I be unwilling to plunge myself once more into the gulf and whirlpool which I have already found to be so dangerous and destructive? . . . They will not be tolerable to me nor I to them.”<sup>74</sup> On the first of March, 1541, he wrote to Viret: “There is no place under heaven which I could dread more; not because I hate it, but because I see so many difficulties facing me there, which I know I am quite incapable of overcoming. As often as the memory of former times returns, I cannot help shuddering with all my heart at the thought of again entering into those old struggles.”<sup>75</sup> With this clear perception of the bitter struggle before him, Calvin showed his Puritan spirit in not shrinking from the task which his conscience persuaded him was laid upon him by God. Three days after he had declared to Farel his unwillingness to plunge again into the whirlpool, and had shown that he clearly recognized the incompatibility of temper (*ingenium*) between himself and the Genevese, he came to this resolve: “When I remember that I am not my own, I offer up my heart slain in sacrifice to God. I have no other desire than that they [the Genevese], setting aside all consideration of me, may look only to what is most for the glory of God and the advantage of the church. . . . I am well aware that it is God with whom I have to do. . . . Therefore I submit my soul (*animum*) bound and fettered to obedience to God.”<sup>76</sup> As one reads these phrases concerning “the glory of God and the advantage of the church,” a “soul bound and fettered to obedience to God,” one is struck with a resemblance to the phrases of the Jesuits, whose order had been founded by papal bull but one month earlier. With all their striking differences in aims and methods, there was a strik-

<sup>73</sup> *Opera*, XI, 36 (in illa carnificina iterum torqueri).

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.* XI, 91, Oct. 21, 1540. Translated in Bonnet, *Letters*, I, 212.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.* XI, 167. In Bonnet, I, 231.

<sup>76</sup> Cor meum velut mactatum Domino in sacrificium offero—mihi esse negotium cum Deo qui huiusmodi astutias deprehendit. Ergo animum meum vincatum et constrictum subigo in obedientiam Dei. To Farel, 24 Oct. 1540. *Opera*, XI, 100, and Herminjard, *Correspondance*, VI, 339, give the date correctly as 24 Oct. 1540 rather than Aug. 1531, assumed in Bonnet, *Letters*, I, 280.

ing resemblance between Loyola and Calvin in their unflinching devotion to what they believed to be for the glory of God.

With such a spirit Calvin returned to the task of a lifetime, the moulding of the mobile, demonstrative, self-assertive Genevese into the sturdy, self-contained Puritan type which he himself represented.<sup>77</sup> The points in his programme proposed by Calvin in the Articles of 1537 and submitted by him in 1538 as requisite for his return were tacitly granted by Geneva on his recall in 1541. They were included in the systematic "ecclesiastical ordinances" drawn up by Calvin, and amended and adopted by the Genevan council in November, 1541. The Ordinances enacted into law the general features of the Puritan Programme, although the amendments and interpretations by the council interfered with Calvin's more thorough-going provision for the distinct rights of the church.<sup>78</sup> The Ordinances defined the functions of the four officers of the church (pastors, teachers, elders, and deacons) and prescribed the method of their election and correction. This ecclesiastical constitution divided the city into parishes, and provided for systematic worship, discipline, sacraments, religious and intellectual training of children, and the singing of psalms "by all the church." The Ordinances also included regulations for the marriage ceremony, for burials, and for visitation of the sick, poor, and prisoners; prohibition of begging; and provisions for a later and more explicit set of marriage ordinances. The chief additions to the points already noted in the earlier documents are the definition of the rights and duties of the four officers of the church. "The upright and judicious men" whom Calvin had asked for in 1537 and 1538 he recognized in 1541 for the first

<sup>77</sup> When Calvin preached his first sermon after his recall in 1541, he began at the same place in the Scriptures where he had left off in his last sermon three and a half years before.

<sup>78</sup> Calvin's "Projet d'Ordonnances Ecclésiastiques," with the emendations of the council, are given in *Opera*, X, 15-30. The amended ordinances were adopted by the primary assembly, 20 Nov. 1541; *Registres du Conseil*, XXXV, fol. 406<sup>ro</sup>. Calvin's draft with emendations still exists in the archives of Geneva, *Pièces Historiques*, No. 1384. The oath for the ministers is in *Opera*, X, 31-32. The revised Ordinances of 1561, *ibid.* 91-124. For the changes which Calvin urged in 1560 in order to secure a sharper distinction between "temporal and spiritual jurisdiction," see 120-123, and note.

time as a distinct order of church officers with the name of elders. The council struck out the name elders (*anciens*) in each of the nine cases where it occurred in Calvin's draft, and substituted for it the title "deputies of the council" (*commis par la seigneurie*). It continued to call them "deputies" and to treat them as such for fourteen years. The twelve elders, or deputies, together with the pastors (six, at first), formed the consistory charged with discipline and, nominally, with excommunication. Calvin won for the consistory the right of excommunication only in 1555, after fourteen years of bitter struggle against the council's refusal to recognize the spiritual rights of the church. Yet the Ordinances indicate a growing emphasis on the distinction between church and state at two points; in the treatment of the distinction between civil and ecclesiastical penalties, and in the oath of the minister.<sup>79</sup> The minister swore allegiance first to God and his Word, second to the Ordinances, third to the *Seigneurie* (i.e. the Little Council), and fourth to the statutes of the city, "but without prejudice to the liberty which we ought to have of teaching according as God commands us." Here once more we find the sane combination of liberty and law which characterizes Calvin and the Puritan states where Calvinism took root and bore fruit.

In spite of certain personally aristocratic traits in Calvin, his logic and his practical experience led to increasing emphasis of the rights of the people. It has already been pointed out, in the discussion of the editions of the *Institutes*, that in 1543 he modified his opinion in favor of an aristocratic state to an approval (from which he never afterward varied) of "either aristocracy or a mixture of aristocracy and democracy." This system of "a mixed aristocracy" was that advocated by John Winthrop and practised by the Puritans of Massachusetts Bay a century later.<sup>80</sup> The later years of Calvin's career in Geneva show him fighting to enlarge the number of those entitled to the civil franchise, and to bring about a more representative government in the church. From the time of his triumph in 1555, the policy of

<sup>79</sup> This oath called for in the Ordinances was passed by the council, 17 July 1542. See *Opera*, X, 31-32.

<sup>80</sup> See Winthrop's "Arbitrary Government Described," etc. (1544), in appendix to R. C. Winthrop's *Life of Winthrop*, II, 440-458 (ed. 1869).

freer admission to burgher rights prevailed, and the numbers increased by leaps and bounds—sixty for example in less than four weeks in May 1555.<sup>81</sup> He also tried to enlarge representative government in the church, and to mark out more sharply the distinction between church and state. In 1560 he urged the council to allow the elders to be chosen from the whole membership of the church and not simply from the citizens (*citoyens*); he requested the council to consult with the whole body of the ministers and not simply with himself in the election of elders, and to discriminate between ecclesiastical discipline and civil penalty; and he suggested a definite opportunity for any one to offer objections to candidates for the ministry.

The council proved ready to accept the last two proposals. In regard to the first, the opening of the eldership to the whole membership of the church, the magistrates frankly acknowledged the logic of Calvin's proposition as following the "Word of God," but even in the days of Calvin's ascendancy they were not prepared to go as far as Calvin wished. Before Calvin came to Geneva, there had been a natural tendency in time of war to centralize authority in the hands of the small and somewhat aristocratic council. On the whole, Calvin's influence tended to prevent this somewhat dangerous development of a political oligarchy and aided a gradual development of representative government. This influence was continued under his successor, so that the aristocratic elements only succeeded in developing unhindered after the ministry grew weak in the later period succeeding Beza.<sup>82</sup>

The political constitution of Geneva had been fixed before the coming of Calvin. He shared, however, in a codification of its civil law drawn up in 1543. Of this feature of his work Rousseau, by no means a Puritan or Calvinist, but nevertheless a by-product of Geneva, wrote thus in his *Social Contract*: "Those who consider Calvin only as a theologian fail to recognize the breadth of his genius. The editing of our wise laws, in which he had a large

<sup>81</sup> See Choisy, *Théocratie*, pp. 175, 185.

<sup>82</sup> See "Geneva before Calvin," Amer. Hist. Rev., Jan. 1903, pp. 221, 237-238, and notes. For Calvin's proposals and the council's votes in 1560 regarding sharper distinction between church and state, see *Opera X*, 120-123.

share, does him as much honor as his *Institutes*. Whatever revolution time may bring in our religion, so long as the love of country and liberty is not extinct among us, the memory of this great man will be held in reverence.”<sup>83</sup> Calvin's contribution to the administration and public law of Geneva, and the marvellous political sagacity and effectiveness which he continued to develop until he became one of the shrewdest practical politicians and most effective statesmen of Europe, foreshadow the keen interest which the Puritan, whether minister or layman, took in the affairs of state. An active interest in politics on the part of every citizen was one of the articles of Puritan faith, one of the axioms of the Puritan state.

Several features of the economic programme of the Puritan state had developed in Geneva by 1541. In the “Liberties, franchises, immunities, usages and customs” granted to Geneva by her prince bishop in 1387, the taking of interest had been recognized and protected.<sup>84</sup> Possibly this existing custom may have aided Calvin to see the justice of interest-taking. His attitude toward it illustrates his attitude toward the Scripture; it also illustrates the economic advantage resulting to Protestantism through a more rational use of the Bible and a revision of the canon law. Calvin took the general ground that both reason and equity were to be used in the interpretation of Scripture. The essential aim, and not the form, of a scriptural injunction should be preserved, as was the case in his interpretation of the commandment regarding the Sabbath. “God gave not that law by the hand of Moses to be promulgated among all nations, and to be universally binding; but in all the laws which he gave them he had a special regard to their circumstances.”<sup>85</sup> Calvin, moreover, was not a literalist, but was ready to recognize and publicly point out such “errors” of fact in the Bible as the use of Jeremiah for Zechariah in Matthew 27 9;<sup>86</sup> the use of twenty for twenty-five (Acts 7 14,

<sup>83</sup> Rousseau, *Du contrat social*, Liv. ii, ch. 7, note.

<sup>84</sup> The Latin text of the *franchises* of 1387 with the French translations of 1455 was published by E. Mallet in *Mémoires et documents de la Société d'Histoire et d'Archéologie de Genève*, II, 271-399. For interest-taking, see Arts. 34, 35, 39, 77.

<sup>85</sup> *Institutes*, *Opera*, I, 239.

<sup>86</sup> *Opera*, XLV, 749.

—*ex errore librariorum*); or of Abraham in Acts 7:16, where he frankly says that Luke drew upon tradition rather than upon Moses, and adds, “there is plainly a mistake, and this place should be corrected.”<sup>87</sup> Calvin therefore found no “absolute condemnation” of interest-taking in the Scriptures; for “the law of Moses (Deut. 23:19) is political, and it constrains us no further than equity and human reason demand.”<sup>88</sup> In accordance therefore with his general appeal to reason and equity, and his sound interpretation that the essential thing in the law was the prevention of oppression and not the prohibition of earning money through the use of money, Calvin declared that interest-taking was right and not unscriptural, provided only the interest was not unreasonable. Calvin pointed out effectively the fallacy of the barrenness of money, and showed that it was no more sinful to take interest on money than to invest the money in a house and take rent. “Calvin’s teaching,” says Professor Ashley, “was, in a very real sense, a turning-point in the history of European thought.”<sup>89</sup> The effect of such an interpretation was of great economic importance, for it gave Calvinists who accepted it, including the two great commercial nations, the Dutch and the English, a decisive economic advantage over Catholics or Lutherans, who still clung to the canon law prohibition of interest-taking. Incidentally Calvin’s interpretation illustrated his tendency toward a re-examination and a freer interpretation of Scripture and toward greater intellectual and economic freedom.

The productive power of the Puritan was increased by his attitude toward labor. The attitude of Calvin and the Puritan was like that of St. Paul, “He who will not work shall not eat.”<sup>90</sup> Energetic and tireless himself, Calvin had no sympathy for “idle bellies who chirp sweetly in the shade.”<sup>91</sup> Work in Geneva was

<sup>87</sup> Opera, XLVIII, 137, 138.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid. X, 246, De usuris.

<sup>89</sup> Calvin’s letter on usury is in Opera, X, 245–249. Ashley, Economic History, II, 458–460. See also R. H. Dana, Jr., in Mass. House of Rep., Feb. 14, 1867. Reprinted in Economic Tracts No. IV, published by the Amer. Soc. for Political Education, 1881. See pp. 32–36, 43.

<sup>90</sup> See Kampschulte, Calvin, I, 429.

<sup>91</sup> Letter to Daniel, Geneva, Oct. 13, 1536, in Opera, X, ii, 64: *otiosis illis ventribus, qui apud vos suaviter in umbra garriunt.* Translated in Bonnet, Letters, I, 46.

obligatory six days in the week. On the 4th of June, 1537, the council took action to enforce the working part of the Fourth Commandment which they had just approved and printed in their city creed. "There was a discussion regarding the people who observe holidays, and it was voted that every one must work as already proclaimed, without observing holidays save on Sunday. This shall be proclaimed ward by ward (*dizenne*) and under penalty of fine. In case of poor people, the men shall pay three sous, the women six liards; the rich shall be fined amounts to be levied in the Little Council. The tithing-men (*dizenniers*) who deal with a man shall share in the fine."<sup>92</sup> In March, 1538, the councillors, as a part of their anti-clerical and anti-French policy, had insisted on the observance of the four ecclesiastical holidays desired by Bern. Calvin and Farel were ready to agree to this, "provided the somewhat imperious form of the imposition be done away with, and liberty be granted to those who wish to betake themselves to work after the sermon."<sup>93</sup> Here is a striking form of economic liberty—liberty to work six days in the week. Some of the extremists left behind in Geneva after Calvin's exile in April, 1538, were ready to go further than Calvin. They illustrate a later Puritan tendency to a very literal interpretation of Scripture which would regard any holiday save Sunday as unscriptural.<sup>94</sup> This was to out-Calvin Calvin. True to their convictions, however, these extremists refused to go to the communion on Christmas day in 1538. When summoned before the council, they justified themselves for their refusal on the ground that "it says in the commandment of God six days shalt thou labor, whereas Christmas day has been made a holiday."<sup>95</sup> This is

<sup>92</sup> *Registres du Conseil*, XXX, fol. 248, printed in *Opera*, XXI, 211.

<sup>93</sup> Herminjard, *Correspondance*, V, 4; also in Cornelius, *Arbeiten*, p. 182, note 3. This liberty was one of the conditions which Calvin and Farel presented to the synod at Zürich as essential before they would return to Geneva.

<sup>94</sup> This attitude was protested against by the Bernese and Genevan ministers after Calvin's exile. See Herminjard, *Correspondance*, V, 137, and note 9; *ibid.* pp. 137-138, for the criticism of the extremists by the Bernese and Genevan ministers.

<sup>95</sup> "Pource quil dist aut commandement de dieu six jour tu travallieras et que lon avoyt fayct le jour de noel feste," is the quaint entry in the Genevan *Registres du Conseil*, XXXII, fol. 255, for 27th Dec. 1538.

probably the first example of the Puritan layman objecting to the observance of Christmas or to the imposing of a religious holiday by the action of the state. More sane and practical was the interpretation which Calvin added to his second edition of the catechism, published the year after his return to Geneva. "In what way," asks the minister, "do you understand that this commandment is given likewise for the relief of servants?" The child replies: "To give some relaxation (*relasche*) to those who are in the power of others. And this also contributes to public order. For each one gets used to working the rest of the time when there is a day of rest."<sup>96</sup> Spendthrifts (*dissipateurs de biens*) were one class of offenders subject to excommunication in the Confession of 1537. In the Ordinances of 1541 the tithing-men and other officers were charged with enforcement of laws against begging. The requirement of labor was again insisted on in 1560, in proclamations made throughout the city. Under the head of "Dissoluteness" it was ordered, "that no one be so bold or impudent as to commit fornication, get drunk, play the vagabond, or even lose his time, or lead others into dissipation; but that each one must work according to his station, under penalty of being punished by the law according to the nature of the case."<sup>97</sup> The Puritan state, by making the idler suffer both ecclesiastical and civil penalties, and by insisting upon labor by every one, contributed not only to its public order but to its economic efficiency. As Weber has pointed out, the Calvinist had a "calling" not merely in a religious but also in an economic sense.<sup>98</sup>

A study of the measures taken in Geneva would reveal a very sane and efficient care for the social welfare of the people and for sounder economic conditions. In his first edition of the *Institutes* Calvin had laid down the necessity of equitable taxation. "Taxes are not so much private revenues as the treasury of the whole people, or rather the blood of the people and aids of public necessity;

<sup>96</sup> *Opera*, V, 65.

<sup>97</sup> Proclamation of 1560, reprinted by Cazenove (Montpellier, 1879). Quoted in Borgeaud, *Histoire de l'Université de Genève*, I, 166.

<sup>98</sup> M. Weber, "Die Protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus," in *Archiv für Socialwissenschaft und Socialpolitik*, XX; for effect of "Beruf," "calling," see p. 38 and following, and Part ii, *ibid.* XXI, 1-110 (Tübingen, 1905).

to burden the people with which without cause would be tyrannical rapacity.”<sup>99</sup> In the Ecclesiastical Ordinances of 1541 discriminating provision was made for the care of the poor and sick. The hospital was to be better maintained, and the sick were to be separated from the children and old people. Special hospitals were to be established for transients and “for those who shall seem to be worthy of special charity”; and a separate hospital was to be maintained for the pest. Provision was made for a quarterly inspection of the hospitals, and for a physician and a surgeon, in the pay of the city, charged with the care of the hospital and the visitation of the other sick poor throughout the city.<sup>100</sup> Calvin, usually at the request of the magistrates but sometimes at his own suggestion, concerned himself with the sewers of the city; the re-establishment of weaving industries, and the investigation of new methods of heating; with matrimonial questions; and with protection against fire.<sup>101</sup>

An appeal to sincere and deep religious feeling had a large place in the development of the profound devotion and the militant temper of the Puritan state. In recommending the training of children to lead the singing in public worship until gradually all should learn to lift their hearts to God, Calvin was working on long lines. This recommendation in the Articles of 1537 was renewed in 1538 as one of the conditions essential to his return. During the next three years, spent at Strasburg, Calvin drew up for the church of French refugees of which he was pastor an order of worship based on Bucer’s modification of Schwarz’ translation of the Roman Mass. After his return to Geneva Calvin modified his Strasburg liturgy, making it less Roman; omitting, for example, the promise of absolution, though retaining

<sup>99</sup> *Opera*, I, 206.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.* X, 23–25. A careful study of medical conditions in Geneva to the end of the 18th century has been published by Dr. Leon Gautier in the *Mém. et doc. de la Soc. d'Hist. et d'Arch. de Genève*, 2nd series, Tome X.

<sup>101</sup> See *Opera*, X, under the various “Ordonnances” and “Consilia,” especially 125–146, 203–210, 231–266. For the new method of heating see *Opera*, XVI, 496, with sketch of furnace; see comments in Roget, *Histoire*, V, 58. See also references in Kampschulte, *Calvin*, I, 428–430; and in H. Wiskemann, *Darstellung der in Deutschland zur Zeit der Reformation herrschenden national-ökonomischen Ansichten* (Leipzig, 1861), pp. 79–87.

the striking confession of sins at the opening of the service. His other changes gave an increased importance to the singing of Psalms. The singing of a Psalm was substituted for the Commandments; and another Psalm replaced the Apostles' Creed. The Genevan liturgy was also made more adaptable by giving a place for extempore as well as prescribed form of prayer. In this Genevan liturgy of 1542 four elements of the Reformed or Puritan worship are worth noting. First, the confession of sins at the beginning of the service, drawn upon by both Reformed and Anglican churches; second, the adaptability of worship to different times and places, through diplomatic omissions and through combination of free and fixed prayer; third, the provision for a deeper emotional element through music; and, fourth, the swinging militant lilt that runs through psalm and prayer. The Psalms translated by Marot, Calvin, and Beza were to prove the consolation of the persecuted, while the Psalm of Battle became the Protestant Marseillaise (as Doumergue has called it) of the victorious Huguenots. Sung in the mother tongue by all worshippers, these psalms introduced both a democratic and an emotional element greatly needed in the Protestant service as Calvin found it. In the noble prayers, there is the same militant Puritan ring that appears in the introduction to the Latin catechism of 1538 and in the psalms. The prayer after the sermon closes with a paragraph which summed up the Puritan purpose, sought the Divine aid to accomplish it, and sent out the citizens fired with a zeal to "win a complete victory." As translated by Knox in Scotland it ran thus:

And forasmuch as of ourselves we are so weak, that we are not able to stand upright one minute of an hour, and also that we are so beleid and assaulted evermore with such a multitude of so dangerous enemies, that the devil, the world, sin, and our own concupisces, do never leave off to fight against us: let it be Thy good pleasure to strengthen us with Thy Holy Spirit, and to arm us with Thy grace, that thereby we may be able constantly to withstand all temptations, and to persevere in this spiritual battle against sin, until such time as we shall obtain the full victory, and so at length may triumphantly rejoice in Thy Kingdom, with our Captain and Governor Jesus Christ our Lord.<sup>102</sup>

<sup>102</sup> Sprott and Leishman, *Book of Common Order*, pp. 96-97. The editors followed the edition of 1611, but modernized the spelling.

The Genevan liturgy was marked by a felicitous combination of simplicity and dignity, giving it a power and flexibility which led to its adoption by the Reformed churches in Geneva, Holland, France, Scotland, and by the Early Puritans in England.<sup>103</sup> There is much in both its spirit and its form which would still be of service to many churches unaware of the richness of their own Puritan liturgical inheritance.

One other feature of the Puritan programme of worship indicates the practical attitude of mind of the Puritan in all lands and his keen interest in social welfare. To "psalms and hymns of praise, the reading of the gospel, the confession of faith," Calvin added in the communion service "holy oblations and offerings." The contribution was a part of worship. "As children of God who seek his kingdom and his justice, . . . we offer and submit ourselves entirely to God the Father and to our Lord Jesus Christ, in recognition of so many and so great benefits. And we testify this by offerings and holy gifts (as Christian charity requires) which are given to Jesus Christ through his little ones, those who hunger or thirst, or are naked, or are strangers, or sick or in prison."<sup>104</sup> The Puritan was a thrifty man of business, but he was also a generous benefactor. It was thoroughly characteristic of the Puritan that the University of Geneva should have been founded not only upon a public grant by a representative assembly, but also upon gifts by citizens of all classes, even by Jénon the baker woman who gave five sous.<sup>105</sup>

One of the fundamental characteristics of Puritan states was their care for education. In the turmoil of 1538, a few months

<sup>103</sup> Strype, *Life of Grindal*, ch. xii, p. 114; *Life of Parker*, Bk. iv, ch. v, p. 325. Cf. Procter and Frere, *Hist. of Bk. of Common Prayer*, pp. 86 ff., 131-133. Calvin's Liturgy, or "Form of Prayers," for Geneva of 1542 is in *Opera*, VI, 173-184. Knox's translation is in various editions, most conveniently in Sprott and Leishman, *Book of Common Order of Church of Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1868). It is also in Knox's *Works* (ed. Laing), VI, ii, pp. 293 ff.; "The Form of Prayers, etc., used in the English Church of Geneva," *ibid.* IV, 141-214. The English Puritan's use of the "Genevan form" is commented upon by Strype in his *Life of Grindal* p. 169, and *Life of Parker*, p. 65.

<sup>104</sup> The subject of Calvin's liturgy is discussed in Doumergue, *Calvin*, II, 479-524, with bibliography; and is briefly summed up in Walker's *Calvin*, pp. 222-226.

<sup>105</sup> Borgeaud, *Histoire de l'Université de Genève*, I, 35.

before the exile of the preachers, there was published in Latin and French the programme of the College, or Gymnasium, in Geneva. It was probably drawn up by Antoine Saunier, the prefect, and reviewed by Calvin and Maturin Cordier. In general it followed the two leading ideas of Sturm, the development of knowledge conducive to piety and the gradation of the school into classes. But the object of the school was not simply the preservation of the church but also "political administration and the maintenance of humanity among men." There is a modern and practical tendency noticeable in the provision for a living language, French, "which is by no means to be despised," and for the "art of arithmetic, that is, numbering, figuring, and calculating." Exercises began at five, stopped at ten for dinner, and continued in the afternoon. Place was found in the daily programme for the repetition of the three documents on which the *Institutes*, the Confession, and the Catechism were based (the Ten Commandments, the Lord's Prayer, and the Apostles' Creed), and for a chapter in the Bible, all in French. As especial inducements at Geneva, the circular pointed out the frequent disputations on the Christian religion, five sermons on the pure Word of God on Sunday and two on each week-day, with "the hours so distributed that one may easily attend all the sermons one after the other"—a Puritan total of seventeen possible sermons a week! The logical necessity for education in a Biblical commonwealth is recognized in the closing paragraphs of the circular: "Although we defer primarily to the Word of God, we do not reject good training (*bonas disciplinas*), which rightly occupies second place. For these two things work together best when united in this order, so that the Word of God is the foundation of all knowledge, and the liberal arts are props and aids to the full knowledge of the Word, and not to be despised."<sup>106</sup>

On his recall to Geneva, Calvin included in the Ecclesiastical Ordinances of 1541 a definition of the work of the "teachers" (*docteurs*), who were to form the second order of church officers.

<sup>106</sup> The Latin text of the "Programme" of Jan. 12, 1538, is printed in Herminjard, Correspondance, IV, 455-460. It was printed in French at the same time, and reprinted by Bétant in 1866. See also Buisson, Castellion, I, 145-149; Borgeaud, Histoire de l'Université de Genève, I, 16-18.

That part of their function which was related most closely to the government of the church consisted in lecturing on theology based on both the Old and New Testaments. "But since one cannot profit by such studies unless he be first instructed in languages and human sciences, and since also there is need of preserving the seed for the future in order that the church may not be left naked to our children, it will be necessary to organize a college for instructing the children in order to prepare them for both the ministry and the civil government." This paragraph is instinct with the thought, and almost the phraseology, which later found expression in the words of the author of *New England's First Fruits* and in the New England statutes regarding education. The Ordinances went on to indicate the steps which should be taken. There should be a place suitable for instruction and for the residence of children and others who may wish to profit by it; a man fit to manage both the house and the teaching; lectures in languages and dialectic; and bachelors for teaching the small children. There should be no other school for the children, save that the girls should have their school apart as heretofore. "All those who shall be there shall be subject to the ecclesiastical discipline as the ministers are." This subjected teachers as well as pastors to a very severe system of discipline, either at the hands of the consistory, with final report to the council, or directly at the hands of the council if the crime were punishable by the civil law. The ministers were to meet weekly for conference on the Scripture to preserve purity of doctrine, and quarterly to remedy any other offences among them. A formidable list of some thirty-four offences was included for which a minister might be tried, eighteen "utterly intolerable crimes," and sixteen vices which could be met through "fraternal admonitions." To all these provisions the teaching force was to be subjected. To this the council made no objection, though it had already so modified Calvin's proposals for discipline of all ministers (including the teachers) as to reserve to itself the final decision in all cases. On one point, however, the council modified Calvin's statement regarding the teachers. This was as to their election. The council was unwilling to leave this to the ministers, but provided for the council's co-operation before, after, and during the examination of candidates.

To the development of the college thus outlined in 1541 Calvin gave much thought and time. The culmination of the Puritan intellectual programme for Geneva, the establishment of a university with fully organized higher instruction, was delayed until 1559, when Geneva, in the words of the scholarly historian of its University, became "a church, a school, and a fortress."<sup>107</sup>

These early years of the work of Calvin and Geneva, from 1536 to 1541, cover only the beginning of the programme for a Puritan state; not its realization, nor all its phases, nor its limitations. Another generation was to witness the victorious outcome of the long and bitter fight to carry out the plan of campaign of the church and state militant. Yet the beginning of the struggle reveals the tendencies which ultimately worked out those by-products of the Puritan state which the modern world regards among its dearest possessions, civil and religious liberty, economic efficiency, and sound learning.

Even in its own day, the early Puritan programme, by its inconsistent emphasis on moral obligation and moral training, economic efficiency, sound learning, the freedom of the church, and the preservation of liberty through law, bred a militant temper, ready to "hazard life for the sovereignty of God and the Word of God," and a moral vigor and political insight fit to cope with the moral indifference and the political absolutism which threatened the age of Machiavelli, Rabelais, and Philip II.

<sup>107</sup> Borgeaud, *Histoire de l'Université de Genève*, I, 83.

*THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION*

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As every one knows, psychology is a word to conjure with. We have today the Psychology of Art, the Psychology of Business, the Psychology of Advertising, the Psychology of Childhood, of Adolescence, and of Old Age, the Psychology of various great men and of various centuries and epochs, until one stands quite aghast at the psychological insight of our times, and feels that the key to everything and anything worth knowing must surely be in the hands of the omniscient psychologist. In fact, psychology would seem to have enlarged her bounds at the expense of every other subject, and to have chosen all knowledge to be her province; so that he who desires his book or treatise on any subject whatever to be regarded as strictly "modern" and "scientific" must needs endow it with a psychological title. This is indeed a short and easy method of becoming a psychologist; and the result is—as one might expect—that all the psychology contained in many of these works is spread, usually in large letters, upon the title-page. All is not gold that glitters; neither is every treatise psychological which bears that mystic word upon its cover.

In no field of serious inquiry are these remarks more pertinent than in that of religion. Our book-shelves and our periodicals are laden with works on "religious psychology," most of which prove on examination to be hardly more psychological than anatomical or geographical. Treatises on theology and statistics, on Church history and Sunday-school methods, as well as that large and amorphous class of writings which twenty years ago would have appeared under the title "Philosophy of Religion"—all these are now pressing themselves upon our attention by the use of that potent shibboleth, "Psychology." And yet, though one-half the works with titles of this nature have not much more to do with genuine psychology than with the weather, there is,

I believe, a young branch of scientific inquiry which rightly deserves the name Psychology of Religion.

The attempt to treat the religious consciousness psychologically did not come altogether out of the blue: like other branches of science, it had its precursors of various sorts. The most important of these were anthropology and the history of religion, on the one hand, and the philosophy of religion, on the other. Since the days of Kant it had been customary for writers on the latter subject to take up incidentally the question of the psychological nature of religion, especially in their attempts at defining their subject-matter. These discussions brought out a good many psychological distinctions and descriptions of more or less value; but no attempt was made to collect data and study them inductively in modern scientific fashion. This lack of an empirical basis makes it impossible to accept the results of the various philosophies of religion as genuine psychology; though as the expressions of religious men, and therefore as data bearing on the religious consciousness, they are often of considerable indirect value. The work of the anthropologists, on the other hand, though thoroughly empirical, is from the objective or external point of view, and therefore, while furnishing valuable material to the psychologist, is not itself psychology.

The psychology of religion is therefore, as I have said, a very young branch of inquiry, being in fact hardly more than a dozen years old. I shall not attempt to say who started it. Perhaps no one can justly claim that honor; but, if it can be given to any one man, it must be awarded to President G. Stanley Hall, of Clark University. This I say both because of his own pioneer work in this field and still more because of his guiding influence over a number of young psychologists doing graduate work under him on subjects chosen at his suggestion. Thus was formed what one may very properly call the Clark school of religious psychology.

The work seems to have taken its start in some investigations concerning the various phenomena of adolescence. In 1882 Dr. Hall published an article in the *Princeton Review*<sup>1</sup> entitled "The Moral and Religious Training of Children," in which he empha-

<sup>1</sup> New Series, IX, 26-45.

sized the importance of the years between twelve and sixteen, the sudden changes in both mind and body and the new birth of energy and feeling that take place during that period. This subject was taken up again a number of years later by two graduate students of Clark University, Mr. William H. Burnham and Mr. Arthur H. Daniels, whose investigations,<sup>2</sup> based on empirical data gathered in part from responses to questionnaires, in part from the facts of anthropology, lie well within the field of the psychology of religion.<sup>3</sup>

The investigations thus far referred to, though valuable, owe their chief importance to their pioneer character. It was not until the year 1896 that the first article of great intrinsic value appeared; namely, the first of a long series of important papers by Mr. James H. Leuba (also, at that time, of Clark University), entitled "The Psychology of Religious Phenomena."<sup>4</sup> The subject of the work, as was natural for a pioneer attempt, was that most striking of religious phenomena, conversion. Mr. Leuba went at his task in thoroughly scientific fashion. He collected materials for his study from various sources, especially from the published accounts of the conversions of distinguished leaders, and also by means of a questionnaire. Basing his conclusions on these empirical data, he analyzed the psychological conditions leading up to conversion, the crisis itself, and the state following it; he described the mental condition of the enthusiastic believer (the "faith state"), showed the necessity of self-surrender as a precondition of conversion, and the sudden and passive nature of the transition when it finally came; and thus displayed the psychological basis for the Christian doctrines of faith, justification, pardon, etc. The whole process was treated from the naturalistic point of view, the causal sequences traced, and the idea of supernatural intervention ruled out. "We must conceive

<sup>2</sup> "A Study of Adolescence," by William H. Burnham, *Pedagogical Seminary* I (1891), 174-195.

"The New Life; a Study in Regeneration," by Arthur H. Daniels, *American Journal of Psychology*, VI (1895), 61-103.

<sup>3</sup> If space permitted, mention should here be made of the investigations in the religion of childhood by Hall, Barnes, Brown, and others, carried on at this same time.

<sup>4</sup> *American Journal of Psychology*, VII, 309-385.

of faith," says Leuba, "as supervening upon specific and always identical psychological phenomena."

This naturalistic attitude dominates in a general way all the writers in this field, but no others have carried it through so consistently and emphasized it so strongly and, I may add, so dogmatically, as has Leuba. It is the key-note of nearly all the papers from his pen which have appeared in rather quick succession since 1896. These contributions of his are of varying degrees of excellence; they often repeat each other, and at times attempt too great simplification; yet in their consistent scientific point of view and their keen psychological analysis they form a body of writings of very great value and importance. Professor Leuba is a genuine and able psychologist, and his contributions have a right to the name "psychology of religion." They deserve a much wider reading than they have yet enjoyed.<sup>5</sup>

The year after Leuba's first article appeared, two other graduate students of Clark University, under the influence and guidance

<sup>5</sup> Professor Leuba's rather limited reputation and influence among the reading public may be due in part to the fact that he has never put his contributions in book form. I am glad to be able to add, however, that he is now engaged in the preparation of two books, one a small volume to be entitled *The Psychological Origin and the Nature of Religion* (Constable & Company, London), the other a much larger work, whose title and publisher are not yet determined upon. I give herewith a list of his more important articles in the order in which they appeared:

"Psychology of Religious Phenomena," *American Journal of Psychology*, VII (1906), 309-385.

"Introduction to a Psychological Study of Religion," *Monist*, XI (1901), 195-255.

"The Contents of Religious Consciousness," *Monist*, XI (1901), 535-573.

"Religion: Its Impulses and its Ends," *Bibliotheca Sacra*, LVIII (1901), 757-769.

"Tendances fondamentales des mystiques Chrétiens," *Revue Philosophique*, LIV (1902), 1-36; 441-487.

"The State of Death," *American Journal of Psychology*, XIV (1903), 397-409.

"Faith," *American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*, I (1904), 65-112.

"The Field and Problems of the Psychology of Religion," *American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*, I (1904), 155-167.

"On the Psychology of a Group of Christian Mystics," *Mind*, XIV (1905), 15-27.

"Fear, Awe, and the Sublime in Religion," *American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*, II (1906), 1-23.

"Religion as a Factor in the Struggle for Life," *American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*, II (1907), 307-343.

of Dr. Hall, entered the field, Mr. Edwin D. Starbuck and Mr. E. G. Lancaster. The interest of the latter was chiefly in the adolescent period as such,<sup>6</sup> while the work of the former<sup>7</sup> was wholly upon the religious questions connected with adolescence, dealing in great detail with conversion and religious awakening in its various phases. Like some of its predecessors, it is based on the answers to several questionnaires, and is divided into two parts, first, conversion, and, second, lines of religious growth not involving conversion. One may perhaps fairly question the wisdom of Dr. Starbuck's almost implicit confidence in the questionnaire method; for the responses seem at times to have been accepted and used uncritically, and rather too much is made of figures and statistical tables. Yet it would be ungracious and unjust to throw any doubt upon the genuine value of this admirable work. It presents a mass of valuable data fairly well digested and interpreted, and is of great importance for practical as well as theoretical purposes as a careful and scholarly study of the growth of the religious consciousness. The book deserves the wide reading which it has received, and is one of the two or three most important contributions to the psychology of religion that have yet been made.<sup>8</sup>

Before turning from what I have called the Clark school, I should mention the foundation in May, 1904, by Dr. Hall, of a periodical for the exclusive study of the psychology of religion, the *Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*. Thus far the articles that have appeared in it have been, it must be confessed, rather disappointing. A few of them have been excellent, but very many have had but little genuinely psychological value. The issues of the *Journal*, moreover, have been but few and very far between, and it might rightly be described as being published "every little while." Although it was founded four

<sup>6</sup> "The Psychology and Pedagogy of Adolescence," by E. G. Lancaster, *Pedagogical Seminary*, V, 61-128.

<sup>7</sup> *The Psychology of Religion*, London, 1903. (First appeared in the *American Journal of Psychology*.)

<sup>8</sup> In connection with the Clark school reference should be made to three other contributions: Hylan's *Public Worship* (Chicago, 1901); Dr. Hall's *Adolescence* (New York, 1904); and Moses's *Pathological Aspects of Religions* (Worcester, 1906).

years and a half ago, only seven numbers have thus far appeared. Between March, 1906, and September, 1907, nothing was heard of it, and in the latter month two numbers were issued in one, in the praiseworthy attempt to make up for lost time. Its chief value thus far consists in its reviews of the literature of the subject, and, most of all, in forming a centre for the encouragement of work in this new field.<sup>9</sup>

It may justly be said that the Clark school has contributed almost half the work of any value that has yet been done in this country on the psychology of religion. It was the first to apply empirical methods thoroughly to the study of the religious consciousness. It has collected an immense amount of data, and its chief merit, as well as its chief characteristic, is the emphasis which it has always put upon the value of facts as such. As might be expected, moreover, it has the defects of its qualities. Its fondness for facts seems at times almost a blind craving. Meaning and perspective are often disregarded and forgotten in the worship of the naked fact. The apocryphal tale concerning the *Report on Child Study*, that out of eleven children who were pinched five said, "Ouch!" and six said, "Ou!" seems quite credible to one who has read some of the writings of the Clark School. Thus from one of these (itself in many ways a valuable piece of work) I cull the following: "Stained glass windows were preferred by 149 of 175 who answered the question. Of these, 19 wished pictures in them." Yet it must be said that love of facts is a good fault, especially in a young science. The psychology of religion will not be beyond the early empirical stage for some time to come, and it is a fortunate thing that in its youthful years it has been so largely formed and guided by a body of thorough-going empiricists.

But the men of the Clark school have not been the only workers in this field. Even on the subject of conversion, which has been so exhaustively studied at Worcester, some of the best work has

<sup>9</sup> In this connection I should mention the foundation in May, 1907, of another journal in the same field and with the same object, the *Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie*, edited by Dr. Johannes Bresler, in Halle, and appearing monthly. The articles that have thus far appeared in it pay especial attention to pathological religious phenomena. A large part of each number is devoted to excellent reviews of the literature of the subject.

been done by men in other parts of the country. Prominent among these are Professor George A. Coe and Mr. Luther Gulick.<sup>10</sup> Professor Coe's book, *The Spiritual Life*, has been widely read, and has exerted a considerable influence upon the ministry, especially in the Methodist Church. It follows lines similar to those of Starbuck's *Psychology of Religion*, dealing chiefly with conversion and religious feeling; and, though without so broad an empirical basis as the latter book has, its facts are critically and safely interpreted. Like Starbuck's book, also, it is of practical as well as theoretical value, and is a useful guide to those dealing with religious problems at first hand. It is encouraging to note that these two investigators, though working quite independently of each other, have reached almost identical conclusions.

The most important single contribution to the psychology of religion is, of course, Professor James's *Varieties of Religious Experience*, first given as the Gifford Lectures at Edinburgh in 1901-1902, and later published in book form (London, 1903). Unlike most of its predecessors of which I have made mention, it is not limited to a single topic such as adolescence or conversion, but covers a great number of religious phenomena. The book is so widely read and has been so frequently reviewed that I need not comment upon it here. Like the works of the Clark school, it is thoroughly empirical in its point of view, being based chiefly, not indeed upon responses to a questionnaire, but upon biographies of religious leaders and other individuals whose religious nature has been marked and developed beyond the ordinary. Possibly it is in part the result of this that, on the one hand, the book is entirely without any of those meaningless and ill-digested accumulations of facts which sometimes mar the work of the Clark school, and that, on the other hand, a slightly distorted view of the religious consciousness has been given, much stress being laid on extreme and often abnormal cases, while the average and commonplace is neglected as being uninteresting and uninstructive. Much, however, may be said for Professor James's choice of cases, as it is a well-known fact that any phenomenon can be at least more clearly made out when accentuated, and not overlaid by, nor confused with, a mass of irrelevant material. And certainly,

<sup>10</sup> "Sex and Religion," Association Outlook, 1897-98.

without the assistance of his somewhat extreme types, Professor James would have had some difficulty in building up so good a case for his final thesis as he has done. For his book is not, like most of its predecessors, merely a psychological study of certain varieties of religious experience; it is, in addition to that, an attempt to see whether the facts studied may not be regarded as having some ultimate significance, and as bearing one way or the other on the deeper philosophical questions of religion. As everyone knows, Professor James's conclusion is that these facts are genuinely and deeply significant; that the religious view of the universe is nearer the truth than the limited view of natural science; and that we may accept it as a demonstrable truth of psychology that "the conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come."<sup>11</sup>

Professor James's emphasis upon the importance of the marginal region of the mind is criticised in Dr. Irving King's admirable monograph, *The Differentiation of the Religious Consciousness*.<sup>12</sup> This work deals with religion as a social rather than as an individual product, and especially as a tribal reaction among primitive peoples.

Two more books, each dealing with a limited portion only of the general field, should perhaps be mentioned before turning from America to France; I refer to Professor Davenport's *Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals* and my own *Psychology of Religious Belief*. The former is a study of the revival from the psychological and sociological points of view; the latter an attempt to analyze religious belief and to discover its psychological bases or elements and its present strength.

The psychology of religion was born and has flourished best in America; and for the very good reason that there is so much religion here to be studied. In this country religion has not been compressed into a formal and uniform mould, as is likely to be the case in Catholic lands, nor has its emotional expression, so interesting to the psychologist, been suppressed by the proprieties and conventions of a self-conscious culture. Something, however, has been done in other countries, particularly in France, on the

<sup>11</sup> Page 515.

<sup>12</sup> *Psychological Review, Monograph Supplement*, January, 1905.

psychology of religion.<sup>13</sup> But the French psychologists, not having the advantages of the American community with its innumerable and varied living specimens close at hand, have turned to the records of the past for their material. By this I do not mean to imply that France is not a religious country, nor that it cannot furnish a great deal of valuable data for the psychologist. Some excellent work has in fact been done, particularly by M. Arréat,<sup>14</sup> on material gathered at first hand and largely by means of questionnaires, dealing with the religious consciousness in France today. But the expressions of religion in France are so stamped and colored by the forms of an ancient and firmly established ecclesiasticism that they lack the spontaneity and naturalness so prominent in the American type. Hence, as I have said, most of the French psychologists who have interested themselves in religion have sought their material in biographies rather than from questionnaires; and it is therefore in France that we find the best psychological work upon that very important phenomenon, mysticism. Innumerable treatises upon the mystics had, of course, long been compiled—treatises theological, historical, physiological—but no serious study had been made upon them from the strictly psychological point of view until the new school of psychologists of religion entered upon their work.<sup>15</sup> The first of these to take the field was Professor Ernest Murisier, of the Académie de Neuchâtel in Paris. In 1901 he published a book entitled *Les maladies du sentiment religieux*, which formed the starting-point for a considerable amount of genuine psychological work on the mystics. The book is devoted to a study of two kinds of *maladie*, namely, an extreme type of mysticism, and fanaticism. Murisier shows that each of these abnormal phe-

<sup>13</sup> I have already referred to the German periodical of religious psychology, and if space permitted mention should here be made of the work of Vorbrodt, Kinast, Vierkandt, Braasch, and others, as well as of two or three English investigators. In neither of these countries, however, has the psychology of religion been so clearly differentiated from the philosophy of religion as is the case in America and France.

<sup>14</sup> *Le sentiment religieux en France*, Paris, 1903.

<sup>15</sup> Mention should, however, be made of Charbonnier's *Maladies des mystiques* (1874), and Lejeune's *Introduction à la vie mystique* (1899), which, though not chiefly psychological in aim, contain much genuine psychology.

nomena is an exaggeration of a normal tendency: one, of the tendency to unify one's own personality; the other, of the impulse to social usefulness. The title of the book (together with its implications) is unfortunate, being at once too narrow and too broad, implying, as it does, that mysticism and fanaticism are the only forms of religious pathology, and, on the other hand, that all forms of mysticism are pathological. Of course there have been abnormal mystics, and Murisier's study of these is admirable; but to write down mysticism as such, at the very start, as a "maladie du sentiment religieux" is dogmatic and unempirical. If one makes allowance for these defects, however, and reads Murisier's book merely as an analysis of certain admittedly pathological phenomena, he will find it extremely illuminating. Its influence has already been very considerable, and its value as a contribution to this branch of psychology is, I believe, not merely that of a pioneer but intrinsic and permanent. It was a great misfortune to the psychology of religion that Professor Murisier, who gave such brilliant promise, died only two years after the publication of his book.

The unfortunate one-sidedness of Murisier's work on mysticism has in large part been avoided by subsequent writers on this subject—prominent among whom should be mentioned Delacroix, Godfernaux, Boutroux, Leuba, and de Montmorand.<sup>16</sup> The best single article that has yet appeared on mysticism is probably that of Professor Leuba, "Tendances fondamentales des mystiques Chrétiens," which was published in the *Revue Philosophique* in 1902.<sup>17</sup> The same emphasis on the naturalistic point of view that was seen in Leuba's other writings is here especially manifest, and great pains are taken to show that every detail of the mystic's experience can be fully accounted for in terms of physiological psychology. Yet while he resolutely rules

<sup>16</sup> Delacroix's book is entitled *Études d'histoire et de psychologie du mysticisme* (Paris, 1908). It is not only the latest, but the most elaborate and exhaustive, treatment of the subject yet made.

Boutroux's work appeared in the *Bulletin de l'Institut Psychol. Int.*, that of the others in the *Revue Philosophique*, between 1902 and 1905.—I make no mention here of the work of Binet-Sanglé, as it deals almost exclusively with the pathological side of religion.

<sup>17</sup> LIV, 1-36; 441-487.

out the transcendental, and refuses to attribute any ultimate or metaphysical significance to mysticism, Leuba is quite willing to admit its moral value, and does much greater justice to the mystics than did Murisier.

No one could put the naturalistic view of mysticism, and of religion in general, more clearly or more persuasively than Leuba has done. Yet that another point of view is possible, and that even psychologists may take it, is shown not only by Professor James's *Varieties* but by some of the writers of the French school, notably Boutroux and Flournoy.<sup>18</sup> These men admit all the facts as described by the physiological psychologist, yet maintain that the facts may bear, and that some of them do bear, a philosophical significance which goes beyond the province of physiological psychology.

The psychology of religion of course does not wish to be metaphysics. It would be merely a science, descriptive and empirical, dealing frankly with phenomena, and ranking merely as a branch of general psychology. As such it collects data, compiles statistics, makes comparisons, and seeks to pass from the level of mere facts to classifications, generalizations, and laws. It is with this aim in view that it has made use of purely empirical methods and has sought to formulate its results in purely psychological and physiological terms. Whether it has always been successful in these efforts is indeed somewhat dubious. Its use of the questionnaire method has frequently been uncritical, and its physiological phraseology and fanciful explanations of complex states by diagrams of nerve-paths seem often an attempt at too great simplification; sometimes they impress one as positively ridiculous. Yet, though it has not fully learned the use of its tools, it has maintained with fair consistency a just notion of its proper aim—namely, to discover the facts, and to describe, classify, and explain them.

While all this is true, however, and while every reference to anything "supernatural" is rightly barred out from psychology as a natural science, it might conceivably be found that the facts

<sup>18</sup> Professor Flournoy's most important contributions are the following: "Les principes de la psychologie religieuse," *Archives de Psychologie*, II, 33-57; and "Observations de psychologie religieuse," *ibid.* II, 323-366.

as collected and described could best be explained and accounted for on some hypothesis other than the somewhat naïve naturalism adopted by the majority of scientists. It might, for example, turn out that the data in hand pointed toward some such hypothesis as that of Professor James—a "wider self" or psychic "beyond," in touch with the subconscious portion of our lives. If further investigations continued to point more and more in this direction, and new evidence for the existence of such a "beyond" were forthcoming, new facts which seemed best explicable on such a supposition, this hypothesis would have to be regarded as a perfectly scientific one, and the "beyond" would not be something supernatural but just one of the regular facts of nature, like the western hemisphere or the process of digestion or the state of hypnosis. The scientist sees nothing supernatural in the luminiferous ether, and he believes in its existence because of certain facts, which indeed might conceivably be otherwise explained, but which seem most simply and fully explicable on that hypothesis. So it might very well be with the psychological hypothesis in question. To maintain that such an hypothesis is "*grundätzlich ausgeschlossen*," that it is *impossible* because "*unscientific*," is dogmatic and unempirical, and is an utterly unwarranted playing into the hands of a crude and shallow materialism. It is often forgotten that naturalism of this kind involves a metaphysic quite as truly as does idealism.

And much indeed may be said for such a non-naturalistic explanation. There are certain facts connected with mysticism and the religious consciousness which seem to point in that general direction. The naturalistic school has still a great deal to do before it can prove its hypothesis the only tenable one. In a sense, to be sure, it can explain all the facts of the religious consciousness, just as the Ptolemaic theory can be made to explain all the movements of the heavenly bodies. The question still remains, Is it the best explanation? Until more data have come in, the naturalistic and what I may call the religious hypotheses must run along parallel with each other as rival alternatives. And so long as science looks to experience as its guide and remains genuinely empirical, the truly scientific man will keep an open mind, and though he may believe one of the alternatives to be

false, will remember that further experience may show him to be mistaken, and hence that it behooves him, in the present state of our ignorance, to avoid dogmatism on either side of the controversy.

The question, then, is still an open one. But, on the other hand, we must not forget that the naturalistic hypothesis has proved itself most useful and fruitful in results in all fields in which it has been consistently applied—something which can hardly be said for its rival, which has only too often, in the hands of over-enthusiastic and uncritical supporters, proved a stumbling-block to genuine scientific progress. And it must be admitted, moreover, that while the religious hypothesis has by no means been disproved, it is still far from showing itself indisputably and clearly the best explanation. It is still, like its rival, merely one of two possible alternatives. So long as this is the case, it would seem best for the psychologist, *as psychologist*, to work along the lines laid down by the naturalistic hypothesis, and to seek to explain all the facts so far as possible by means of the laws already clearly established by physiological psychology. If he doubts their sufficiency to explain everything, let him subject them to the test of universal application; for, if they are really inadequate and in need of supplementation, their insufficiency can be shown in no better way. This he should do, I say, as a psychologist; but this in no wise hinders him from holding to whatever transcendental explanation he may, as a religious man or as a philosopher, deem most satisfactory. An idealistic universe may be large enough to embrace a naturalistic science. And while we are still uncertain as to the proper explanation of our facts, the many data of psychology which seem to point toward a religious interpretation of the world, even though they fit in with a naturalistic description, may very properly combine with one's otherwise grounded religious outlook or idealistic philosophy to justify one, *as a man*, in holding to such a belief.

There is, therefore, nothing to hinder the psychology of religion from furnishing philosophy with material which it can use in support of a religious view of reality; and there is much in the recent investigations of the religious consciousness which may well strengthen the faith of the religious man. But it is not

merely on the theoretical side that the new science can be of use to religion. In fact the practical religious worker will gain quite as much assistance from this branch of investigation as will the philosopher or the theologian. The recent elaborate and exact studies in the religion of childhood, the phenomena of adolescence, the nature of conversion and the age at which it is to be expected, and in several other related subjects, cannot fail to be of value to the intelligent pastor, teacher, and parent. And in a more general sense the psychology of religion should be of considerable practical assistance to all those who are seriously studying the larger tendencies of the times and earnestly seeking to contribute their share toward the wise guidance of the community in its religious life.

There is a growing feeling, shared by most close students of the times, that we are in the midst of a serious religious crisis. The almost universal acceptance of biological evolution, the higher criticism of the Scriptures, the naturalistic trend of modern science, and the general increasing demand for independence of thought, are bringing about their inevitable results. The old authorities and the old arguments for the religious view of the world are yearly, even daily, losing their hold over the community. Views which would have been considered downright heresy twenty-five years ago are taught in most of our colleges and theological seminaries and openly preached from our pulpits. Side by side with this intellectual change has come a falling off in church attendance and a loss of prestige on the part of the church in general. And so the question inevitably forces itself upon every serious observer who has the interests of the community and the race at heart, whether religion, if it is to last, must not give up her time-honored trust in the old authorities and seek to draw most or all of her strength from some other quarter.

In trying to answer this vitally serious question we must avail ourselves of every means in our power to see the situation exactly as it is. What, in short, is the real strength of religion in the community? And here we have a right to look for assistance to the psychology of religion. As yet, indeed, but little has been done toward answering this question; but the task of feeling the pulse of the religious community and investigating the real nature

and strength of its religious belief naturally belongs to religious psychology, and, though vast, is well worth its while. An interesting investigation with a somewhat similar aim has just been concluded by the *Mercure de France*,<sup>19</sup> which, though hardly belonging to psychology in the stricter sense of the word, furnishes rich material to the psychologist, and possibly throws some light upon the problem just referred to. The following question was sent out to a number of the leaders of thought throughout Europe: "Are we passing through a dissolution, or an evolution, of religious ideas and of the religious sentiment?" To this question over one hundred and twenty-five answers were received, of which about twenty maintained that religion is destined to dissolution, while a hundred or more insisted that it is imperishable. Of course a mere collection of opinions such as this touches only the surface of the problem. A more thorough going investigation and one more psychological in its nature is that of M. Arréat in the book referred to a few pages back, *Le sentiment religieux en France*. After a careful consideration of the facts at hand, Arréat reaches the conclusion that "France has ceased to be passionately Catholic," and that there is no reason to believe it will ever become Protestant. "The Frenchman gives up the religion of his fathers to turn to scepticism or some philosophy." But, as the writer points out, this philosophy, and even this scepticism, may be, if not essentially Christian, at least thoroughly religious. For the man who is naturally religious will remain so, no matter what his creed; and religious belief is not confined to what we call either Catholicism or Protestantism. For all who desire to inform themselves on the religious condition of France today Arréat's book is invaluable; and investigations of a similar nature in England, Germany, and this country are a decided desideratum.<sup>20</sup> If the study were seriously undertaken by a number

<sup>19</sup> See the numbers for April 15, May 1 and 15, June 1 and 15, and July 1, 1907. Professor Goblet d'Alviella has published a brief summary of the investigation in the *Revue de Belgique*, which was reproduced in translation in the *Open Court* for January, 1908.

<sup>20</sup> Something of the sort has of course been done by a number of writers: cf. Shailer Mathews's *The Church and the Changing Order*, and Dr. Broda's review of the religious situation the world over in the *International* for March, 1908.

of capable investigators and a much greater body of data collected than Arréat was able to gather, it would furnish us with some very serviceable information as to the real status of religious belief and feeling. We can hardly steer our course wisely and successfully unless we know with some approximate degree of exactness just where we are.

There is, however, something of vastly greater importance and usefulness in this matter than statistics, and that is a knowledge of the real nature of religion and of the religious consciousness in general. From what region of man's nature does religion chiefly spring? Where are its strongest intrenchments? If the old authoritative foundations be shaken, is there really any other base to which religion may safely turn? These are, after all, the important questions, and upon them the psychology of religion can speak with authority and with no uncertain voice.

For with almost complete unanimity the workers in this field maintain that religion is a matter of temperament and attitude and demand rather than one of creed and intellectual belief. With this temperament as a basis of division, it may be said that every community is roughly divisible into two classes of people, the religious and the non-religious. The former is probably the larger of the two—in fact, it seems probable that, in this country at least, more people are naturally religious than is generally supposed; we Anglo-Saxons are, on the whole, more likely to hide our deeper feelings than to parade them. Yet it must be confessed that we cannot tell with any exactness the relative size of the two classes. Church statistics certainly throw very little light upon it. For while some of the non-religious class call themselves "sceptics," the majority of them are to be found within the churches. These people have never been religious, and perhaps never can be. Religion has never taken any real hold upon them, and if they believe in God, it is in the same abstract way in which they believe in the Czar of Russia or the binomial theorem. The loss of this belief would indeed result in their ceasing to class themselves as Christians, and might even for a time decrease their respect for morality by removing from them certain traditional restraints and sanctions. We ought therefore to hesitate indeed before shaking their faith in the old authori-

ties. And yet even should this be done—gradually and after a time—we should have no reason to anticipate any very serious results. New abstract beliefs would soon replace the old ones; new moral sanctions would take up the functions of those laid aside; and the individuals themselves, never having known the spiritual life, would suffer no great loss, being quite as religious after the change of creed as before it.

The class of people who are religious, like those who are not, are also found both within the church and without it, among the believers and among the sceptics. They are, of course, of various types, differing both in the kind and in the intensity of their feelings and beliefs. With some the "mystic germ" has been but slightly developed, being a demand or yearning rather than an intuition or an emotional certainty. With some the question of creed is of considerably more importance than with others, and in their case the overthrow of an old doctrine may work serious loss. But for the great majority a creed is but an external thing; and the rejection of one or the adoption of another, though it may mean temporary pain and struggle, is in the long run but an incidental matter. For, as I have said, nearly all the students of this subject in our day as well as in the past agree that religion in its genuine form grows out of the emotional rather than the intellectual nature, or, better still, from the man as a whole, and that the overthrow of an authority or the refutation of an argument has but little permanent effect upon the really religious spirit. In the case of the great majority of what I have called the religious class, underneath the externals of creed and cult, deep down in the hidden recesses of the conscious life, there flows a stream of religious intuitions and demands which are vital and almost instinctive in their nature, and which refuse to be utterly abolished or destroyed by anything that science or criticism can do. Religion is a more vital thing than science; it goes down deeper into life than does any intellectual doctrine: hence its forms and expressions, its creeds and its liturgies, may indeed be altered and destroyed; but through all these changes the essential part of the religious nature remains itself unchanged, serenely defying the power of successive scientific dogmas and shifting "psychological atmospheres." It is an easy thing to

pick a few leaves from an ancient oak—a child may do it, and when he has done so new leaves will grow again; but to pluck up the oak with all its deep-lying and branching roots—that would be a task that might well prove too much for the strength even of a giant.

An illustration of the vitality of religion after most of its usual modes of expression have been given up is seen in that not uncommon phenomenon, the religious agnostic. It happens not infrequently that men of culture and intellectual power, well versed in the science and criticism of our day, feel themselves unable to subscribe to any creed or to worship with any church, yet find springing up within them a stream of inarticulate but genuine religious experience and intuition which is to them the very water of life. At the risk of proving tedious, let me quote from one such instance, the confession of a French agnostic:

"I seem to feel within the depths of my being an action, a presence; in short, I seem to be the object, even prior to being the subject, of an action that is spiritual. This is in part a rudimentary, half-conscious belief, in part it is simply the expression of a fact, the testimony to a sort of profound and vague sensation. I tell myself that this sensation itself may be an illusion, that there may be nothing real about it apart from my subjectivity; but it *is*, and that is enough for me to live by. . . . It is a part of my being, and has for the rest of my being an importance and a value that are supreme—that suffices me. And for the rest, I tell myself that the very fact that I possess this experience called 'religious' is a witness in me to the existence of the inaccessible reality; of the union, within my consciousness, of the me and the not-me; that in it I have in some measure an immediate knowledge of the roots of my being, of a bond between me and something else, this 'something else' being necessarily self-conscious since it passes within my self-consciousness. . . . And just because I have become agnostic, and because every intellectual formulation of the inaccessible is for me simply a representation of the Reality, without any value in itself, I feel myself on solid ground. I have the experience there within that I have not to act but to receive; that I have not the initiative but the duty of

waiting and listening; that the source of life is beyond the conscious self, for me, for all men.”<sup>21</sup>

This man is perfectly capable of taking the naturalistic point of view, of looking at his religious experience objectively and seeing that it might be classified as hallucinatory. And yet the experience loses none of its authority, none of its certainty, for him. The naturalistic interpretation he deems quite consistent and tenable; yet for his own part he is convinced that the religious explanation is the true one, and his agnosticism on all points of creed and theology in no wise interferes. He remains a religious man spite of his agnosticism, because this religious experience of his is his very own, and because it has for his life a value that is supreme. And this suggests two important considerations which deserve brief mention here.

The authority of the religious intuition, the “mystic germ,” is seldom or never questioned. As in the case just quoted, this inner experience of the man himself seems inevitably, and in spite of rival and plausible interpretations, to claim for itself an unfaltering credence which no intellectual belief, gained by pains-taking induction or labored reasoning or external authority, can ever enjoy. And, secondly, if it ever comes to a matter of argumentation at all—which in fact is seldom the case—there is one argument in favor of the acceptance of this inner experience at its face value which, to him who has known it, is usually quite decisive; namely, *its value for life*. In the words of our agnostic friend, it is “enough to live by,” “it is a part of my being, and has for the rest of my being an importance and a value that are supreme, and that suffices me.” We outsiders may classify it learnedly as “phénomène hallucinatoire”; but the man himself knows that it is good to live by, life-giving—and “cela me suffit.” This fact of the value of religion for life is attested alike by the psychology and the history of religion and by the experience of the common man. And until human nature gets radically changed, it would seem that man will remain a religious creature, quite irrespective of the rise and fall of any dogmas, be they theological or scientific.

<sup>21</sup> Quoted from Flounoy, who reports the case at length. See his “Observations de psychologie religieuse,” in Archives de Psychologie, II, 327-366.

Of course there is nothing essentially new in all this. Yet it will hardly seem superfluous to have a belief long held on the authority of the intuition of a few confirmed by a painstaking and systematic study of a large body of facts carefully and critically collected and sifted. And in throwing more light upon the essential nature of the religious consciousness, the psychology of religion has contributed something of genuine value for the guidance of all who are trying to deal with the present crisis wisely and well.

*THE TASK OF THE SYSTEMATIC RELIGIOUS  
THINKER OF TODAY*

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Theology was once the great intellectual interest of thoughtful men. It explained their religious experience, justified their faith, and gave them intellectual satisfaction. It earned and deserved the title of "the queen of the sciences." It has now fallen upon evil days. It is depreciated and neglected. Its foes are many; and its friends, even in the Church, are not numerous. The explanation for this situation of theology may be found in the immediate practical interests of life, the new thought-world in which men now live, and also in the inadequacy of the theology once current to meet the intellectual and moral demands of modern men.

Explanation, however, is not justification. There is the same reason for theology today as yesterday. The facts of religious experience remain essentially the same, and they still demand interpretation. The faith of the soul must be maintained in a world which challenges its right to be, and against hostile systems of thought. The interpretation and vindication of religion are more needed today than ever before. The incompetence of old theologies is no reason for doing without theology. If we are true to the demands of religion, we shall be constrained to provide some theology. The new attempts at securing an adequate theology must, however, be thorough and courageous. The great need now is the discovery of some principle by which we can interpret the facts of religious experience and arrive at a reasoned insight into the meaning of man, the world, and God. It is the conviction of the writer that the religious thinker has given him in Christ this interpretative principle, and that his great tasks can be achieved by the use of this principle.

The question is seriously raised by some thinkers, when they

look upon the ruins of old theologies, whether a systematic theology is now possible. Is it not one of the ideals of the mind which must be abandoned? They ask, "Must we not be satisfied simply with the scientific presentation of the facts of religion, without the attempt at a philosophical appreciation of their ultimate significance? or, Is not the most we can do and also the best simply to show the values of religion?" Affirmative answers to these questions are accepted, strange to say, by many persons in the church.

It is of course necessary to discover the facts of religious experience and the reflection of men upon them in the past; but this scientific presentation is only preparatory to the deeper appreciation of their truth in the nature of things and, consequently, of their importance to men everywhere today. After science has done its work in any department, comes the greater work of philosophy; and after criticism and history have done their work in the sphere of religion, and on its products in the lives of men, in the institutions of society, and in its sacred literature, comes the greater task of theology in estimating these in the terms of their ultimate significance.

It is also a necessary and important task of the religious thinker to show the values of religion for modern men; but it is not his whole task. It is true that not all the facts of religion are equally significant, nor all past historic events necessarily of much value to men of today; and equally true that, since we live in a different thought-world from the men of the past, not all their explanations of religious experience are of equal validity for us. We need concern ourselves only with the moral and spiritual values of revelation which serve us in these later days.

We cannot however regard the task of the theologian as finished when he has given us his estimate of the values of religion. There are more needs of the mind than can be satisfied with values. There is the need to be assured of facts, and this need begets the spirit of investigation and gives rise to science and history. There is also the need for truth, and this gives rise to the scientific description of the fact and to the philosophic appreciation of it.

Religion too is profoundly concerned with facts. The events in the history of Israel and the facts of the life of Jesus are of the

first importance to the Christian religion. It has a fact basis in history, on which it builds its thought. It is also deeply interested in truth. It bears witness to the truth of its great facts and mighty principles. It endeavors to bring men into intimate relation with eternal realities. It grounds its values in the verities of a truthful universe. Values will not hold the mind of man long unless he is convinced of their ultimate validity. It is inevitable that religion should become theological, and that theology should become philosophical.

The religious thinker who sets about the construction of an adequate theology must find his starting-point in the religious experiences of men. The new theology must have this experiential basis. In this respect it will be as empirical as the other philosophical disciplines. However far-reaching its conclusions, its premise must be the fact of religious experience.

Religious experience takes its rise in the soul today just as spontaneously and inevitably as other kinds of experience. Man finds himself on this earth, with powers of mind which make it possible for him to be acted upon by the forces of the world, and in turn to react upon them. This action and reaction give him his experiences on the various levels of consciousness, from the lowest sensuous to the highest spiritual plane. The highest experience arises, like the lowest, from the sense of the action of forces upon him and his reaction upon them in feeling, thought, and conduct. He feels himself in relation with supersensible reality. There is another presence than the world and human beings which disturbs his soul with deep feeling, high thought, and great projects. He has the sense of dependence upon this great reality for his existence and for his larger and deeper life. He feels himself held in moral subjection to a higher authority than his own will or the wills of his fellow-beings. He is bound in obedience to a moral authority that searches his very soul, and has the august right to command him to live for the best. He realizes that he is not here for his own private interests, but in the interests of the Divine Being in whom he lives and before whom he stands. He must use his powers in furthering the interests of God. Again, and greatest of all, he finds that he may have fellowship with this divine presence; that there may be an interchange

of thought, and a communion in which he finds the joy of living and the inspiration for his high endeavor. These religious experiences take their rise here and now in the hearts of men. They are the profoundest experiences of the soul. They are the ultimate facts in our religious life.

But observe further that these religious experiences, taken in their general features, are not peculiar to one man, nor to a group of men, nor to one nation, nor one period in the history of the world. They are, on the contrary, human, universal, and persistent. The history of religions thus comes to the aid of the systematic religious thinker and helps him to make convincing the fact that religious experience is an essential characteristic of man. Religion is a constituent element in the life of the race. The human nature out of which it emerges is the same in all men, and the relation of men to the divine reality is essentially the same.

There are of course differences in religion. There are varieties of religious experiences, as there are of other experiences. The history of religion shows the same phenomena of development, arrest, and even retrogression, as other great human interests. All these facts, however, but serve to show how profoundly human a phenomenon religion is, how much involved it is with the career of the race, and how closely related it is with other aspects of the total experience of men. It is rooted in human nature. This racial aspect of religion deepens the foundation and broadens the base for the new structure which the systematic religious thinker must build.

The experience of the Christian man in this modern world has, however, a distinctive character. He is born and reborn in a Christian community. He enjoys a rich Christian heritage of thought and a great fund of religious feeling. The Christian consciousness is therefore the greatest fact in the religions of the world. It is the typical religious experience. In it religion reaches its highest meaning; it comes to its own; it is primarily moral and spiritual. This experience is deeper in its reach in the soul, greater in its power over man's life, richer in its cultivation of his nature, and clearer in its meaning for the interpretation of his life than any other.

The man with the distinctively Christian experience has a deeper sense of God, a truer understanding of his nature and character, and a stronger faith in his goodness. He has the sense that he is ever in the presence of the Father, and the conviction that love is at the heart of the universe, that righteousness rules in all things, and that the moral welfare of man is the supreme divine concern.

There is also a profound sense of moral unworthiness. The vision of the divine perfection reveals, by contrast, how great is man's imperfection. The vision of the divine holiness produces the consciousness of moral uncleanness. This sense of sin is not the primary fact in the Christian religion, but secondary; it is not original, but derivative. While it is one element in the Christian experience, and has a darker hue than is found in other religions, it is not the deepest element. For the very vision of God that produces in the Christian the sense of sin also produces the experience of redemptive grace. The Christian realizes that he is not left alone to work out his salvation. His redemption is the chief interest of God; and in this truth he finds his hope for the achievement of a noble character and his inspiration for high endeavor in bringing in the Kingdom of Heaven.

The deepest thing in Christian experience, in which it takes its rise and reaches its culmination, is the filial consciousness. The Christian soul cries in times of joy and sorrow, of success and failure, on earth, and forevermore in heaven, "Abba, Father!"

This Christian experience, which has produced the distinctive type of Christian consciousness, is due ultimately to Christ. It is true that these great truths are mediated through individual Christians, and the church, and other agencies which embody more or less the contents and the spirit of the Christian faith. There is a great Christian succession, which reaches back from Christian parents in the home to the apostles and martyrs of the New Testament; and all have had some part in the creation of this type of religious experience. But the primary source for this type of religious experience is found in the life and teaching of Christ. He is the author and finisher of our faith. It is his consciousness of the Father that creates our distinctive sense

of God. His conviction of the great spiritual realities creates our religious assurance. His moral earnestness makes us take a serious view of life. His hopefulness of man and the world awakens in us great expectations. When we are experiencing the deep and great realities of religion, we are reproducing his experiences. When we think of God as Father, interpret our relation to him as filial, and believe in the redemption of the world as at present in progress and in the future as realized, we are thinking in Christ's terms, and living in his spirit, and believing with him. When we are at our best, we are making his life our own. When we take the Christian attitude towards God and man and the world, we have the mind of Christ. Christ, therefore, is the creator of this Christian consciousness.

More than this, he is the norm for the determination of this consciousness. He is the type of the Christian experience which is to be reproduced in all souls. What is congruent with the type, or what can be assimilated to it, may have its place and part in the consciousness of other Christians. This is the principle which we must use in our estimation of the worth of experiences, ideas, and ideals in the modern world, and in the Scriptures as well. We must endeavor to enrich our experiences with the world-life; but we should be selective in our attitude towards this life and take only what can be transmuted into the Christian type of experience. There is no source of enrichment so great as the Scriptures; but even here we must be selective, and appraise everything by its Christian affinities.

The systematic thinker, in dealing with religion, is engaged not only with a genuine and profound aspect of human life but with the most significant experience of man. The mind functions at its best in religion. All its powers are in highest activity. The heart feels most deeply and intensely; the mind thinks most profoundly and comprehensively; the will goes forth in a mighty way to do the behests of God. There is nothing that makes such a strenuous demand upon the total nature of man as religion. The more soul, the more religion; the greater the activity, the deeper the experience. It is in religion that we have the transcendent activity of the mind. President Eliot has given noble expression to this thought in an address on the *Future of*

*the New England Churches.* "Does any one ask," he says, "why universities, which must inevitably be occupied chiefly with secular knowledge, should feel any great concern for the permanence of religious institutions? I answer, that universities exist to advance science, to keep alive philosophy and poetry, and to draw out and cultivate the highest powers of the human mind. Now science is always face to face with God, philosophy brings all its issues into the one word duty, poetry has its culmination in a hymn of praise, and prayer is the transcendent effort of intelligence." Religion is thus the greatest possible activity of the soul. It is man at his best. It is religion, as Hegel said, that constitutes the true dignity of man.

As man comes to his best in religion, so religion comes to its best in Christ. Religion may be regarded from a point of view which includes within it all religious phenomena. The general features of religion are the main interest. The effort is made to give an inclusive definition. Religion may also be regarded from another and higher point of view, which seeks for the typical features, and takes account only of the essential elements of the highest achievement of the religious consciousness. The religious thinker possesses in the Christian gospel the typical features of religion. It is not the general features of religions, but the typical features of the Christian religion, that reveal to him the true meaning of religion. For him religion culminates in Christ's religious experience. The prophetic hopes and longings of the hearts of men in all lands and in the long-past ages find their fulfilment in his life. His conception of God as the loving Father makes clear the object of their search. His fellowship with God on all the great concerns of the soul and of the world realizes their yearnings for full communion with the divine. His thought of all men as the children of God, his interpretation of human life as a moral relation, and his ideal of the brotherhood of man as the social end of every man's endeavor, satisfy the moral seriousness of all the great souls whose passion has been to make religion a thing, not of ritual nor of dogma, but of life. Jesus is himself the greatest thing in the Christian religion. In him we see what religious experience is in all its depth and breadth and height. He is the glorious illustration of the relig-

ious life. Religion realizes its great possibilities in his personality. He is the greatest soul at its best in the highest sphere of human life.

It is an essential and distinguishing feature of the religious experience, at its lowest racial level and at its highest Christian summit, that it has an objective reference. While it is a profoundly emotional experience, it is not wholly so, nor does its emotion terminate in the self. The religious feelings are outgoing feelings. They imply an objective reality from whose stimulus they take their rise and to which they go out in search as their proper object. While religion is the profoundest subjective experience possible to man, it is also the most objective. If it were not due to a direct relation with a divine reality, it could not hold or win the attention of serious men. When we are profoundly religious, we are compelled to become philosophical and theological. We must seek to know the objective reality with which our religion links us. There is the same reason for believing in the divine reality into relation with which we are brought by our religious experience as there is for belief in any other objective reality which comes into our experience. The venture of faith here is the same the soul makes in practical conduct, science, and philosophy. The soul is not great enough for itself, and it is too great for ultimate scepticism at this point. It seeks to know the eternal reality.

The great problem, however, has been to find some principle by which the nature and meaning of the eternal reality might be known. As long as men had recourse to something less significant than themselves, there could be no true interpretation of God or the world. It was only when they took the best in their own lives as the principle of interpretation that they began to read aright the meaning of the life of God.

Now the systematic religious thinker takes the best soul in the history of the race as the key to the meaning of God and all things. He finds in Christ the man who is the measure of all things. While he is indebted primarily to Greek philosophy for the humanistic principle, he is indebted to the Christian religion for the person who is great enough to serve as the principle. Protagoras was the first to assert the principle that "man

is the measure of all things." He evidently intended it to be a sceptical principle. He meant by it that in our interpretation of life we cannot get beyond the human point of view, and, indeed, each man is shut up to his own point of view. It is impossible to get an objective criterion. There is therefore no use in wasting time and strength in this futile endeavor.

The first attempt at a deeper reading of life through a constructive use of this humanistic principle was made by Socrates. Renouncing the attempt to interpret the natural world, he gave himself the more strenuously to the interpretation of the inner nature of man. He held that there is a real science of human nature. If man is the measure of all things, then the measure is at least a being with moral ends which can be brought into the light of consciousness by reflection and fashioned into beautiful ideals.

While Socrates did much in giving a nobler interpretation of the moral nature of the man who is the measure of all things, he did little or nothing in the larger interpretation of the world through man. He did his work so well, however, in making man fully intelligible, that his followers, from Plato to the modern idealists, have been free to make the larger use of the principle. They have all seen that "man's life furnishes us with a key which opens up to us the secrets of the universe more adequately than any other that can be used."<sup>1</sup>

This is the principle by which the theistic interpretations of the universe are made. There is no other way open to us to the heart of the universe except our own human personalities. If this way is blocked for us, then there is no other highway or path. The greatest minds have refused to believe that the way is blocked. They have made the great venture of interpreting the universe through the highest in their own lives. The systematic religious thinker finds himself here in the company of the great idealists of all lands and of many centuries.

While, however, these thinkers have used man in general as their principle of interpretation, the Christian thinker makes use of Christ as his final principle for the interpretation of reality. In the life of Christ there are certain elements which are of the

<sup>1</sup> Mackenzie's Humanism.

first importance for our interpretation of man, the world, and God. The first is his consciousness of God. This was vivid, intense, and continuous. It was the deepest experience of his life. He moved about in the world of the spirit in the fullest conscious realization of it. He had fellowship with God in a more real sense, and with greater satisfaction, and with a clearer understanding, than he had with men. This fellowship attained to a sense of oneness with God. There was harmony between his will and the will of God and correspondence between his mind and the mind of God. Thus the life of Christ became the perfect organ for the full expression of the life of God. The eternal thought in the divine mind came to and through his mind; the deepest love in the heart of God found expression in and through his heart; the purpose of God for the world was realized in his life. Jesus was thus the very incarnation of the life of God. His soul was grounded in the being of God, and God's life was embodied in his life.

This is the great truth which the Christian church has ever striven to express and to conserve in its doctrine of the divinity of Christ. It has felt assured of the nature, character, and purpose of God when it has seen him revealed and incarnated in Christ. The deepest longing of the soul to be certified as to the character of God and his purpose with reference to its life and the life of the world has been met by the doctrine of the divinity of Christ. The church has been sure of this one instance of incarnation. It has clung to this with great tenacity, and has served all after-ages by its fidelity. If the church had been robbed of this precious truth, humanity as well as the church would have been infinitely the poorer.

While the church was sure of this one incarnation, it had no such firm hold of the other great fundamental truth of the universal incarnation. The ideal incarnation is, however, but a special and perfect instance of the universal fact. It makes clear to us that the human as human is the medium of the divine. All lives are grounded in the being of God and partake of his nature, and in proportion to the development of their humanity they are capable of incarnating the life of God. The doctrine of the incarnation, when it is carried to its legitimate conclusion, makes

clear to us the twofold fact that all souls are grounded in God and that God is incarnated in all souls. This conserves for us in the very being of God all our great and precious values of personality and character.

The Christian thinker of today must make the largest use of the truth of the incarnation of God in Christ. He must be true to his principle and go all the way with it. He must not hesitate in applying it in interpreting God nor in interpreting man. He must read the character of God in the terms of the character of Christ. What men would not ascribe to the purpose or motive or conduct of Christ they must not ascribe to God. This will give us a new and the true reading of the life of God. The historic theology of the church has been morally defective since it has not used the total consciousness of Christ in its reading of the character of God.

In like manner the Christian thinker of today must apply the principle of the incarnation to the interpretation of the lives of all men. He will hold firmly to the ideal incarnation in Christ for its own sake, but also for the sake of the discovery and interpretation it enables him to make of the fact of the incarnation in all men. They stand in essentially the same fundamental relation to God as Christ, since they partake of his nature, and work out his purposes, and realize his ideals for them. They must be finally interpreted by the intention of God in their creation and by the possibilities of their nature.

Another fact in the life of Christ of fundamental significance in our interpretation of his life and, through his life, of God and man, is his great ethical principle. We may best express this by the term ethical personalism. The depth and breadth and height of the life that Christ lived gave him the profoundest possible personal experience and the clearest insight into the reality and worth of personality. The greatest fact in his inner world was his own soul. He had a deep sense of its moral dignity and a strong and great conviction of its infinite value. He discovered in other men the same moral personalities. If they did not realize their worth, it did not make their personalities of no worth. Even if they sinned against their souls, that did not rob them of all moral worth. It only made their sin the more deplorable.

Jesus realized the moral worth of men in spite of their sin, and consequently had a profound respect and love for them, and gave himself in service to make them achieve character and to bring them all into right personal relations with one another. The infinite worth of the personality of every man and the right personal relations of all men were his fundamental ethical principles. He dealt primarily with persons, not institutions; with men rather than movements. If men lived the life of the soul and were in right moral social relations, then the Kingdom would be established.

It is this recognition of ethical personalism that has made his ideal such a power in history and gives it such influence today. It is true that the forms of his thought are largely set aside, and that his precepts had special reference to local and contemporary conditions, and that many modern problems did not come within the field of his vision. Yet, after making all these deductions from his ethical teaching, the fact remains that he has given us the great ethical principles by which we interpret the moral worth of each man and the moral mission of all men. The fundamental ethical facts of life are the same yesterday, today, and forever. Each man has a moral personality of infinite worth; all men must come into the deepest and broadest possible social relations; the attitude of love upon the part of each and all, under all circumstances, and in all places, is their moral duty. We must still go to him for the ethical principle for the right interpretation of man's moral nature and his moral relations in the world. The more men do this, the deeper is their insight into their own souls, the higher their ideal, and the greater their devotion to the moral interests of man. The progress of the world is made by the realization of his principles. Christ's ethical ideal is the highway to the City of God.

Since Christ, then, is our key for the interpretation of God and man, and his moral experience and ethical ideal are thus summed up, we get a clearer insight into the purpose and the nature of God. We read the purposes of individual existence and of the moral movement of history as the realization of the moral personality of each and of all. The nature of each is interpreted by the realized personality of Jesus, as the oak inter-

prets the nature and the purpose of the acorn, and the relation in which Jesus stood to all the men and women and children with whom he came into contact gives us the moral goal of the ethical process through the centuries. What he was, each must strive to be; what his personal social relations were, we must work for in our day and generation.

These great ethical interests are true not only in the human sphere of the soul and of history but also in God's own life. They have their value for us, and they have their validity in God. They are real in God while only ideal in us; and their reality in him will secure their realization in us. We must therefore have a conception of God great enough for the eternal foundation of these moral interests. We must have a conception of God which will account for, and at the same time safeguard, all our moral values and social interests. He must include within his own life the outcome of all human life and love. Our idea of God must be adequate for our moral universe. Ethical personalism, here and now, must have its ground and richer counterpart in the being of God.

Self-sacrifice is another fact of fundamental significance in the life of Christ. As he stood at the centre of the moral and religious life and looked out upon the world with its multitudes of men, he realized that he could not do for them what he wanted to do without going to the uttermost limit of self-sacrificing love. The very greatness of his ideal for men and the vast possibilities of their nature would require the dedication of his whole soul in their service. The necessity for the sacrificial life lies in the need of help for the realization of this great ideal and the unfolding of these vast possibilities. The necessity is not caused by the fact of sin, though sin increases the necessity and makes the task infinitely more difficult. The law of sacrifice is the law of the universe prior to the sin of man, and will be its law after his sin is but the pale memory of his earthly career. Yet the fact of sin makes the sacrificial life a greater necessity, and fills it with poignant experiences. Jesus realized as no one else that the sin of man was the great hindrance to the realization of his ideal purpose for them. Their sin made them blind to what they were; it sunk them into the depths of animalism; it set

them in moral isolation from one another or in antagonism to one another; it made impossible the coming of the Kingdom in which all would be brothers; it kept them apart from their heavenly Father.

When he thought of what men were by nature and what they could be in character, there came to him the sense of the tragedy of man's sinful life. The conviction was born in him that the thing that must be done, and the greatest thing he could do, was to save men from their sin that they might live the life for which they were created. It was this greatest and deepest of moral problems with which Christ grappled. He interpreted his mission in life in the terms of the salvation of men. He gave his great soul to this task. His soul felt the woe and misery of sin. He suffered the utmost moral cost of a sacrificial love. His soul travailed in pain for the salvation of men. It was through this travail of soul on behalf of men that he won them from their sin and bound them in love to God and one another. The process of atonement, or reconciliation, went on in the souls of men when they were in his presence; and the same process goes on, century after century the world over, when men come under the power of his life, as they reproduce his thought in their minds, his love in their hearts, and his purpose in their wills.

This great experience of Jesus is the key by which we open the door into the inner life of God. Jesus interpreted the life of God through the deep and holy love in his own heart. Before this love had its upwelling in his heart, it had its eternal fountain in the heart of God; before it called him to his high vocation, it had given God his eternal vocation; before it had involved so much moral suffering on his part, it had involved the same for the heavenly Father. The love which compelled him to live and die for men was the same kind of love which determined the attitude of God towards men. Christ's attitude towards men in time is the same as the eternal attitude of God towards all his children. The sacrificial love that had its highest expression in the life of Christ is the deepest thing in the life of God. It flowers in the world, and comes to fruitage in the life of Christ and all good souls, because it is rooted in the very being of God. The law of sacrifice through which men realize their moral ideals,

and spend themselves in the service of others, and establish the Kingdom on the earth, is grounded in the divine nature. This law of sacrifice thus yields us the deepest insight into the character of God. It is one of the most precious and potent truths of the Christian gospel; and the religious thinker must show that it has its reality in God, that it is the law of life, and that Christ was its truest exponent and best example.

Once more, there is the fact of Christ's certainty of the eternal preservation of his soul and of all souls by God. The faith of Christ in the loving care of God deepened with the years, and grew in power as the end of his life drew near. He based the immortality of the soul in the nature of God, and had the profound conviction, which amounted in his consciousness to a certainty, that death would not end his career nor defeat his cause in the world. He looked into the immediate future and saw the black clouds of men's hate and murderous designs; but he looked beyond this into the greater future, and contemplated himself as living with God and in the hearts of men. The last words on the cross show his absolute assurance of God's care and keeping of his life in the very moment of death itself—"Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit." There could be no greater conviction of the continuance of his life beyond this earthly scene. And there can be no more secure basis for that conviction than the moral character of God. Here is the fundamental ground of immortality. Here is our primary datum for thought on the eternal life. If God is not trustworthy, if his hands do not hold the soul, then there is no hope.

Whatever use we may make of Christ's resurrection, it can only be confirmatory of this fundamental thought of Christ. It is not an independent ground: it can only be at most a confirmation of his deeper thought. Scholarship may make it impossible for us to use the records of the resurrection as we once did; it may point out their discrepancies, indicate the legendary accretions, show the crass materialism of the later accounts, and even argue that resuscitation is not resurrection. We may be forced to admit all this. Yet the great fact of Christ's consciousness of the living God as the ground of our hope now and of our life hereafter remains untouched.

The great fact in Christ's experience, accessible to our thought and possible to our experience, is his faith in the character of God as conserving all souls in the eternal world. The resurrection faith is confirmatory of this. The conviction of the souls of men in the early Christian days and in our time that such a personality as Christ's is conserved in the universe forevermore is the thing that grips the heart. The annihilation of Jesus would be the destruction of the greatest personal value of the race. The moral character of God is at stake in the preservation of Jesus. The conservation of Jesus' life makes the universe a wholly different thing from what it would be if he no longer lived in God, and with him, and for him. The universe takes on a new moral character when the greatest personal value of humanity is forever conserved in it.

The same consciousness that yields us this insight and conviction tells us that his faith concerns not himself alone, but all souls as well. God is not the God of the dead, but of the living, for all live unto God. We too can commend and commit the souls of our dear ones and of ourselves, and indeed humanity also, into the hands of God, and be assured by Christ and by our hearts that they are safe in him. The conservation of the ideal human life realized is the pledge of the conservation of all human life for the realization of the ideal.

These four facts of Christ's consciousness constitute his right to be taken as the principle by which the systematic religious thinker interprets the being of God and the meaning of the world. The highest reality in human life is taken to assure the soul of its deepest convictions and to enlighten its thought of the eternal reality. The interpretation of the being of God in the terms of Christ's life and thought makes him supremely personal in nature, profoundly moral in character, and eternally altruistic in purpose. The meaning of the world is read in this thought of God; and the character and career of man, in time and eternity, are regarded as determined in ideal and purpose, and as fashioned and guided, by the loving Father.

The constructive religious thinker has the still further task of showing the relation of man's religious experience to his other experiences, and of vindicating its truth in relation to the other

realities of the world. It is required of him that he have a philosophy of religion. He must add to his faith knowledge. He must not follow the example of some who abandon this task.

The Ritschelian theology has served us well in fixing attention on the great ethical and religious value of the revelation of God in Christ. It has emphasized the central thing in the Christian religion and in Christian theology. It has freed theology from the charge of being a dry and devitalized interest. It has also liberated us from many things which men formerly thought more essential to the gospel. There is nothing but praise and gratitude for this high service. The whole Christian world is greatly indebted to this theological movement. It has, however, proved weak where a modern theology must be strong. It has divorced philosophy from religion. It has discarded metaphysic from theology. It has depreciated all theoretical interests in matters of religion. It has abandoned the attempt to add philosophical knowledge to religious faith. Practically the only place where God may be found is in Christ. All other ways to God are barred by the warning, "No thoroughfare, dangerous passing." It would save religion by isolating it from the serious philosophical pursuits of men. It would keep it in an inaccessible citadel; and has called in sceptical allies to aid in defending it. The worst enemy of this theology is its own fundamental scepticism. More than once in the history of religion men have tried this method of safeguarding its sacred interests, and always with disastrous results. There is no safeguard and defence for the sacred interests of religion like truth. This is the great ally of religion—"Thy truth is my shield and buckler." Whatever the truth, and wherever its source, it is the great safeguard of religion. The faith that has knowledge added to it will multiply its power.

We are forced to relate our religious experience to other experiences and our religious knowledge to other knowledge by two necessities. There is, first, the inner need for it. All the experiences of life have their rise and place in one and the same mind. It is the same mind that comes into contact with the world on the level of its material forces, and with men on the level of daily life, and with God on the heights in spiritual fellowship. The modern man has a variety of experiences and a multiplicity

of interests, and his first intellectual task is to bring order and coherence and unity into his own mind. He cannot allow disorder there. His mind must not be a junk-shop of various scraps of knowledge. Nor must it satisfy him to arrange his experiences and order his knowledge into separate compartments. This may serve very well as a convenience in the office or in the study, but it will not do for the mind itself. A man's experience and knowledge of various things must be an organic whole. They must have a vital connection. There must be dependence and interdependence of the parts and the whole. The mind's own life must be a living and systematic whole. A man must be religious with all his powers. He must love God with his whole soul. He must live his life in unity if he would have power and enjoy peace. The intellectual tragedy of divided interests we witness today in the lives of many men. Their religious experience and theological knowledge are at war with the new and rich knowledge of the modern world. There is no peace for the earnest and thorough-going mind except in the inner systematization of all its experience and knowledge.

There is also the objective necessity. The very fact that we live our lives in a universe is itself a demand upon us that we understand it. We must have knowledge of all our interests and experiences in their objective reality. Our various interests and the several branches of our knowledge have their place in the woven texture of things, which, like the robe of Jesus, is without seam. Every part of our knowledge and every one of our experiences have their threads inwoven in this seamless garment of truth. Or, to change the figure, everything we know or experience is in a context of meaning; it is never truly known apart from the context; and it can only be finally known when its whole context is read and understood.

We are impelled to try to secure a subjective and an objective systematization of the universe of truth accessible to us. We cannot, of course, secure this completely; our inner world is too incoherent, and the outer world is at once too complex and too fragmentary as it reports itself to us; but this is the sublime ideal which the great thinkers have ever cherished. It is a flying ideal they pursue, but the pursuit itself is inspiring.

We are thus at once compelled and encouraged to recognize the mutual relations and aids which our religious experience and our secular experience, our theology and the various sciences sustain and give to one another. Religion and theology may have the most to give, but the service is not altogether one-sided. It is like St. Paul's gracious conception of his relation to the Roman Christians when he wrote, "I long to see you, that I with you may be comforted in you, each of us by the other's faith, both yours and mine."

The sciences throw much light upon the world in which we live and in the face of which we must maintain our faith. They reveal to us the sublimity of our world in its extent in space and its duration in time. They give us an infinite and an eternal world in which to live. They trace for us the protean manifestation of the one infinite and eternal energy that is the source of all things. They discover for us the marvellous laws which describe the career of the sun and also of the mote that floats in the sunbeam. They make clear to us the mighty movement of evolution from the star-mist to the coming of man, who stands "God-conquered with face to heaven upturned." They make us realize that however wonderful the mechanism of nature is, the teleological end reached in the ascent of man is still more wonderful. They enter into his soul, learn the secret processes of all his powers, and the intimate connection of the whole organism, and the significance of religion in his experience. They open to our gaze the long, difficult way the race has trodden to our days. They study our contemporary life with its vast complexity, tremendous powers, grave problems, and they prophesy greater things in store for our forward-moving humanity. They endeavor to give an interpretation of nature, man, and God in terms satisfactory to the reason.

The systematic religious thinker receives all this knowledge from the hands of these fellow-workers in the world of truth, and gives it a deeper meaning through the application of his great interpretative principle. For a philosophic appreciation of the deeper meaning of scientific facts and principles and their place in a universe of truth, it is absolutely necessary to have recourse to the humanistic principle of interpretation; and for

the systematic religious thinker, as we have seen, Christ is the highest principle of interpretation. The naturalistic interpretation of nature is made through the natural objects as they are presented to us, while the humanistic interpretation is made through the thinking subject. The fundamental fact, then, in our interpretation of nature, when we take into consideration its qualitative differences and teleological movement, is mind. Nature is the revelation of spirit. All its forces are the manifestation of will; all its laws reveal the methodical working of mind; all its advancing forms of life make evident the realization of purpose; the coming of man and the advent of Christ show us the kind of will and mind and purpose that lie behind and within nature. "We baptize," as Dr. Gordon says, "the creative Being behind nature and behind human history and life into the name of Christ."<sup>1</sup>

In like manner the systematic religious thinker gives a deeper interpretation of the life of man. He gladly takes from the hands of the scientist, psychologist, and historian all his facts concerning man's origin, his psychological functioning, and his career on the earth to this day; but he reads his life in the light of the incarnation. He therefore finds a deeper moral nature in him, a more sublime goal of all his endeavor, and an infinite significance in his character and career. The movement of history is towards an ever greater realization of the Kingdom of God. The whole process and the goal of civilization are read in terms of the Kingdom of God. In a word, the whole world of man's interests is the subject of redemption.

The theologian receives from the philosopher, his nearest fellow-worker—indeed, his colleague in the department of deepest truth—his significant principles and results. He finds himself nearer to the philosopher than to any other worker. They have much in common, and this common possession is becoming more every day. They are profoundly interested in ultimate realities; they are impelled to seek an interpretation of the meaning of the world, man, and God; they cannot rest until they find "the good of the intellect." The philosopher endeavors to find this good in moving from the world and man to God, and the theologian accompanies

<sup>1</sup> Gordon, *The Christ of Today*, p. 91.

him on his way. The philosopher is satisfied when he finds the ultimate reality; but the theologian desires a clearer understanding of this ultimate reality, and is profoundly concerned with its personal nature, high moral character, and everlasting interest in the lives of men. Theology seeks a clearer understanding of God for a deeper fellowship with him and a greater co-operation with his mighty purposes. With philosophy it would know all that can be known; but this knowledge is for life—"If ye know these things, blessed are ye if ye do them." The contrast between philosophy and theology may be illustrated by two scriptural texts. Philosophy loves the text, "The spirit of man is the candle of the Lord": theology the text, "In thy light shall we see light."

Finally, the systematic religious thinker has the practical task of making his truth serve his day and generation. He owes a duty to his truth and to his age. He must endeavor to rescue theology from its threatened oblivion and recover it to the exalted place it once held. He must try to relate it to the throbbing life of the world, and guide the thought of his age on the deepest subjects of human thinking. This work must be done primarily in our schools of theology. It is of the utmost importance that these schools turn out men who have a profound interest in theology; who can think through the great theological truths, and have reasoned convictions on all the mighty themes of the Christian religion. The pulpits of the land will have more power when the preachers have a reasoned and vital theology.

The religious thinker owes a duty to the church also. He must strive to help it give more attention to the great contents of the Christian faith. The church sorely needs a better understanding of its faith and a deeper interest in it. Its attention is too largely taken up with secondary matters, and it lives too much for the immediate interests which serve to give it the semblance of power in the lives of men. The church needs to return to the central things of its faith, to the ruling conceptions of the consciousness of Christ and their mighty implications; and it is the duty of the religious thinker to help the church make this return. The more the great reasoned truths of religion take possession of the mind

of the church, the more will it be recalled to its primary tasks and fundamental interests.

Finally, there is the serious task of ministering to the men who are no longer in intellectual sympathy with the church nor with the Christian religion. This is one of the ominous facts of our day. It is a grave question whether the church has not lost its intellectual leadership. There is no doubt of this as respects the Catholic Church, for it is dead set against the whole modern movement of thought. Unless the religious thinkers in the Protestant churches win the place of leadership, grave consequences will be inevitable. We can still count upon the moral sentiment of the community, which is largely Christian, and still more upon the Christian ethical ideal. But both the sentiment and the ideal are due to the fundamental truths of the Christian religion. We cannot expect that men will long feel the power of the moral sentiment and hold to the Christian ethical ideal when they are perplexed, or in grave doubt, about the fundamental truths of the gospel. Our only hope of keeping the sentiment of the age Christian and of maintaining the Christian ideal in its rightful place lies in making these fundamental truths the dominant ideas in the minds of men. This is the urgent duty of the systematic religious thinker.

*MONISM, PLURALISM, AND PERSONALISM*

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Two philosophical conceptions of God are now contesting the field with the theology of Christianity—Monism and Pluralism. It will be the endeavor of this paper to show that neither of them offers so rational, adequate, and comprehensive a conception of God as does Christianity, for the reason that neither is so true to that category which is coming to be more and more clearly recognized as the supreme interpretation of deity, namely, personality.

## I.

Monism, if it is to successfully differentiate itself from pantheism, must show its consonance with personality. That has long been its recognized and accepted task. The history of philosophy since Kant has been largely occupied with a prolonged and varied attempt to bring personality into harmony with a monistic interpretation of the universe. Fichte attempted it, and reached a universal will or life, spiritual, and inclusive of other finite realities, but which could hardly be called personal.<sup>1</sup> Schelling tried it, and came out with an impersonal absolute. Then came Hegel, and, advancing to a new and vital conception, endeavored to demonstrate the personality of the absolute by showing that the whole process of cosmic and human development is a consciousness process, and that this consciousness must be one and personal.

The crucial and much disputed question concerning Hegel's philosophy is whether his all-embracing, all-enfolding absolute is personal or impersonal. Professor Seth emphatically denies

<sup>1</sup> "I abhor all religious conceptions which personify God, and regard them as unworthy of a reasonable being," said Fichte, although by this he probably meant personify in the sense of anthropomorphize.

personality to Hegel's Absolute.<sup>2</sup> Dr. McTaggart takes the same view; basing his definition of personality upon self-consciousness—the ability to say "I am"—he affirms his belief that "Hegel did not himself regard the Absolute as personal."<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, Professor Calkins seems to regard Hegel as teaching the personality of the Self: "The absolute self, differentiated, Hegel teaches, into the rich variety of the world of nature and of limited spirit, is no lifeless or abstract thought, but concrete self. 'The highest, extremest, summit,' as he says, 'is pure Personality, which alone—through that absolute dialectic which is its nature—encloses and holds all within itself.'"<sup>4</sup> But although Hegel thus expressly attaches the term personality to the absolute, it will not do, in view of his habitual freedom in the use of terms, to take his own word for it. His system as a whole makes it impossible to conceive of the absolute as in any true sense personal.

Aside from Dr. McTaggart's contention that Hegel's absolute is not personal because it is not completely self-conscious, the decisive issue lies not so much at that point as in the ethical incompetency for personality of a being who confounds good and evil. Hegel's absolute is not personal, because it is not moral. A pure personality might possibly be conceived as adventuring into unconsciousness in order to attain to a higher consciousness, but not as adventuring into evil in search of a higher good. Of this, our own pursuit of personality assures us incontestably. It is true that in his personal development a man may, through his very sin, his very self-apostasy, come in the end circuitously to that point in spiritual progress which he might have reached in the straight line of moral integrity, yet it is not because of his sin but in spite of it.

It is very easy to confuse condition and cause. A man's sin may be the condition of his salvation; it is never the cause of it. *O beata culpa!* is a natural cry from a redeemed self, but it means only that in the joy of redemption the light of the new life shines backward, and suffuses even the sinister act of apostasy, which

<sup>2</sup> Hegelianism and Personality.

<sup>3</sup> Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, p. 59.

<sup>4</sup> The Persistent Problems of Philosophy, p. 388.

the soul nevertheless knows to have been, in itself, wholly and solely injurious and bad. Because the self can, with the aid of the higher self, recover its lost birthright, let us not suppose that the selling of the birthright was the means of its recovery.

There is only one way to explain moral evil adequately, and that is as the act of finite freedom—a freedom so essential to personality that without it a human being could not be a person. But although sin is a free act, each act of evil, instead of being a step forward in the progress of personality, is a step backward. If, in exerting itself sufficiently to recover this lost ground, the self attains new strength of selfhood, shall we attribute the gain to the backward step, or to the act of self-recovery? If it be replied that it was the backward step that made possible the self-recovery, the answer is that it simply determined the form of the self-exertion which, better directed, might have resulted in still greater advance.

We do not rightly estimate moral evil except when we perceive it as, in itself, purely, wholly hateful, hostile, and destructive. It may be so involved with other motives and with conditions that make for good that, confused with its accompaniments, it seems good, but *per se* it is not mere absence of good, much less good in disguise, but the implacable foe of good. Only as we recognize it as such can we overcome it, and get good by overcoming. Itself can never be changed into good; its overcoming works us inexpressible good.

It is of course conceivable that God may be one like ourselves, pressing on stumblingly, haltingly, toward self-realization; committing not simply mistakes but sins; knowing good yet doing evil; self-directive yet self-defeating. Such a God, containing within himself all human persons, might be a person in the making, as we are, but he could not be a complete person. He would need an infinite person to account for him. For imperfect personality requires perfect personality. There can be in the realm of the moral, the personal, no imperfect except as there is a perfect. In the realm of the impersonal this principle does not hold, because the impersonal gets its ideal element only from the personal realm. There may be imperfect islands, yet no perfect island; imperfect houses, yet no perfect

house; but there cannot be imperfect persons and no perfect person. I may have the idea of a perfect island without its actually existing; but I cannot have the idea of a perfect person without his existence, because he exists, not in the realm of the actual, that is the physical, at all, but only in the realm of the ideal, the eternal.<sup>5</sup> In so far as I, as a person, belong to that ideal order, I am in direct relation to him, the perfect person, just as, as a physical being, I am in direct relation to the race.

Not only does Hegel's monism thus contradict divine personality, it takes away much of the meaning and reality from human personality. It is indeed a high prerogative to be a part of the absolute self, a moment in the universal process of the divine self-realization; but if one has no choice in the matter, no power to the contrary, is there after all much significance in the part he plays? What is left of human personality, with autonomy gone and responsibility shattered? Hegel was too much absorbed in the great areas and wide inclusions of a comprehensive system to be much concerned with the interest of the separate self. Lost in a vast movement, subordinated to a mighty process, the individual human self was left to take such inventory of its diminished greatness as it might.

This indifference to human personality on the part of Hegelianism could not continue. Neo-Hegelianism awoke to the necessity of finding a worthier and better defined place for the human self, and this has been its most distinctive task. Most noteworthy in this direction is the philosophy of Professor Royce, who has gone further in his study of human selfhood, in the attempt to reconcile personality and monism, than any other writer. In *The Conception of God*, *The World and the Individual*, and *Studies of Good and Evil*, Professor Royce has attacked this problem from every angle, and pursued it with remarkable penetration and perseverance. The result is a contribution to philosophy of the greatest wealth and value.

The human self, Professor Royce defines as "a meaning embodied in a conscious life, present as a relative whole within

<sup>5</sup> The ontological argument, that is, in the true form is valid; but we are not dependent upon it for our knowledge of the existence of God. That comes through personal recognition.

the unity of the Absolute life.”<sup>6</sup> To this relative whole within the absolute Professor Royce attributes what he regards as a real freedom, namely the freedom of expressing a unique and worthful meaning: “What we see, however, is that every distinguishable portion of the divine life, in addition to all the universal ties which link it to the whole, expresses its own meaning.”<sup>7</sup> Again: “I alone, amongst all the different beings of the universe, will this act. That it is true that God here also wills in me, is indeed the unquestionable result of the unity of the divine consciousness. But it is equally true that this divine unity is here and now realized by me, and by me only, through my unique act. My act, too, is a part of the divine life that, however fragmentary, is not elsewhere repeated in the divine consciousness. When I thus consciously and uniquely will, it is I then who just here *am* God’s will, or who just here consciously act for the whole. I then am so far free.”<sup>8</sup>

Little exception need be taken to this description of the human will in its moral activity, when acting harmoniously with the divine will; but what of its immoral activity, its resistance of the Good Will? Here also is uniqueness of meaning, but a bad uniqueness, the uniqueness of opposition that implies another sort of freedom, a freedom of choice and self-direction. And indeed, with a super-Hegelian sensitiveness to moral distinctions, Professor Royce distinctly recognizes the reality of moral evil, and virtually admits the real freedom from which it issues: “There is the possibility and the fact of a finite and conscious resistance of the will of the World by the will of the Individual. The consequences of this resistance are real evils—evils that all finite beings and the whole world suffer.”<sup>9</sup> But with this recognition of the freedom of opposition, what becomes of the theory? With each finite self thus made a centre of free choices and self-direction, the possibility of a God consisting of the totality of finite selves vanishes. The further Professor Royce goes in his analysis of the self, the clearer it becomes that his monism is out of keeping with his ethics. “A Self whose eternal perfection is attained through the totality of these ethically significant tempo-

<sup>6</sup> *The World and the Individual*, II, 268.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.* I, 466.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.* I, 468.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* II, 398.

ral strivings, these processes of evolution, these linked activities of finite Selves,"<sup>10</sup> cannot be reconciled with a human freedom sufficient to account for the active opposition and potency of existing evil. The temporal strivings of finite selves gain their ethical significance only in relation to a perfect will with which they strive to come into harmony, even as he strives to have them do.

God must be a distinct person, above as well as within the selves, perfect where they are imperfect, whole while they are fragmentary, true while they are erring, in order to be a completely personal God. If he attains his perfection only through their strivings—strivings in which they manifest not only imperfection but anti-perfection—perfection is no longer an eternal existence, but an empirical process, and thereby loses its very reality. Perfection as it pertains to finite selves is an empirical process, but as it pertains to the infinite self an eternal, inexhaustible fulness. It is a striking evidence of the extravagant application of the category of development that the divine author of it should himself be made subject to it. The incongruity is especially marked, in that development has no meaning in the ethical realm except as there is an ideal of perfection toward which the development moves. How can "development," "becoming," have any meaning except as there is a Perfect One above the process, transcending it, explaining it? Such an One there cannot be, if monism be true.

## II.

If monism is an inadequate account of personality, are we then driven to pluralism, as a necessary alternative? If by pluralism is meant its current form the answer is, No. Current pluralism breaks up the absolute of monism into a fixed number of distinct though intimately related persons or selves, whose unity either itself constitutes the only deity, or of which God is a constituent member.

Strictly speaking, there are three types of present-day pluralism, which may be characterized as Theistic Pluralism, Atheistic Pluralism, and Pragmatistic Pluralism. Passing the first for the

<sup>10</sup> *The World and the Individual*, II, 419.

moment, we find in the atheistic pluralism of Dr. McTaggart an interesting instance of Hegelian monism passing over completely into its logical outcome. 'If,' reasons Dr. McTaggart as a consistent Hegelian, 'we have only an absolute composed of finite selves, then the plurality of these selves is quite as distinct a fact as their unity; and their unity is at best an impersonal unity in which there is no place for a personal God, or indeed for any God at all, in the proper sense of the term.' The second type, pragmatistic pluralism, is an individualistic pluralism. It will have a God or gods, if such are useful; but it is not quite certain as yet whether it is worth while to keep one or more of these beings in existence or not.

The theistic pluralism, or personal idealism, of Professor Howison stands by itself in its pronounced theism, and presents the clearest, strongest, and most convincing argument for the existence of God advanced by modern philosophy. Based on the nature of personality itself, it shows that the existence of God is inseparably bound up with that of the community of finite persons, each of whom, "though indeed defining himself against each of his fellows, must define himself primarily against the Supreme Instance, and so in terms of God. Thus each of them, in the very act of defining his own reality, defines and posits God as real—as the one Unchangeable Ideal who is the indispensable standard upon which the reality of each is measured. The price at which alone his reality as self-defining can be had is the self-defining reality of God. If he is real, then God is real; if God is not real then neither can he be real."<sup>11</sup>

This is a most satisfactory statement of the rational principle involved in that immediate recognition of God which is the basis of religion. But unfortunately Professor Howison stops short of the full implications of his theism. Instead of going forward to the rational inference which the religious consciousness has universally drawn, that human, imperfect personality finds its ground and source in this Perfect Person, Professor Howison, in his laudable effort to discredit the theory of mechanical creation, ignores the ontological dependence of the finite and imperfect upon the infinite and perfect, and places the human selves upon

<sup>11</sup> *The Limits of Evolution*, second edition, p. 355.

the same level, as respects self-existence and self-origination, with God.

Thus every form of pluralism, including Professor Howison's personal idealism, fails to meet the full requirements of personality. The source of this deficiency is in the failure of pluralism to recognize immanence, just as monism fails to recognize transcendence. Pluralism is so taken up with plurality, it is so sensitive to the distinctness and autonomy of each separate self, that it fails to take due note of that intimacy of relationship by which finite selves enter into each other (each preserving still his own centre of self-hood) and dwell in each other, while the Supreme Self enters and dwells in all.

Since we are obliged to use spatial terms of spiritual relations, it is truer to say that we are within than without one another, so intimately are we related to each other. Especially is it true—and the only adequate truth—to say of the Perfect Person that he is in us, and we in him. Otherwise we have, in our relations with one another, an isolation that cannot possibly constitute a society (except after the fashion of a "social contract"), and in our relations with God a remoteness that cannot possibly constitute a unity.

### III.

The failure of monism to co-ordinate with personality is due to its recognition of immanence only; that of pluralism to its recognition of transcendence only.<sup>12</sup> Finality can never be reached until these two truths—transcendence and immanence—are seen to be complementary, until the circle of a true inclusiveness sweeps about them both and holds them in polar unity. This Christianity, rightly understood, does, and does by means of the fulfilling and correcting truth of personality. That which fulfills also corrects. God is neither the sum of all existence, nor a separate unitary individual, but an immanent yet transcendent person.

Personality is the only reality that can be both immanent and

<sup>12</sup> Transcendence and immanence are here used in the common, if not altogether appropriate, sense of "the doctrine that God in his proper and essential nature is prior to and above the world, or that he has reality in himself apart from his works," and "the indwelling or inworking of the Deity in nature and man." See Baldwin, *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*.

transcendent. As force, God could be immanent only. As unitary, unrelated being, he could be transcendent only. But as person he is both immanent and transcendent.

To perceive how transcendence and immanence both belong to personality, we have but to turn to our own selves and our activities and relations. Imperfect though we may be as persons, as respects time and space we are both immanent and transcendent. I am immanent in my body, informing it and directing it, yet I also transcend it, and though I am limited by it, yet am I lord of it. Far indeed are we from being bound by space, although we cannot wholly escape it. We are at the same time spatial and non-spatial, dwelling in the two worlds like a bird between sky and tree-top. As a physical being I occupy space; am near or far from others; must move swiftly or slowly to get from place to place. But as person, as soul, I occupy no space whatever, no not so much as a pin-point. I think, move, feel, superspatially. My moral life, which is my truest life, is lived not in space at all.

So, too, as respects time. On one side of our being we are time-creatures, hindered and circumscribed by time limitations; able to do "but one thing at a time"; having a fixed place in a time-series; serving as a hireling our day. But in another sphere of our being, as persons, we are above time, look down upon it, transcend it. *In* time we are, but not *of* time. In the momentous decisions and experiences of the soul, slow years of ordinary living are swept into swift seconds. Time loses significance in the life of the spirit. Our association, as persons, with time is only part of that complication of ours with the empirical order which constitutes the tragedy of our present existence. The first thing for the Ego to learn is that it does not belong to this empirical order. Then it may go on to discover how to master and use it.

When one has once grasped the truth that as persons we are supertemporal and superspatial, he has the key to many of the most closely-locked problems of existence. Because as persons we are thus supertemporal and superspatial we cannot be mortal. Death, which shatters all our temporal relations and all our spatial relations, cannot shatter ourselves. And for the same

reason our relations to one another cannot be comprised in, or defined by, time and space. As supertemporal we are not, as persons, limited to today or tomorrow in our relations with one another. And as superspatial we are not, strictly speaking, external to one another, impenetrable, impervious, apart. No, our personal uniqueness consists not in the impenetrability of each person, as if he were an objective existence, a thing; but in that personal unity and self-consciousness by which he remains forever a distinguishable, inconfusible self. The personal monads, if we use Leibnitz' symbol, are not windowless. We are indivisible, not because of any peculiar adhesiveness, but because, as selves, we are not material beings at all. In whatever relations he may be, a self is always a whole by virtue of his selfhood.

In the very freedom and transcendence of personal relations, then, lies the possibility of immanence. The term itself is, of course, but a symbolism. The truth for which it stands is that the relations of persons to one another are too intimate to be expressed in terms of externality. We are—to repeat—rather within than without one another in our most vital personal relations.<sup>13</sup> And yet this immanence does not impair our personal integrity and unity; these can suffer impairment only by our own free act. The very word by which we most commonly designate our mutual personal relations, "influence," bears the same implication. Indeed no term that falls short of this suffices. We flow into one another, we dwell in one another—not in any material sense, but in the vital activities of our personal relationships.

The doctrine of the immanence of God is but a larger interpretation and application of the limited immanence which we know in our human relationships. If my friend can be, as it were, *in* me by virtue of the reality and power of his personality in my life, and yet without impairing my personality, then surely God, by virtue of whose personality my personality exists, can be *in* me without such impairment. I am not less real that he is in

<sup>13</sup> "There is nothing that can come closer, nothing that can penetrate a person more than another person. Bodies and objects are insuperably exterior to one another; not so persons." Gaston Frommel, *Études morales et religieuses*, p. 358 (quoted in *The Expository Times*, December, 1907, p. 111).

me, but more real; not less free, but more free. For it is only as a social self, in the most intimate and active relations with other persons, that my personality can develop. And no intimacy can be so purifying and liberating and fructifying as that with the Supreme Person. There is no difficulty in the idea of immanence if it be personally and not spatially conceived. "If the fact of God's omnipresence is conceded, this immanence of the Perfect within the imperfect as the Soul of the soul is *eo ipso* implied."<sup>14</sup>

God is immanent in universal humanity. Without him no one could be, even potentially, a person. And yet he is not immanent in all in the same manner and degree. That depends upon the capacity, receptiveness, and response of each separate person; and that in turn upon many factors, some of which lie quite beyond our vision. Enough that each human person shares in that universal divine immanence. Not as though God were divisible, and so much of him, less or more, inserted in each human soul. Rather, as the all-penetrating light radiates from the one quenchless sun, flooding the spacious chamber with splendor and stealing subtly into the narrow and shadowed room, so the Eternal Light richly illumines the great soul that lies open and expansive to his beams, nor fails also to suffuse with all possible radiance the enclosed and ill-advantaged soul whose walls may yet expand to admit more light.

#### IV.

Nature offers to the divine indwelling a medium far less capacious than humanity, yet far more open and plastic. Love, truth, and grace, nature cannot embody; only beauty, power, and harmony. Yet these are personal, not impersonal, attributes. They are in sky and mountain and flower, not because of mere form and proportion and color, but because in form and proportion and color hides the mind of a personal God.

Here, again, we gain our best understanding of the divine immanence by the analogy of our own immanence. A person paints a picture, or composes a sonata, or writes a poem, or builds a house, and in the very process inevitably puts himself

<sup>14</sup> W. R. Boyce Gibson, Hibbert Journal, January, 1907, p. 44.

into it. In some subtle way the quality and flavor of his personality pervades it. It is his, whether he own it or not. One knows instantly an angel of Angelico or a sketch of Rembrandt or a statue of Michael Angelo or a line of Shakespeare. More marvellous than the fabled touch of Midas is this touch of personality upon the outward world. Yet not *completely* plastic is the material, for the very reason that it is something less than spiritual. Pigment, marble, language—how each at once serves personality, and at the same time thwarts it; invites and denies; expresses and limits! The artist now soars, now chafes; now seizes, now fails. Here, see his meaning gleam pure and splendid through line or stone or syllable; there, hide and halt beneath that very medium which but now embodied it.

Is not such the relation of what we call nature to the Supreme Personality? With a wealth of variety and adaptation it responds to his informing Spirit. And yet nature cannot be a perfect medium of the Divine Spirit, simply because it is nature and not spirit. It will not do to identify the two. It is very true that nature has no meaning, no existence even, without mind; but that does not make it identical with mind. There is a natural and there is a spiritual; there is matter and there is spirit. To break down the distinction between them is to bring confusion and disaster into thought and into life. Not all, but *in* all, is God. And not in all in the same way and the same degree. It is part of our great human training to find him in the outer world, to detect, to perceive, to understand. Verily our God is a God who hides himself; yet hides himself only that he may more graciously reveal himself. For where there is no concealing there is no search, and where there is no search there is no finding. To get at the kernel within the husk, the meaning within the symbol, the essence within the embodiment—that is to find God in nature. There is a fine suggestion of the true nature of the divine immanence in the Bhagavadgita:<sup>15</sup>—

There is nothing else, O Danangaya! higher than myself; all this is woven upon me, like numbers of pearls upon a thread. I am the taste in water, O son of Kunti! I am the light of the sun and moon. I am “Om” in all the Vedas, sound in space, and manliness in human beings; I am the

<sup>15</sup> Sacred Books of the East, VIII, 74.

fragrant smell in the earth, refulgence in the fire; I am life in all beings and penance in those who perform penance. Know me, O son of Pritha! to be the eternal seed of all beings, I am the discernment of the discerning ones, and I the glory of the glorious.

If the pantheism of India had gone no farther than this, the results would not have been so serious. Not to lose bearings in this great sea of truth, but to sail it in the light of the stars that shine above—that is the difficult task in which India so dismally failed, and in which Christianity has thus far succeeded. If Paul describes God as “in all,” he couples it with “over all.” If the author of the Fourth Gospel teaches as the very substratum of his gospel the divine indwelling in creation, it is as the Logos, not as the complete Godhead. If Justin Martyr and Clement of Alexandria find the very essence of Christianity in the immanence of God in man, their Christology saves them from pantheism. If Athanasius, with his training in Platonism, finds the universe full of God, he never identifies him with it. “For not even by being in the universe does he share in its nature, but all things, on the contrary, are quickened and sustained by him.”<sup>16</sup> Saint Augustine, whose conceptions closely border upon pantheism, escapes it by his doctrine of creation *de nihilo*.<sup>17</sup> Mysticism dwelt close to the lotus-land of pantheism, but seldom ventured too far within. John Smith, the Cambridge Platonist, declares that “those scattered rays of beauty and loveliness which we behold spread up and down over all the world, are only the emanations of that *inexhaustible light which is above*.”<sup>18</sup> And Wordsworth, in the most familiar and endeared expression in literature of the divine immanence in nature, clearly and completely differentiates himself from pantheism by describing God as the being, *not* who is the light of setting suns, but *whose dwelling* is the light of setting suns

And the round ocean, and the living air,  
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man.

Thus does the Christian conception exult in the divine immanence without thereby losing the transcendence.

<sup>16</sup> De incarnatione, § 17.

<sup>17</sup> Weber, History of Philosophy, p. 189.

<sup>18</sup> See Caldecott, The Philosophy of Religion, p. 189.

## V.

The endeavor on the part of Christianity to harmonize and unify immanence and transcendence finds its historical expression in the doctrine of the Trinity. In spite of its controversial and ecclesiastical character, the Nicene formula was an earnest and profound effort to define the nature of divine personality. And the most significant fact regarding it is that both the problem and its solution grew inevitably and naturally out of the problem of the personality of Christ. It seems a far cry from the simplicity and sincerity of Jesus Christ—the most real, and in a sense the best understood, man who ever lived—to the fathomless speculations of the Athanasian controversy; and yet the whole process lay enwrapped in the answer of Peter to the question of his Lord, “Whom say ye that I, the Son of Man, am?” From the personality of Jesus to the personality of God is a straight and unavoidable path.

When men undertook thus, for the first time, to define God in the light of personality, it became clear that in some way he must needs be conceived both as transcendent and as immanent. Retaining, therefore, the well-established Hebrew conception of transcendence—“God, the Father Almighty”—they complemented and fulfilled it with the Christian form of the conception of immanence—“and in Jesus Christ the Son of God, only-begotten of the Father, that is, of the substance of the Father, God of God, light of light, very God of very God.” Here is the nucleus of the doctrine of a personal God who is at once transcendent and immanent, absolute and revealing, perfect and imparting. Not that the Nicene doctrine was complete and final, either in statement or in conception. It was but a germinal and inadequate, yet inestimably important, grasping of a truth whose larger significance is only now opening before us. The Nicene doctrine itself suffered serious deterioration and distortion in the barren interpretation of Augustinianism and Calvinism, and is only now coming to true appreciation and development in the New Athanasianism of modern theology. The immanent Logos, which Athanasius found in the only-begotten Son alone, has now come to be recognized in all men, yet without lessening, but rather heighten-

ing, the unparalleled significance of him who alone can rightly be called *the Incarnate One*, the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.

There is another way in which the doctrine of the Trinity stands for, and helps to maintain, the truth of the divine personality. That is by setting personality, as applied to God, over against individuality. Perhaps three men out of four confuse personality with individuality. For this reason, when God is spoken of as a person, many a thoughtful man or woman will reply, 'I cannot think of God as a person; to me he is far too great, too universal, to be a person, like ourselves.' And all the time the speaker is thinking of a person simply as an individual. Of course God is not an individual; that is just what perfect personality makes it impossible for him to be. The qualities of pure personality, such as in ourselves, as imperfect persons, are associated with individuality, in a perfect person must transcend individuality. Moreover, it is that very perfection of personality that, so to speak, individualizes God, that distinguishes him from everything and everyone else.

The trinitarian doctrine endeavors to represent this perfection of personality, this fulness of being, by refusing to God stark numerical unity, standing as that does for individuality, and substituting for it a threefold unity, far more adequate to express the richness, the love, the glory, the inexhaustible fulness, of the Perfect Person.

Thus does Christianity conserve and defend the reality of a perfect person. All the reality, the intensity, the pervasiveness, of a God who is through all and in all is retained, without the extravagances and moral blindnesses of pantheism. Immanence, personally conceived, finds its true interpretation in relation to that transcendence by means of which moral relationships and values are preserved and the universe is seen as one in which God dwells but is not absorbed.

*THE MORAL CRISIS WITHIN THE CHURCH*

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When Pope Pius X, standing upon the traditional rock of papal authority, issues a decree upon matters of faith, his words carry the weight not only of his sacred office but also of his immense social influence. We may perhaps share Tertullian's amazed indignation, when Pope Calixtus first assumed the right to speak for the whole church—"Audio edictum esse praepositum et quidem peremptorium"—and yet we listen. We listen, because, in this modern world, no interest which concerns the well-being of any part can be of indifference to the whole social structure; and more especially we listen because the movement which in Roman Catholic circles is known as Modernism is a vital and pressing problem in every organized body of Christian believers.

Within the great historic church this utterance of the Pope is of supreme human interest. The elements of a thrilling drama are all present. There, in the person of Pius X, stands the transcendent authority and wisdom of the ancient church. He speaks, not as the Holy Father to his children, but as the unerring guide and teacher of the faithful. The very audacity of his words appeals to the imagination. They are a call to battle. The church is the citadel of truth. The enemy, who are attacking it from within, must be beaten back, hewn down, and utterly destroyed. Here is a will that would stem the current of the world's life; would hold the thoughts and emotions of all the faithful in bondage. The passage of time, the achievements of knowledge, the rise of a new order which has revolutionized social values, are as nothing. Philosophy, science, historical criticism, are but ministers to the supreme dictatorship of truth which is reposed in the papal chair. The reader rubs his eyes. It seems as if the Pope had taken from their resting-places in a museum of antiquities weapons of ancient warfare with which to meet the destructive machinery of modern inventions.

The voice is there, but it sounds like an echo of a far-away past. The will is there, but where now is the authority which it once exercised over every channel of human intelligence and endeavor? The demand is there, but where shall we look for those awful resources of censure and discipline? Will the world, which once trembled at the rebuke of the imperial bishop, now heed the words which demand of the faithful a fearful and unthinking obedience?

The appearance of this papal decree shows that the importance of the intellectual revival among Christian thinkers is not misunderstood or undervalued at the Vatican. The modern spirit is not standing without and knocking as a suppliant at the doors of the church. It is intrenched within, and is claiming its rights of inheritance as the loyal child of the great Mother. The enemies of the church are her adoring and devoted sons. That is the pathos of the situation: the anathemas of the Holy Mother fall upon her own offspring.

The Modernist is in a sorry plight indeed. He is begotten of two great loves. Blood of his blood, flesh of his flesh, and bone of his bone is the church of his devotion and obedience. He is no Ishmaelite, but the true child of promise. The faith of the church he holds with all the passion of his soul. Its doctrines, its sacraments, its vigils and its fasts, are his by inheritance and by the appropriation of his heart. More than that, his prophetic eye sees in the historic faith and organization the spiritual hope of generations yet unborn. Nevertheless he owes allegiance to another authority. He is the child of another intellectual world. From his earliest conscious moments he has been trained and disciplined in an atmosphere of exact science which knows no final authority save in established truth. To him each new achievement in knowledge is a new revelation of God. To deny this revelation is to deny God. However much he holds in reverence the Doctors of other days, he cannot accept their teaching when it conflicts with the known facts of this present time. He believes that, while the doctrines of the Christian faith were born of the culture of the ancient world, they are not, in the nature of things, forever chained to it; but that it is the mission and genius of the Catholic Church, through its accumulated wisdom and experience of centuries, to

give a spiritual interpretation to every new discovery of knowledge and to every new development of human understanding. He would make the church, not an intellectual dungeon, but the radiant and spacious home of those who walk in the light of God.

He is the citizen of two worlds. Between the love of his heart for the church of his devotion and the loyalty of his soul to the revelation of truth he must tread his bitter way. On the one hand are the joys, the satisfactions, the rewards, of life; on the other the humiliations and sorrows of those who suffer for very truth's sake.

This great moral crisis, which is so acute within the Church of Rome, is present in some degree within all bodies of organized evangelical Christianity. To enter a gathering of one of their councils is to pass into an unfamiliar atmosphere. The observer becomes aware of a certain preoccupation of mind which gives an indirectness to all its proceedings. It seems not to meet face to face the existing conditions of life. It seems to be apart from the real world and to be busily concerned in measuring its thoughts or its actions with a remote, but sacred, standard of truth or government. Its real religious zeal is somewhat deflected from its course by the requirements of conformity to a tradition which is manifestly the creation of another age and other surroundings. There appears to be something almost like a fear that the religion of Jesus may escape from the established system and become a free gift to all men. This is but an extension of the spirit of the Vatican. There is also a Protestant Modernism, and between this and the Mediaevalism which —unavowed and often unconscious—pervades the Protestant churches, lies a wide and unbridged chasm. The tyranny of a traditional interpretation of the Scriptures, the arrogance of an ecclesiastical caste, are the unrelenting foes of the spirit of religious freedom which appeals to this age with a divine insistence.

The Pope has but reasserted the claim of Cyprian, that only by obedience to, and dependence upon, the bishops is union with the church and with Christ possible, for within the church founded by the Apostles is the whole and uncorrupted truth of God—*extra ecclesiam nulla salus!* He turns the minds of the faithful

to that momentous time which Harnack calls "the most fatal turning-point in the history of Christianity"; but even Pius X, with all his power, is not able to bring back again the conditions of social and intellectual life out of which sprang the authoritative and monarchical church.

Looking backwards, we see how essential to the well-being of the Christian communities, and even to the existence of the church, was the individual's obedience to its laws and conformity to its teaching. Submission to outward control is not necessarily a form of slavery, but may be of the essence of true liberty, or a high and noble choice of the individual will. It may well be that the body which exercises authority over each member (as in a great university) is the one efficient source of intellectual and moral life, and is animated by the highest spirit of the age. It may be an army of defence against the attacks of ignorance and sin upon the social body. It may be the champion of justice and righteousness. It may be the teacher of wisdom, and lead the hearts of men to the love of truth. It may hold up a standard of devotion and self-sacrifice and heroism in the pursuit of a noble cause. It may, in short, gather together into a living and powerful organism the hopes, the aspirations, the moral sentiments, of the age.

If the church cherishes this high ideal of its mission and destiny, then it may indeed be the home of all ardent and generous souls. However glorious its past, its divine opportunity is in the present. Whatever its sacred possessions, they must serve to interpret the will of God to the minds of men. No true disciple of the living Master can be wholly moral by conformity to the standards or requirements of any other age. It has been said of the Pharisee that he was a moralist a generation behind his time.

It is this ecclesiastical preoccupation with the mental and moral attitude of another age which keeps the church apart from the actual life of today. Men see this sacred institution stirred with activity, eager in propagandism, compassing sea and land, and zealous in a hundred forms of good work. Its immense services to the welfare of humanity are justly valued; yet its power of moral leadership is steadily slipping from its grasp. The voice which speaks in the name of God and proclaims the ancient authority of truth is no longer heeded in the great centres of

learning. The church still appeals to the faithful; but the mighty stream of human activity passes it by.

It must nevertheless be recognized by any observer of social conditions today that the church holds the strategic position of moral opportunity. With its venerated past, its sacred traditions, its divine commission, it reaches, as no other institution can, the deepest sentiments and the noblest impulses of our generation. To it therefore is committed the opportunity and responsibility of leadership; and it is at this point that we meet face to face the great moral crisis which confronts every form of organized Christian faith.

For moral leadership is a high and mysterious quality of soul in the individual or institution. Its appeal is to the imagination, for it must invest with a glowing sentiment the unrealized aspirations and unfulfilled purposes towards which a generation is struggling. In these it must see the most radiant, the most enduring, realities of the age—those commanding objects of desire which appeal to the ardor and devotion of generous souls.

That, surely, was the romance of the early church. The humblest believer leaped from his obscurity into the arena of life. He became endowed with the dignity of an ambassador, and set forth on his astounding mission to win the world to Christ. In his passion for righteousness and in his fearless zeal for the revealed truth lay his power over the wills of men. The Jewish faith had drawn many worshippers into its cult by its pure monotheistic teaching and by its noble ethical standard, but the followers of Jesus sought for nothing less than the establishment of a world-wide Kingdom. The church incorporated into its body religions, philosophies, social customs, politics, secret societies—all the interests, activities, longings of men—and glorified them with an enthralling faith.

It is just this quality to fulfil and justify every high and out-reaching human passion, to uplift it with faith in a divine moral order, that gives to the church its moral opportunity. The church will be heard so long as it proclaims in the name of God the reality of those spiritual premonitions which are known, not through the eye of sense nor by the outward experiences of life, but are the soul's inward witness to the eternal good.

Thus the authority of the church cannot be a power once bestowed, nor a grace which trickles in a narrow channel through the ages; nor can it rest upon a norm of truth or conduct once established: its authority is rather in its divine commission to lead every development in human understanding and in social betterment on towards the supreme ideal of life which is secure in its faith in God.

If the church is powerless to reproduce the conditions of life and thought—the ambitions, the sentiments, the limitations—of the period out of which came the sacred symbols of its faith, its real commission still remains, which is to lead towards God the uplifted life of devotion and enthusiasm of every age. To-day, in a thousand pulpits, the church is rebuking the spirit of selfishness, of materialism, of lawless passion for gain or power. Yet this is not enough, for its great mission is to manifest a purpose so detached from self-interest, so free from mental preoccupation, so ready to surrender privileges and possessions, so full of understanding towards every ray of light which makes clearer the path to God, so zealous and devoted to every cause which reveals the love and care of God for his children, that all men can turn to it for fellowship and guidance.

Nothing less than this is the price of true and universal moral leadership today. We are a people of high enthusiasms and spiritual adventures. But the most significant quality of our age is its originality—its readiness to break away from accustomed forms, from familiar and conventional channels of expression. There is unquestionably a change of intellectual attitude, and a temper of investigation towards all authority, so deep and far-reaching that even the most conservative observer is startled. And it is this which is surely forcing Christian leaders to a reconsideration of the place and worth of the church as a social institution.

Even the casual reader knows that the authority of the church in the past has been based upon intellectual leadership. The church was never a mere eleemosynary society. It never limited its work to the function of worship. It was the teacher of the truth. Sainthood and scholarship went hand in hand; the great Doctors of earlier days were the intellectual giants of their

times. Now it is a distinguishing feature of our age that the sense of the sacredness of truth, of its supreme and compelling authority, of its divine source and of its infinite variety of revelations, makes one of the great moral passions within the souls of men. If the moral value of conformity has lost its place, there has arisen among the common people a feeling for intellectual integrity which calls out the devotion of a religious faith.

The children of democracy have been fed on the food of liberty; and liberty has meant that there shall be no obstruction in the path of development nor hindrance to the fullest attainment of personal right. It has meant, in the higher sphere of intelligence, that the pursuit of knowledge and understanding shall break through all barriers of tradition in its way towards the goal. It is chained to no method; it accepts no results as final; but it is animated by a high enthusiasm for the ultimate victory of truth over error. A generation ago the scientific world was arrayed for attack upon the great and inert mass of tradition with which religion was identified. It had one mighty weapon. The leaders of the scientific method had the ears of the young. They sat, too often, in the seat of the scornful, but always in the seats of learning. They appealed to the ardor and the generous impulses of youth. They taught a wonderful new knowledge of which the ancients never dreamed, based, not upon the traditions of the past, but on the new understanding of nature's laws.

A great many foolish things have been said of what is called the "scientific spirit," and many enormities have been committed in its name; but no words can over-magnify the immensity of the revolution which was brought about when the young scholar was trained day after day in the ways of exact knowledge, and when little by little his soul was filled with the inspiration of intellectual integrity—and by integrity was meant, not conformity to any past tradition or law, but the full acceptance of each new revelation of truth which was discovered and classified through the study of man and nature. In this great principle of the authority of truth, and of the moral quality in every form of study and investigation, a new and wonderful moral motive was given to the common man as well as to the scholar. If it

led him away from accepted norms, from familiar traditions, it yet awakened within his soul those qualities of devotion, of sacrifice, of consecration and enthusiasm, which are the fruit of a true religious faith. He saw in the orderliness of law, in the tracings of development, and in the varieties of form, a vision of the mind of God. He found in these a basis of a moral world. He discovered the ground upon which to rest his assurance and confidence that "all things work together for good."

No institution can today hold the authority of moral leadership which does not to the fullest degree appeal to this great moral passion for the enlightenment of truth. The schools and the universities are truly leading towards a high and noble faith; for it is a marked characteristic of all our great institutions of learning that freedom of investigation and study, freedom from all outward restraint or control, has been lifted up into the realm of moral law. The day of the sectarian college has passed. It is out of step with the march of the age. The teacher of a system is discredited. It has become recognized now that a teacher is commissioned to obey but one authority, and that that authority is the truth.

How much this means to the church of Christ is the grave question which meets us on every hand. It must be acknowledged that the whole mechanism of the church was adjusted to a scheme of things that has passed away. No Father or Doctor who labored and strove for the truth of God in other days could have dreamed of this surging spiritual tide which has swept the minds of men out of the charted course—not Irenaeus, who saw a basis for immortality in the legends of Jonah and the three men in the fiery furnace; not the great Origen, with his extravagant allegorical interpretation of the Old Testament; only Jesus, the great Modernist, revealed the law which reaches to the very core of our life today: He that willetteth to do the will of God shall know the truth. Is the church of Christ then anchored to the teachings of the past? Or is the church fully and utterly committed to teach the faith that the law of God is the law of life?

The seriousness of this question cannot be overstated. The formularies and rites of every religious body are the sacred vessels in which have been handed down from generation to generation

the revelations committed to its keeping. Through the mist of centuries the part which human passion or the limitation of human understanding played in the structure of these hallowed symbols can be but dimly seen. To most disciples of any particular form of faith or polity it seems as if its "deposit" of truth were a divine gift. This possession is in no sense conditioned by the development of human knowledge. It is from above and is absolute. It is therefore definitely declared that the church of God is not commissioned to proclaim the truth—as men understand truth—but to preserve the tradition which has been handed down through the centuries. Between a world which exalts intellectual integrity into a high moral ideal and an institution which demands of its disciples either indirectness or limitation of thought there can be no abiding union. It would not be strange if a mind preoccupied with the church of Cyprian should lose somewhat of its fine sensitiveness to the moral spirit of today.

But the aim of all true religious faith is illumination of mind and heart. To this great purpose the church of Christ is committed. It enshrines the ideal life. It bears witness to the reality of spiritual experience. Therefore on its ideal side it is bound to no past; it is fettered to no system; it has no inherent authority. Its high commission is to proclaim the faith—the faith which has fired the saints of every generation—in the supreme relationship of human souls to a loving and righteous God.

Never was a greater opportunity afforded to the church than now to give the richness of its experience, the sacredness of its traditions, the full flavor of its religious life, to sweeten and inspire and direct the lives of men. The scientific mind without the glow of religious feeling cannot finally satisfy the cravings of the soul. The achievements of the laboratory or the discoveries of the telescope may add greatly to human knowledge and widen the horizon of human minds. But the true leadership for which this hour calls is that of religious faith—it is the assurance of the value of life interpreted in the terms of religion. It is to gather up the results of modern knowledge into a divine synthesis which will illuminate the teachings of the past and give to the present a noble and inspiring purpose. The age of the prophet is upon us—the prophet who shall understand the aspirations, the hopes, the discontents of the time

—and whose clear and spiritual eyes shall see the revealed purpose of God in this seething and flowing life. Society is crying aloud for moral leadership. It is creating new ideals. This is an age of reverence. It hungers after God.

It can hardly be questioned that the roots, not only of the historic church but of every body of Christian believers, were planted deep in a social soil which was inimical to democratic ideals. The spirit of the churches is the selective spirit. By their structure and by their doctrines they are, when literally interpreted, out of tune with the master music of our age. It is true that even the monarchical church, within its organization, opens the opportunities of a democratic society to its members; and yet as a social institution it represents to the masses of men those special privileges of selection and class against which the best life of this generation is in deadly warfare.

To these masses it seems that the church is outside of, and apart from, the great moral struggle to make all men free men within the City of God. What else is the literal interpretation of the historic rite of baptism? We are told that "all men are conceived and born in sin," and that "none can enter into the Kingdom of God except he be regenerate and born anew of water and the Holy Ghost." Did not the Fathers rightly interpret this conception when they declared that there was no salvation without the church? Was not Calvin right in proclaiming that church-membership was the essential condition of enfranchisement in a righteous city? It may seem to us that the long debate about post-baptismal sin was a strange misconception of the spirit of Jesus; but through the smoke of intellectual battle we can discern the clear and strong purpose of those who were building into a mighty order of caste and privilege the spiritual truths which were revealed for the larger liberty of all mankind.

Perhaps in no other doctrine can the immense change in religious understanding and sentiment be more clearly seen than in the attitude of believers towards this mystical and touching rite. The social and parental feeling has issued its decree of love and hope, and nailed it on the door of the universal church. We may philosophize about evil, but no loving parent can ever again

accept the monstrous doctrine that the child of love is "conceived and born in sin." Against the authority of the church human consciousness has raised up a higher authority, and dictates in the voice of a diviner truth to the souls of men. What is this higher authority? To the answer of this question the great social movements of our time are directed. The long-established relationships of life are bending to the pressure of a new and irresistible power. The old order which enshrined reverence and authority in parenthood, in office, in social caste, in education, is giving place before the demand that every claim of right or privilege shall be valued by its inherent worth and by its service to mankind. From this upheaval of settled customs, this ruthless examination of long accepted authorities, the church cannot be exempt. The severe process of readjustment of relations through which society is passing is most surely awakening among all classes a universal and sensitive motive of social responsibility. What Wiclif saw in vision seven centuries ago is working itself out, through the throes of social struggle, into the society and government of today. "The law of social obligation is based upon the law of God," and there resides in no institution or office, however sacred, any authority which can contradict the enlightened conscience of the people.

We hear much, and rightly enough, of the service of the church to other generations—of its zeal for souls, of its protection of learning, of its struggles for righteousness. But today we are in the midst of undreamed of conditions; of a situation for which the church has made no provision. Organized Christianity grew into its full strength with the growth of the institution of feudalism; and feudalism was not only a form of social structure but was also a temper of mind: its genius was force. In the close and dependent relationship of overlord and vassal two great social principles were evolved—authority and obedience. If the church began by relieving the individual of his personal responsibility, it ended by taking from him every attribute which makes life important in itself.

Now it is just this consciousness of the importance and value of life to the individual that has seeped down through the strata of caste divisions into the souls of the masses of toilers. We are met

therefore not so much by a readjustment of social relations as by a violent upheaval of an established order. The rise of industrial democracy is the phenomenon of supreme human interest in our generation. Its huge body has lifted itself through the crust of settled traditions and forms and institutions—dividing, breaking down, scattering, overwhelming, with little enough concern about the past or the future. It is a great, brutal, material giant. It demands rights, claims privileges, and compels the attention of the world. It does not appeal; it strikes. It does not ask a hearing; it roars its commands. Yet it is not a drunken giant. On the contrary, it is singularly firm and persistent and determined. It fills its own world. Its attitude is that of attack. It is alert, watchful, self-contained; and its bitter antagonist is the social structure of class and privilege. It hopes for no heaven, and it fears no hell. Yet it is tender towards its own. It is inspired with the passion of brotherhood; and its protecting arm, which is so ready and strong to strike its foe, is gentle and loving when it enfolds the weak and poor.

In itself this uprising of the toiler is a startling departure from the old, simple relationship of protection and dependence between the overlord and vassal in society or church. It is creating new and perplexing problems in the industrial world. It is changing constitutions and affecting governments. It is uplifting new social standards and making new social values. But the full significance of this revolution cannot be grasped until it is interpreted in the terms of a vast moral awakening, for behind all its good and evil lies the great vision of the worth and importance of the individual life.

It has been often pointed out that the official ministry of the church grows less and less attractive to the generous-minded youth of today. Even its unique opportunities for human service and its noble passion for the salvation of mankind fail to appeal to the imagination. As a whole, the church remains strangely detached from the vital interests of the masses, as well as from the controlling spirit of the intellectual world. The questions of government or doctrine with which it is so largely occupied imply a different condition of life and thought. They are lingering memories of a world that has passed away. The divisions of Protestantism have

become temperamental rather than doctrinal. Even when the church deals with the problems of social change, its way of approach is unfamiliar to the modern mind. It is still concerned with its endowment of rights and privileges, its traditions and forms, which it holds to be essential elements of its life and authority. It has still something to preserve which is alien to the social spirit of our time, in place of its authoritative utterance that the prophetic message of the compelling law of God is forever modern.

Yet in the moral awakening which underlies the rise of industrial democracy there has developed an unattached ministry in which the joy and the hope of the early church seem to be born again. Here we find the renascence of the romantic spirit which is forever associated with a passionate loyalty to Jesus. In this dawn of the new age of human brotherhood, the lives of the social worker and the civic reformer alike are striving, with divine conviction, toward the supreme sacrifice of the Son of Man. The new ministry of the justice and righteousness of God sees with a new intensity and clearness, from the Mount of Vision of this twentieth century, the one figure which inspired the disciples of an earlier dawn. "It was the image of a young man giving up voluntarily, one by one, for the greatest of ends, the greatest gifts; actually parting with himself, above all, with the serenity, the divine serenity, of his own soul; yet from the midst of his desolation crying out upon the greatness of his success, as if foreseeing this very worship. As centre of the supposed facts which for these people were become so constraining a motive of hopefulness, of activity, that image seemed to display itself with an overwhelming claim on human gratitude. What Saint Lewis of France discerned, and found so irresistibly touching, across the dimness of many centuries, as a painful thing done for love of him by one he had never seen, was to them almost as a thing of yesterday; and their hearts were whole with it."

It is this spirit which breaks away from the classic forms and restraints of institutional life, and flings itself, in the abandonment of love, into the very heart of the human tragedy. This spirit bestows no charities, and makes no sacrifices; but it fills with the wine of life those privileged souls who can share in the hopes, the discontents, the struggles and the aspirations, of the masses

for whom are opening the gates of a new life. The prophetic eye may see again the inspired vision of the Messiah who is a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief, who bears the burdens of his people and leads them out of captivity into spiritual liberty. If the moral fire has died out of those old basic words, authority and obedience, it has lit up with a new radiance the watchwords of our time, co-operation and fraternity.

Can the church, into whose keeping is committed the religious welfare not only of a selected few but of all mankind, stand apart from this deepest and most far-reaching of the human interests of today, isolated by the very glory of its history, and dehumanized by the sacredness of its possessions? Is it not just because it is the accepted custodian of religion that there is given to it the inspiring opportunity of gathering into a divine synthesis all the vast and divided interests of social life and charging them with a moral dynamic? While the fear and jealousy of sectarianism are driving all religious teaching from the public schools, where shall we look for the spiritual guide who shall teach and train these wild and wayward human wills into the larger faith? Who shall teach this individual of the new social order to add to his own personal interests the interests of the whole social body; teach him that his soul can be lost in no deeper hell than that of absorption in his own business or pleasure; teach him personal responsibility for the wrongs of society or government; teach him that the outcast and forsaken, the ignorant and degraded, are members of the social family; teach him, amid his fierce struggles for personal rights, that the highest value of life lies in personal responsibility.

These are the vital and insistent questions which a democratic society may ask of the church today. In a civilization in which industry is divorced from religion, religion from the state, and the state from the most vital problems which threaten its existence, the cry for moral leadership arises from the very heart of a bewildered people. To the church has been intrusted the stewardship of great possessions which are the gifts of God to all mankind. The faith it holds, when set free for human needs, is not only the driving power of moral endeavor but the controlling power of moral restraint.

With so great riches, yet one thing more is needful—that painful thing done for the love of Christ—the surrender of its own, that it

may give back to the hungering world the spiritual faith in the Son of God. The preconceptions of the feudal church must yield before the rising tide of the ideals of a social democracy. The dream of a material empire, the lust of power, the isolation of exclusive doctrinal systems, must be absorbed in the passion of a loyal discipleship which would be as its Master, for where the Christ stands there must his church stand also. "He stands at the gates of the twentieth century, waiting till the lagging people overtake him. Then he will lead the tired and famishing into his city of love."

## THE MEDIATORIAL OFFICE OF THE VEDIC FIRE-GOD

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The mediatorial office of Agni (Latin *ignis*), the Vedic Fire-god, has never been explained; nor has there ever been an attempt to clarify the relation between Agni as mediator and as avenger, or to show whether either of these functions is extraordinary. Usually the office is taken for granted, as if it were the regular business of Agni to act as a mediator between gods and men. It depends on what is called a mediator whether this is true or not; and the loose use of language has surprising results when non-Sanskrit scholars take up a word used by Sanskrit scholars in a literal sense and employ it in the theological sense. 'Mediator' means literally a go-between, or messenger, and Chaucerian English so uses the word; but the common theological connotation adds to this the idea that the messenger or go-between goes as an intercessor or reconciler between two opposed parties.

Now when the author of *Ethnic Trinities* (and even Tiele) undertakes to show the universality of Christian ideas in religious phenomena, he instances the Hindu Fire-god as a 'mediator,' using the word as applied in Christian theology. As a matter of fact, this gives a very incorrect view of Agni, who does not intercede with other gods for the sake of men. The idea that the fire of the sacrifice helps to appease the wrath of other gods is not wholly absent; but it is worth while to see when and where this idea is found, and especially to learn how it is reached and what it implies.

Usener, in his *Götternamen*, speaks of some gods being 'opaque' and some being 'transparent.' Agni is a transparent god. He is fire, the mighty power that burns the forest, that is lighted on the hearth and on the altar, that is three-fold, born first in the sky, then on the earth, and thirdly in the waters of the cloud. As in Zoroastrianism, fire is also the heat, or life-warmth, the productive

and generating power in plants and animals. He is the son of sky and earth, or, as elsewhere said, he is brought down from the sky.

Agni's normal function is to serve as a messenger of meals to the other gods. He is first fed himself, and then he calls the other divinities to feast. Morning, noon, and eve, meals are prepared for the gods. The fire ascending signals afar, an  $\ddot{\alpha}\gamma\gamma\alpha\rho\nu\pi\hat{\nu}\rho$ , to tell the hungry host that all is ready. Agni, in short, is an animated dinner-bell to summon the gods to breakfast, dinner, and supper. As such he is the "friendly messenger" (*passim*), but *qua* messenger he is not mediator, only a "far-goer," *dūtā*, just as Saramā is the messenger of Indra and rain is the messenger of the Rain-god. Nevertheless, as messenger, he tells the gods about men if men desire, and he is occasionally asked to assure the other gods that the sacrificer is pure and sinless. But this does not imply that he asks the gods to forgive the sins of men, or that he does anything to influence the gods in their action, save to bring the message with the announcement that the men who sent it have prepared a feast for the gods. The striking proof of this is that Agni himself is given the same sort of message when another god acts as postman. Thus, in Rig-Veda 7, 62, 2, the sun is invoked to "proclaim us (the worshippers) sinless to Mitra, Varuna, Aryaman, and Agni." What Agni does is to make the sacrificer pure through the sacrifice by carrying to the gods the offering that mollifies them if they are angry. Only thus is he said to free from sin and from the 'bonds' (sickness) which serve to indicate the existence of the divine wrath. In several passages Agni frees from sin directly, as do other gods. Compare Rig-Veda 4, 12, 4, "Make us sinless before Aditi (Earth-goddess); loosen our wrongs (sins), O Agni"; and *ib.* 54, 3, "O Savitar (Sun), render us sinless before gods and men." Another phase of his character also leads to misconception. Agni is called *upa-vaktár* (*vac*, Latin *voco*, cf. *advocatus*), which might suggest (and has suggested) that he is an 'advocate' of men before the gods. Nothing is farther from the poet's mind. As *upavaktár*, Agni is merely 'helper' or, as he is also called, 'arranger' in the business of sacrifice. To be 'messenger and arranger' he is sent down by the gods (8, 19, 21), and *upavaktár*,

applied to him in 4, 9, 5, means merely that he encourages men in sacrificial work, as Soma or Savitar is an *upavaktár* and Indra is an *adhivaktár* (*advocatus* as encourager) in battle.

Agni, still transparent, helps man both by burning with heat the demons of darkness and by giving various things to the worshipper. He gives rain by slaying the dragon that keeps back rain, for Agni is lightning as well as altar-fire. He is begged to keep afar his own injurious dart, for lightning can injure men as well as slay demons (10, 142, 1-3). But chiefly he helps by strengthening the good-will of the gods in his capacity of food-bringer. He is thus, in averting the wrath due to neglect, the saviour (*paraspás, trátár*), just as he is a saviour in protecting men from demons by means of his "flaming tooth, like a club." So is Indra a 'saviour'; and in fact, in words which one might well think were originally addressed not to Indra but to Agni, Indra too is in 7, 20, 1, the "strong, active saver from great sin." Not only is Agni *like* the other gods, in relation to men, but he *is* the other gods. Thus he is "like Varuna" in wisdom, and again he is identified with Varuna; he makes the worlds; he guards earth; protects the sky; becomes through his ability the "father of the gods"; and has the standing epithet "son of power," not because, as has lately been suggested, it requires some strength to twirl the fire-sticks, but because, like Indra, who has the same epithet, he is typical of strength, as the gods are called the "sons of immortality." The term for his fresh, abounding strength is *yúvan*, not *juvenis* in the sense of young, immature, but 'fresh' and 'vigorous.'<sup>1</sup>

To understand exactly how the conception of Agni approaches that of a mediator, one must start with the wrath of the gods. What is meant by the prayer to Agni, "Keep from us the sin that makes us fall," in RV. 1, 189, 1? This is so little moral that it might be paraphrased with "keep from us the hurt that injures us." The following words show that what is rendered 'sin' is really 'hurt.' So when Aditi, the Earth-goddess, "makes sinless,"

<sup>1</sup> Compare in RV. 1, 155, 6, *yúvákumáras*, 'vigorous, not weak,' where *yúvan* is directly opposed to *kumárá*, weak, youthful. This is also the idea in Agni's epithet *Yahú* and *Yahvá*, in regard to which see a paper by the writer in the forthcoming Journal of the Oriental Society.

it means "keeps scathless." Agni is begged to cast the sickness which one man deserves upon someone else. Compare 10, 37, 12, "Whatever verbal or mental act of ours has angered the god, may ye set that wrong down on him who is maliciously opposed to us," where the 'wrong' is the same word rendered 'hurt' above ('sin'). The wrath of the gods is objectified in illness, fever, drought, hurt of any kind, which appears among men and may be cast out. Thus in 1, 114, 4, "Rudra's wrath be cast far from us." In 6, 62, 8, this wrath is cast out (as disease) upon demons. But there is here no appeal to Agni.

The worshipper has no need of a mediator. As he appeals to another god to announce him sinless to Agni, and as he appeals to Agni to announce him sinless to other gods, he appears to demand a herald of his virtue; but this is not his constant attitude. Usually he makes his cry direct to the god whom he worships. Thus in 1, 24, 14: "We make depart thy wrath (*áva te hédo imahe*) by means of obeisance and sacrifice, O Varuna. Loosen the sins (wrongs) we have done; make loose thy bonds (of sickness) from us." And in 7, 58, 5, "We make depart the wrong (sin, *áva tát éna imahe*) of the mighty gods." Here the 'wrath' of one passage is the 'wrong' of the other. In both, the worshipper entreats in his own name, not through a mediator, for the removal of the wrath of the gods, which is the hurt incarnate in the victim, the 'wrong' which is sin because it is the visible sign of sin. There is no wrath without sin; hence hurt, the sign of wrath, is, as it were, the very sin itself. Compare the prayer for relief from suffering in 7, 84, 2, "Ye (gods) bind with bonds which are not straps (not literally bonds); may I turn aside your wrath."

But though Agni is too great (not to say synonymous with the greatest gods) to be thought of as if he were a Mithra to an Ormazd or a Marduk to an Ea, and though the normal tone of the sacrificer is one of direct address to his gods in begging him to avert sin (that is, avert the effect of wrath due to neglect), yet Agni has his part to do. Some one must present to the gods the *quid pro quo*. No one supposes that a wrathful god will show mercy without reason. A certain amount of proof of repentance is necessary. And this proof is furnished by renewed zeal in making offerings.

Hence, as Agni is “the priest divine of sacrifice,” he is sometimes said to make men sinless himself, and sometimes in the same way to make the gods merciful. On the whole, however, this last is a rare attitude for the worshipper to assume; nor does it imply intercession. In 1, 94, which, from the fact that it mentions a fuller list of priests than is known elsewhere, may be assumed to be rather late, Agni is thus asked to avert the wrath of the Maruts (but the passage is not very clear); and, again, in the opening hymn of the fourth book of the Rig-Veda he is asked to “make go away the wrath of the god.” He does this, however, not by interceding for men, but mechanically, as presenter of sacrifice. In 1, 128, 7, another idea is brought out. Here Varuna is no better than a devil, and Agni is begged to save man “from the trickery of Varuna,” but this is just as he saves from the trickery of other devils (1, 99, etc.). Hence the tricks and wrath of the spiritual beings go together in one petition of deprecation: “O Agni, do thou keep off divine anger and ungodly tricks” (6, 48, 10). But there is in this office no mediatorial function. Agni drives away evils of this sort as he drives away other evils, for example, curses (Agni “drives curses off”), kills the old dragon, and generally “leads man to the better.”<sup>2</sup>

There are passages in which Agni is entreated to protect man, but in these the gods are rather co-equal workers. Thus, in 3, 1, 15, Agni is besought “with the gods to do the singer a favor and protect.” He is the brother of Varuna, the god with whom he is elsewhere identified, and the gods serve him because he serves them, upholding their laws (especially the “laws of Varuna”), so that, if he chooses, he may “blame men to the gods” for neglect of law or sacrifice, as, conversely, he may “sacrifice away” not only the blemishes of the altar but the god himself, the expression, “sacrifice the god away,” being identical with “sacrifice the gods’ wrath away” and “sacrifice the blemishes away by means of oblations.”<sup>3</sup>

The expression “by oblations” gives the key to this whole series of acts. It makes it clear that there is no more mediatorial idea

<sup>2</sup> RV. 2, 9, 2; 3, 3, 6; 3, 20, 4.

<sup>3</sup> RV. 4, 1, 5; 7, 60, 9; AV. 19, 3, 4.

in any of these passages than there is, for example, in 1, 171, 1, where the worshipper, without addressing Agni at all, says directly to the Maruts (Rain-gods), "By means of this obeisance and hymn I beg for the Maruts' good-will."

Instead of being a mediator, Agni may follow up the faults of the sinner (4, 3, 13), and so appear as a possible avenger of the wrong done against the gods. But there is only one passage where this idea is fully carried out, that is, where Agni is represented as burning with his sharp tooth of flame those who injure the laws of the great gods, Varuna and Mitra, so that "those who are wicked and untrue go to the deep place." This passage represents these gods in a different light from that of the early hymns, where they are their own avengers, and, as Ludwig has observed, shows a later touch. It is perhaps the first adumbration of the later theory of the hell-fire which punishes the wicked according to the scheme of post-Vedic theology. But what is most interesting in it is that it puts the top stone on the edifice of the fire-cult morality of the Rig-Veda, in which Agni as messenger becomes helper of men, punishing the hurtful demons and evading demoniac anger, and at last punishes men themselves, if they do wrong. Yet it must not be forgotten that Agni helps only as the agent of the worshipper. He acts only as a bearer of reconciliation, not as the reconciler. What reconciles the gods is the sacrifice offered by man. Agni is not himself the sacrifice; he merely sees that it is well made and that it reaches the gods. This is a service for which he is duly paid, in that he gets the best part of the oblation himself. There is, however, a Vedic legend to the effect that he once got so tired of this work that he ran away and hid himself, and had to be routed out by the gods and bribed to go to work again.

## SOME RECENT BOOKS ON THEOLOGY

Illingworth, J. R., *The Doctrine of the Trinity*.  
Hall, F. J., *Introduction to Dogmatic Theology*.  
Ritchie, W. B., *Revelation and Religious Certitude*.  
Bowne, B. P., *Personalism*.  
Rogers, A. K., *The Religious Conception of the World*.  
Lloyd, A. H., *The Will to Doubt*.  
Drummond, James, *Studies in Christian Doctrine*.  
Peile, J. H. F., *The Reproach of the Gospel*.  
Nash, H. S., *The Atoning Life*.  
    *The Christ that is to Be*.  
Worcester, McComb, *Coriat, Religion and Medicine*.  
Powell, L. P., *Christian Science, its Faith and its Founder*.  
Campbell, J. M., *Paul the Mystic*.  
Scott, W. M., *Aspects of Christian Mysticism*.  
Inge, W. R., *Personal Idealism and Mysticism*.

Among the many tendencies discernible in current theology, two are well illustrated by *Illingworth*. The first is to regard Christianity as a distinct intellectual entity, having premises and methods of its own, with doctrines derived from revelation and contained in a tradition the substance of which is unalterable, although its statement becomes increasingly explicit as an expression of deepening experience and in response to varying needs. The second is to emphasize value judgments, and, in harmony with the pragmatic principle, to argue to the truth of a general attitude or a specific doctrine from its practical efficiency. Standing firmly upon the tradition, *Illingworth* urges also the practical results of belief in the Trinity as evidence for its truth. The same book illustrates also the dangers of both tendencies. As a "Catholic" thinker, the author is inclined to read into the Scriptures and early Patristic writings the full results of dogmatic development, and declares that he has no hope of convincing those who, standing without the Church, do not already accept its fundamental premises and traditional doctrines. As a pragmatical thinker he slips easily into the fallacy of *post hoc ergo propter hoc*. The book itself makes no contribution to the literature of the subject, and although certain well-known arguments for the doctrine of the Trinity are admirably put, the methodological errors referred to impair the worth of the book as a whole.

—*Hall's* "Introduction," which is the first of a projected series of ten volumes by the same author, is an example of the Catholic tendency. As a Churchman the author accepts as final and authoritative the Catholic faith, and in this volume treats of the importance of theology, its relation to other sciences, its sources, data, presuppositions, and the qualifications for its successful study.—A quite different view of revelation is held by *Ritchie*, who deems it a continuous and individual process, by which souls through obedience to the Spirit become personalities receptive of truth—a process manifest in the record of the Bible and consummate in Christ. Hence revelation, so conceived, is a means of knowledge, and because it involves immediate contact with reality gives the certitude which ratiocination lacks.—A philosophical basis for *Ritchie's* argument is furnished by *Bowne*, who argues in characteristically clear and tart style that the world considered as the object of knowledge and the residence of causality can be conceived only in terms of personality. The position is that of critical monism; unity is affirmed, and experience is invoked to attest both the dependence and the independence of human personalities. In this respect the book falls in with the growing opposition to a monistic absolutism in which human personality is submerged and the individual becomes merely a function of the Absolute. But the difficulty of critical monism is the old one of preserving in thought, and not merely by dogmatic assertion, the reality of the individual in an inclusive unity.—*Rogers* offers an interesting suggestion by insisting that, while reality must be interpreted in terms of consciousness and regarded as one, its unity is not that of self-consciousness, but rather the teleological unity of a social whole, a society of selves each of which is as ultimate as God himself. To interpret the unity of reality by the category of purpose is congenial with modern habits of thinking and opens a promising path.—The organic relation between the individual and the universal is the fundamental principle of *Lloyd's* book, the title of which, however, is infelicitous, as it seems to suggest an opposition to James's "The Will to Believe," although the two books are in essential harmony. *Lloyd's* thesis is that since reality attaches to nothing in its individuality, but only in the complex wherein all things are impli-

cated, and since our apprehensions must necessarily be partial, the sense of contradiction inherent both in ordinary consciousness and in the more refined differentiating consciousness of science, with the doubt which it inevitably produces, is a perpetual warning of incompleteness, inspiring further activity and keeping man in fellowship with man and in communion with God. In this very sense of uncertainty, then, is fundamental witness to reality as a whole, and hence it is in the felt paradoxes of experience that one is in immediate relation to reality.

Such fundamental philosophical discussions as these, however, are lacking in *Drummond's* clear and calm statement, pervaded by sweet reasonableness, of his own theological beliefs as contrasted with traditional dogmas. One characteristic of the book, in fact, is the paucity of its references to the more strictly philosophical writers. Indeed, the book falls short of a treatise on systematic theology only by the absence of a constructive philosophical principle. Another marked characteristic of the book is the constant reference to established creeds and confessions rather than to the works of individual theologians. This method, deliberately adopted, results in presentations of various doctrines which none of their modern defenders will acknowledge as just, but it gives a capital background for the clear exhibition of the author's own contrasted thought.—The engaging modesty and gentle reserve of *Drummond's* book appear also in *Peile*, who discusses the question why the kingdoms of this world have not yet become the kingdoms of our God and his Christ. The description given of existing social and economic conditions impresses one familiar with similar descriptions in books on sociological Christianity as singularly mild and colorless, although the author deprecates its harshness. The answer to the question proposed is that the moral teachings of Jesus have never yet been taken in full seriousness; but the emphasis is upon the general spirit of unselfishness rather than upon particular precepts, and upon individual regeneration in preference to social reformation.—The problem which *Peile* discusses arises from the conviction that the purpose of Christianity is to establish a kingdom of God in the world. If this be true, it is plain that the idea of the kingdom ought to be a constructive principle in Christian theology.

This is accepted by *Nash* in his contribution to the doctrine of the atonement. Holding that the central distinctive idea of Christianity is the Kingdom of God, the author finds its present symbol and most accurate representative in the family life, from which, therefore, rather than from the inferior life of the state, the principles of Christianity are to be deduced. The application of this method to the doctrine of the atonement is made with the writer's well-known suggestiveness of thought and felicity of phrase. If one member of a family sin, all the members suffer, and the corporate will of the family reasserts in forgiving love the violated relation. So God in Christ reaffirms against the sin of the world the reality of the kingdom and its law of love.

An interesting point in present conceptions of the kingdom is the emphasis upon its physical as well as its moral aspect. The anonymous author of "The Christ that is to Be" maintains that both sin and suffering are evil in nature and origin; and hence that the salvation which Christ offers is deliverance from bodily as well as from moral ill. As the faith of an individual needs the support of a corporate confidence—whence the necessity of the church—the author urges the church to accept the ministry of healing in order that the belief of all may strengthen the faith of each and so progress be accelerated. The discussion is loose and rambling, and there are some amusingly fantastic pages in which the writer soberly invokes bacteriology in support of demonology.—Superior to this somewhat vague and rhetorical presentation of the subject, however, is Dr. Worcester's book, which has had wide circulation because of popular interest in the Emmanuel Church movement, and which aims to justify the practice of mental healing by reference to psychological principles, especially as found in the subliminal realm. It is to be hoped that other clergymen proposing to follow the example of Dr. Worcester will imitate him also in the strict limitation of the field of operation to functional nervous diseases and in his constant reliance upon the guidance of trained and competent physicians.—Manifestly the outstanding form of this therapeutic Christianity is in Christian Science, to which *Powell* devotes a book of investigation and criticism. Accepting the principle of mental healing, and ascribing to it the cures wrought by Christian

Science, the writer criticizes the organized movement because of its crude metaphysics, its attitude towards the Christian church, the pretensions of its founder, and its practical consequences especially with reference to marriage and the family life.

It is due in part to the mystical side of Christian Science, as well to the wider acquaintance with phases of Eastern speculation, that there has been of late a notable revival of interest in mysticism. Attention has been called to the possibility of a mystical side in the character of Jesus, and the subject naturally receives consideration in books on the Fourth Gospel. *Campbell* endeavors to prove from an exhaustive study of the Epistles that Paul was a mystic at once Christian, evangelical, rational, and practical. Notwithstanding a frequent over-straining of passages cited, the book is valuable and repays thoughtful study. —Materials for the study of mysticism are rapidly accumulating. *Scott*, for example, supplies an abundance of quotations from the principal Christian mystics, but unfortunately has failed to give exact references, so that his book is of more value to the devotional reader than to the serious student. He has rendered one worthy service, however, by recalling attention to Peter Sterry, an English mystic whose work has been almost wholly ignored by writers on the subject.—There is urgent need of a thorough systematic study of the worth of the mystical experience, especially from the point of view of philosophy. The writer who promises most in this direction is *Inge*, whose latest book is devoted to a criticism of personal idealism, with its supposed teachings as to the impervious self and the inferiority of reason to will, which is pronounced alien to Christianity as represented by the Logos doctrine, and by all the mystics who teach the unity of life, as against pluralism, in reason and not in will.

W. W. FENN.

*EXCAVATIONS AT SAMARIA*

The first season's work of the Harvard Expedition to Samaria closed in the latter part of August. In consequence of various delays and interruptions incident to the beginning of the undertaking, the actual digging covered only nine or ten weeks in all. Doctor Gottlieb Schumacher, who has had the direction of the work, surveyed the ground, tracing the remains of the city wall, the circuit of which is about two miles and a half, and made a plan of the site.

After conference between Professor Reisner and Dr. Schumacher, exploratory trenches were opened at two places: one a short distance southwest of the modern village of Sebastiyeh, where some standing columns indicated the presence of a temple in Roman times; the other about three hundred yards farther to the southwest, on the highest part of the mound and the terraces immediately to the west of it. At the former, the lines and dimensions of the temple have been partially determined, more complete exploration being deferred to another year.

On the summit, where most of the digging has been done, a great stone stairway was uncovered, ascending from north to south. Nineteen steps, which must originally have been more than seventy feet in length, remain. They lead up to a rectangular paved area, now extending between fifty and sixty feet from east to west and twenty-five feet from north to south, and lying but a few inches beneath the present surface of the ground. Massive substructure walls, scattered drums of columns, and fragments of carved mouldings, show that the summit was once crowned by a large edifice, which has, however, been so completely destroyed as to leave nothing standing above ground. At the bottom of the stairway was found the torso and base of a marble statue of heroic proportions and fine workmanship. The type recalls Roman imperial statues, and Professor Lyon ventures the conjecture that it may be a statue of Augustus, in whose honor Herod, when he rebuilt the city, renamed it Sebaste. It is to be hoped

that this question may be settled by the recovery of the missing head of the figure. A few feet from the statue stood an altar, and not far from it two altar *stelae* with Latin inscriptions.

A detailed account of the work of the Expedition will be given in the January number of the REVIEW.





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